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Abstract
The two research chapters of this thesis are weakly related in the sense that one of them
focuses on the market failure induced by information imperfection and the other focuses
on the market failure exacerbated by information imperfection. We study the first type of
market failure in the context of corporate equity finance and study the second in the
context of long-term bilateral transactions.
In the equity finance market, adverse selection may arise due to the asymmetric
information of firms' value. It has been argued that firms, in response to the inefficiency
induced by adverse selection, may signal their unobservable values through choices of
equity flotation methods. In the context of UK open offers and rights offers, we provide
evidences for this signalling hypothesis. We find that information content of trades
marginally significantly falls after both rights offers and open offers. This result suggests
adverse selection gets less severe post equity offers. And it in turn implies that
asymmetric information is resolved with equity offers. Together with Armitage and Snell
(2003)'s finding of positive price effects of UK open offer and negative price effects of
rights offers, our result suggests that asymmetric information is resolved with firms'
choices of equity flotation methods, and that open offers are employed by good firms to
signal quality to the market.
In addition to the signalling hypothesis, we establish some patterns of adverse selection
in London SEAQ. Information content of trades is related to trade size. Small trades are
not informative, while median trades and large trades are informative. For the comparison
between purchases and sales, large purchases are more informative than large sales, while
median purchases are less informative than median sales. These results suggest that
informed traders handle large purchases and large sales with different strategies. They
also imply that market makers are less harsh to traders with positive private information.
With some preliminary evidence, we set up a hypothesis of the pattern of human
intermediation in London SEAQ: human intermediation works in a "carrot" format when
private information is more costly to obtain and adverse selection is more severe; it works
in a "stick" format when information of a stock can be generated less costly and market
makers face fewer threats from informed trading.
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In most of long-term bilateral trading relationships, transaction parties have to make
investments which are geared towards their partners. Once the investments are sunk, a
party can not rely on market to discipline his partner, and his investments return will be
vulnerable to expropriation. This problem, known as the hold-up problem, will
discourage parties from making socially desirable investments. Due to information
imperfection, the hold-up problem can not be solved by complete contracting.
The theses reconsider the hold-up problem by allowing a party to separately invest in
his outside option in order to capture its value. We find that after considering this
investment option, the hold-up problem is potentially more severe than previously
observed. Unproductive investments may be made just to accumulate bargaining power.
These inefficient investments may crowd out relationship specific investments; even
worse, the socially efficient relationship may break because of them. All these inefficient
outcomes can happen where in the previous formalization of hold-up, socially efficient
outcome is the unique equilibrium outcome.
Based on our set-up, we find that exclusive contracts can affect investment incentive.
The presence of exclusivity sufficiently reduces the sensitivity of a party's payoff to his
investment in his outside option. As long as his investment in the outside option is less
productive than his relationship specific investment, his incentive to invest outside will
be wiped out. We also find that exclusivity improves efficiency when relationship
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Introduction of the thesis
The First Fundamental Welfare Theorem states that when markets are complete, any
competitive equilibrium is necessarily Pareto Optimal. It formalizes Adam Smith's claim
that the "invisible hand" of the market can be relied upon to achieve optimal results.
However, there are a number of ways in which the situations in actual markets may
violate at least one of the assumptions of this theorem. In these cases, market equilibria
fail to be Pareto Optimal, a situation known as market failure.
The two research chapters of this thesis are weakly related in the sense that one of them
focuses on the market failure induced by information imperfection and the other focuses
on the market failure exacerbated by information imperfection. We study the first type of
market failure in the context of corporate equity finance and study the second in the
context of long-term bilateral transactions.
In the equity finance market, it is likely that a firm has a better knowledge about its
value than outside investors do. This violates an implicit assumption of the fundamental
welfare theorem that the characteristics of all commodities are observable to all market
participants. Thus, we expect that the market equilibria fail to be optimal in the presence
of the asymmetric information. And the inefficiency will be exacerbated by firms'
adverse selection where a firm's equity finance decisions depend on its privately held
information in a manner that adversely affects uninformed outside investors.
In response to the inefficiency induced by asymmetric information, equity finance
market may adapt by allowing for the possibility of signalling. It has been argued that
firms may signal their unobservable values through choices of equity flotation methods
(e.g. Eckbo and Masulis (1992)). Armitage (2002) and Armitagc and Snell (2003), in the
context ofUK open offers and rights offers, claim that open offers allow potential placees
to investigate the issuers, and that it is the placees' willingness to buy at the offer price
that informs the market about the issuers' value. Armitage and Snell (2003) establish that
there exists equilibrium in which good firms signal their quality by choosing open offers.
Surprisingly, there have been so far no definite empirical evidences for the signalling
hypothesis. Chapter 3 of the thesis attempts to make up this gap. In the context of UK
open offers and rights offers, we attempt to establish that good firms signal quality with
open offers.
If good firms do signal quality with open offers, asymmetric information of firms'
values must be resolved with equity offers. The reason is that the market can observe a
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firm's choice of flotation methods and can infer the firm's quality from its choice. Thus
insider information will be revealed to the market with equity offers.
To examine the resolution of asymmetric information, we can rely upon transactions in
the secondary market. If asymmetric information of a firm's value is resolved, the
amount of private information about the firm is reduced. As a result, in the secondary
market, informed traders' informational advantage over market makers is lessened.
Adverse selection in the transactions of the firm's stock will be less severe.
Therefore, the hypothesis of resolution of asymmetric information can be tested by
identifying the changes of adverse selection in the secondary market transactions during
equity offers. Negative changes suggest that asymmetric information is resolved with
equity offers.
In Chapter 3, with price impact method, we find that information content of trades
marginally significantly falls after both rights offers and open offers. This result suggests
adverse selection gets less severe post equity offers. And it in turn implies that
asymmetric information is resolved with equity offers. Together with Armitage and Snell
(2003)'s finding of positive price effects of UK open offer and negative price effects of
rights offers, our result suggests that asymmetric information is resolved with firms'
choices of equity flotation methods, and that open offers are employed by good firms to
signal quality to the market.
In most of long-term bilateral trading relationships, transaction parties have to make
investments which are geared towards their partners. This type of investments, referred
by the literature as relationship specific investments, is less valuable outside the
relationship. Once the investments are sunk, a party can not rely on market to discipline
his partner, and his investments return will be vulnerable to expropriation. This problem
is known as the hold-up problem.
In the presence of the hold-up problem, without additional governing mechanisms, it is
generally inefficient to place a transaction under market since opportunism can no longer
be constrained absent of competition. Facing the risk of being held-up, a party will be
reluctant to make socially desirable investments. A potential remedy is to place the
transaction under a market contract. In particular, if information is perfect, complete
contracting will be feasible and there will be no room for the hold-up problem. In real
world, however, information is far away from perfect. It is very likely that crucial
elements of the trading relationship can not be contracted upon. If so, the relationship will
simply be governed by an incomplete contract. The literature on incomplete contracts has
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established that as the environment gets sufficiently complex, an incomplete contract will
be virtually worthless for the hold-up problem (Hart and Moore (1999)). If so,
organizational modes other than market will be called upon to facilitate the transaction.
In this thesis, we do not attempt to offer a solution to the hold-up problem. Instead, we
attempt to show that the previous works on hold-up understate the inefficiency induced
by the hold-up problem since they do not consider the possibility of separately investing
in a party's outside option.
In the hold-up problem set down by Grossman and Hart (1986), for example,
transaction parties are not allowed to separately invest in their outside options, and the
values of their outside options are merely a by-product of the parties' relationship
specific investments. Since a party's outside option provides bargaining strength during
ex-post negotiation, the party has extra incentives to make relationship specific
investments and the existence of outside option partially offsets the under-investment
problem induced by hold-up.
We claim that this type of formulation of hold-up is incomplete. Relationship specific
investments per se may not be sufficient for a party to create and realize the value in his
outside option. If so, the party should be able to separately work on its value. If these are
true, outside option can actually be a source of non-cooperative and inefficient
behaviours: a party may make unproductive investments in his outside option for
bargaining power to avoid being held-up.
In Chapter 4, we re-formalize the hold-up problem by allowing a party to separately
invest in his outside option in order to capture its value. The hold-up problem gets
potentially more severe than previously observed. Unproductive investments may be
made just to accumulate bargaining power. These inefficient investments may crowd out
relationship specific investments. Even worse, the socially efficient relationship may
break because of them. All these inefficient outcomes can happen where in the previous
formalization of hold-up, socially efficient outcome is the unique equilibrium outcome.
Based on our set-up, we find that exclusive contracts can affect investment incentive.
The presence of exclusivity sufficiently reduces the sensitivity of a party's payoff to his
investment in his outside option. As long as his investment in the outside option is less
productive than his relationship specific investment, his incentive to invest outside will
be wiped out. We also find that exclusivity improves efficiency when relationship
specific investments are sufficiently productive, but worsens it when they are sufficiently
unproductive.
3
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 are literature reviews
devoted to the Chapter 3 empirical research. In Chapter 1, we review the theory on the
SEOs price effects. The two most prominent approaches to the SEOs price effects are the
adverse selection and signalling approach, and the agency cost and control approach. The
first one studies the SEOs price effects in an environment of asymmetric information. It
claims that the price effects come from the resolution of asymmetric information with
firms' equity finance decisions and the associated flotation method choices. The second
approach appeals to the agency problem in a public firm. It claims that the SEOs price
effects come from the improved or worsened monitors on management after SEOs.
In Chapter 2, we provide a review of adverse selection in London SEAQ. In particular,
we discuss how adverse selection affects market makers' valuation and hence market
prices, and how adverse selection generates bid-ask spreads. Besides, we also explore
how the pattern of adverse selection is related to trade size and trade time, and how the
pattern is affected by human intermediation.
In Chapter 3, we test the signalling hypothesis in the context of UK open offers and
rights offers. In addition, we establish some patterns of adverse selection in London
SEAQ. Information content of trades is related to trade size. Small trades are not
informative, while median trades and large trades are informative. For the comparison
between purchases and sales, large purchases are more informative than large sales, while
median purchases are less informative than median sales. These results suggest that
informed traders handle large purchases and large sales with different strategies. They
also imply that market makers are less harsh to traders with positive private information.
With some preliminary evidence, we set up a hypothesis of the pattern of human
intermediation in London SEAQ: human intermediation works in a "carrot" format when
private information is more costly to obtain and adverse selection is more severe; it works
in a "stick" format when information of a stock can be generated less costly and market
makers face fewer threats from informed trading.
In Chapter 4, we re-examine the hold-up problem by allowing a party to separately
invest in his outside option.
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Chapter 1
Review of Literature on SEOs Price Effects
1.1 Introduction
There have been widely documented evidences that SEOs generate abnormal, mostly
negative, stock price effects, e.g. Eckbo and Masulis (1992), Wruck (1989), Slovin, et al.
(2000). The extents to which the market reacts to issue announcements are different
depending on flotation methods, e.g. Eckbo and Masulis (1992).
Modigliani and Miller's (1958, 1963) famous irrelevant proposition states that the mix
of equity and debt is unrelated to a firm's value in a frictionless and tax-free capital
market. Their logic is simple. A firm's return stream is unaffected by its capital structure.
Any opportunity to improve the firm's value by repackage its return stream through
capital re-structure will lead to a pure arbitrage opportunity. The force of arbitrage will
pull the firm's value toward "first-best" level. In equilibrium, capital structure is
irrelevant.
But why SEOs have price effects and why the effects are different dependant on the
flotation methods? To explain these phenomena, the literature considers the possibility
that the market's perceptions of a firm's return stream can be altered by the firm's
decision to sell equity. The literature also reconsiders the possibility that a firm's return
stream can be altered by the firm's capital structure. Two lines of reasoning have been
put forwards: adverse selection and signalling approach, and agency cost and control
approach.
The first approach, started by Myers and Majluf (1984), argues that a firm is better
informed about its own quality than outside investors are. In equity finance market, this
asymmetric information gives rise to an adverse selection problem where overvalued
firms are more willing to sell equity. The market rationally responds to the adverse
selection problem by revising down its valuation of the issuers. Equity selling prices will
be worsened. To mitigate the adverse effects of equity offers, a firm can signal its quality
to the market. This can be done through choices of equity selling price, (e.g. Heikel and
Schwartz (1986), and Giammarino and Lewis (1989)), and choices of equity flotation
methods (e.g. Chcmmanur and Fulghieri (1999), Armitage and Snell (2003), and Eckbo
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and Norli (2004)). If signalling is differentially costly to firms of different qualities, a
non-pooling equilibrium may exist. If so, firms' qualities will be revealed to the market
and the market will update its valuation according to firms' signalling choices.
Agency cost and control approach reconsiders the notion that managers will maximize
a firm's value. An essential feature of public companies is the separation of ownership
and control. The preferences of managers and owners generally will not coincide.
Incentive provision is necessary for managers to behave optimally from owners' point of
view. Due to infonnational problem, complete contracting is impossible or prohibitively
costly. Agency problem can not be solved inexpensively. One of the disciplinary powers
over managers is from capital market. Market for corporate control can provide
incentives for managers to behave well through take-over threats. How well the threats
can discipline managers depends on a firm's capital structure. Shleifer and Yishny (1986)
show that a tender offer is more likely to arise and succeed if the raider holds a
substantial share of the firm at the time of offer. Since an SEO may alter a firm's share¬
holding structure, e.g. equity private placements tend to create outside block-holdings,
the take-over threats the incumbent managers face may change with the offer, which will
have effects on the managers' incentives to maximize the firm's value. Therefore, SEOs
can affect a firm's future return stream and consequently its stock price.
Ever since Wruck (1989), researchers mostly find significantly positive announcement
period abnormal stock returns associated with equity private placements, e.g. 4.4% in
Wruck (1989) and 6% in Cronqvist and Nilsson (2005). Together with the widely
documented evidences that significantly negative stock returns are associated with US
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firm commitment offers , it seems to support the agency cost and control approach. On
the other hand, although the empirical findings can be interpreted in a way that is
consistent with the adverse selection and signalling approach , there have been so far no
firm evidences that support the signalling hypothesis. Our empirical research in Chapter
3 attempts to make up this gap. In the context of UK rights issues and open offers4, we
attempt to establish that UK open offers are employed by high quality firms to signal
quality to the market.
1
E.g. Eckbo and Masulis (1992)
2 US firm commitment offer tends to increase shareholder dispersion. Eckbo and Masulis (1995)
3 For example, Hertzel and Smith (1993) use some noisy proxies for the degree of information asymmetric,
e.g. firm values, to argue that private placements are employed to reduce information production cost.
4
UK open offers can be described as private placements with pre-emptive rights preserved.
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In what follows, we provide a review of the two approaches to the SEOs price effects.
Since SEOs price effects are different dependant on flotation methods, in Section 1.2 we
briefly introduce some basic features of UK flotation methods. In section 1.3, we review
the adverse selection and signalling approach. SEOs price effects are examined in an
environment of asymmetric information. Firms, acting in the interest of existing
shareholders, sell equity to finance investment projects. The market rationally expects an
adverse selection problem and adjusts its valuation of the issuers downwards. To obtain
better equity selling prices, good firms attempt to signal quality to the market. We will
investigate a set of signalling instruments and discuss how the incentive to signal affects
firms' choices of flotation method. In section 1.4, we review the agency cost and control
approach. Agency problem is allowed and managers of a firm may not act in the interest
of existing shareholders. Disciplinary power from capital market can curb the agency
problem. We will investigate why and how this power may be varied with SEOs. Section
1.5 concludes.
1.4 Some basic features of UK SEOs flotation methods
The types of SEOs methods adopted in the UK are rights offers, open offers, private
placements and bought deals. UK companies are very concerned with the certainty of the
proceeds in an SEO. Compared with their US correspondences, the UK flotation methods
allow more room for an issuer to gather information about potential investors' interests
and to seek pre-commitment to buy or to underwrite shares before the issue is publicly
announced (Armitage (2000)). An arranger is employed by the issuer to facilitate this pre-
announcement book building process. The extent to which the arranger is involved is
different dependent on the type of the issue. The arranger may act merely as a marketing
agent in an uninsured rights offer, or as an underwriter in an open offer or a private
placement, or may even purchase all the new shares as principal in a bought deal.
Obviously, different types of offers give issuers different degrees of assurance of
proceeds, and the risk borne by an arranger or underwriter varies accordingly.
Different types of offers target different groups of investors. Potential investors can be
differentially informed, possess differential bargaining power, and have differential
willingness and ability to supervisor management. Private placements and open offers
help involve a small group of sophisticated investors; bought deals tend to increase the
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holdings by numerous small and passive investors; rights offers help preserve an issuer's
ownership structure.
• Rights offers
To protect existing shareholders' voting right, corporate law dictates that existing
shareholders be granted the right of first refusal to purchase a new issue of voting stock.
This entails that rights offers be the default method for a firm to raise new equity capital.
In a rights offer, existing shareholders are given pre-emptive rights to purchase shares
proportion to their current holdings during the offer period. Offer price is set at a discount
of the pre-announcement market price so that the rights have a value. Existing
shareholders can either take up their entitlement or sell the rights. Either way can ensure
them the value of the rights.
Before a rights offer is publicly announced, the arranger of the issue may seek
agreement to buy from the existing shareholders. The shareholders may pre-commit to
buy or pre-renounce their entitlement. Through this process, the issuer can obtain a rough
estimation about the take-up level. The take-up level is the fraction of new shares
purchased by the existing shareholders. It reflects their willingness to participate and may
be informative about the issuer's value (Eckbo and Masulis (1992)). In the UK, Rights
offers have a mean take-up level of 84% (Slovin, et al. (2000)).
If the shares in a rights offer are entirely pre-committed, the certainty of proceeds is
more or less guaranteed. Otherwise, the proceeds from the issue will be uncertain since
there is always a possibility that the market price falls below the offer price before the
new shares are fully subscribed. To guarantee the success of an issue, the issuer can set a
low offer price to encourage pre-commitments and to reduce the possibility of the market
price falling below the offer price. This does not harm non-subscribers since they can sell
the rights. But in a world of asymmetric information, choices of subscription price may
signal insider information. And a low offer price may convey a bad signal to the market,
which adversely affects the market price and hence impairs the success of the offer
(Heinkel and Schwartz (1986), and Slovin, et al. (2000)).5
Alternatively, the issuer can employ the arranger as an underwriter who commits to
purchase any unsubscribed shares at the end of the offer period. This type of rights offers
3
Armitage (2002) provides a different explanation of the relation between negative market responses and
deep rights-offer discounts. He finds that firms offering deep discounts are those that anticipate arrival of
bad news during offer periods. And it is the potential bad news that causes negative market responses, not
the deep discount itself.
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is referred to as insured rights offers. The underwriter in an insured rights offer will be
called upon to buy any unsold shares at the offer price up to the limit of its underwriting
commitment. In the UK, it is common for the underwriter to diversify the underwriting
risk by contracting with sub-underwriters (Armitage (2002)). They as a group provide a
guarantee for the certainty of the proceeds. In the UK, rights offers are almost universally
insured (Slovin, et al. (2000) and Marsh (1979, 1980)).
In the UK, rights offers tend to elicit negative market responses. Slovin, et al. (2000)
find that over the post-deregulation period6, two day announcement average abnormal
return for rights offers is -3.1%, statistically significant at the 1% level. For insured rights
offers, the AAR is -2.9%, statistically significant at the 1%> level; for uninsured rights
offers, the AAR is even more negative: -5%, statistically significant at the 1% level.
• Private placement
An equity private placement is a non-rights method of flotation. Existing shareholders
do not have pre-emptive rights to purchase new shares.7 Instead, shares are placed with
one or more investors by private negotiation before the offer price is fixed and the issue is
publicly announced (Armitage (2002)). During the negotiation, potential placees can
investigate the issuer, decide whether and how much to buy, and indicate an acceptable
price range. This information helps the issuer to set a mutually acceptable offer price, and
helps guarantee the success of the issue.
A private placement is distinct in its selling process and its effect on ownership
structure. In a private placement, the issuer sells blocks of new shares to a small group of
professional investors and industry experts by negotiation. Insider information of the
issuer can be transferred efficiently. A private placement is an effective mechanism for
the issuer to alter its ownership structure. The identity and the size of the new share
holdings can be controlled. And since a small number of investors purchase blocks of
new shares, the offer tends to create block-holdings and increases ownership
concentration.
By creating block-holdings, private placements effectively invite monitoring into the
issuer's operation (Wruck (1989) and Shleifer and Vishny (1986)). Target investors in
private placements are sophisticated in that with insider information and the high voting
6
Rights offers are the only SEOs flotation method in the UK before the mid-1980s; London stock exchange
regulation changed in 1986 to broaden the choice of flotation methods available to firms in SEOs.
7 Shareholders must have voted in advance to dis-apply the pre-emptive rights.
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and income rights, they are more likely to be active in management and corporate control
contests.
Private placements tend to elicit positive market responses. With US private placement
samples Wruck (1989) finds a significantly positive two day announcement AAR of
4.4%\ Hertzel and Smith (1993) find that of 3.28%. Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003), with
Swedish private placement sample, document a significantly positive two day
announcement AAR of 7.3%.
• Open offer
An open offer is a hybrid between a private placement and a rights offer. It can be
described as a private placement with pre-emptive rights preserved. Before the
announcement of an open offer, the arranger negotiates privately with investing
institutions so that he has a list of placees by the time of announcement. However, the
shares placed can be clawed back by existing shareholders who still have pre-emptive
rights to purchase new shares. If existing shareholders do not wish to take up their
entitlement, the shares are allocated among the placees at the offer price. An important
difference between an open offer and a rights offer is that existing shareholders can not
sell the rights in an open offer. Since take-up levels are low in UK open offers, on
average about 50%, offer discounts do imply wealth losses. Most UK open offers are
made at substantial discount (Armitage and Snell (2003)).
The placees in an open offer do not merely provide a guarantee for the proceeds. They
will buy all the shares not clawed back by existing shareholders. The ownership effect of
an open offer is similar to that of a private placement: new block-holdings are created
after the offer.
In the UK, market responses positively to open offers. Armitage (2002) documents a
significantly positive two day announcement AAR of 1.03%. Armitage and Snell (2003)
find that of 1.5%, significant at 1% level.
• Bought deals
Bought deals are also non-rights flotation method. In a bought deal, an underwriter
purchases the entire offer from the issuer on the spot at a fixed price. After that, the issue
is announced, and the underwriter sells the shares to clients, with no further obligations
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on the part of the issuer (Slovin, et. al (2000)). Compared with other types of offers,
bought deals allow the issuers to obtain fund immediately without uncertainty.
An underwriter bears most risk in a bought deal since new shares are placed after the
underwriter buys out the shares. Therefore the underwriter has most incentives to verify
that the issuer is not overvalued. In the UK, market responds positively to bought deals.
Slovin, et al. (2000) find that the two day announcement AAR for bought deals is 3.3%,
statistically significant at the 1% level. They claim that this is because the reliability of
underwriter certification is highest in bought deals. Overvalued firms will avoid the
rigorous check by underwriters in bought deals, and choose other types of offers. On the
other hand, undervalued firms have incentives to signal their quality and correct market
price by passing the test and obtaining certification from underwriters. Therefore, firms
conducting bought deals may probably be those undervalued. If so, the positive market
reaction to bought deals is a result of signalling by undervalued firms.
In a bought deal, the issuer can not control the identity of its new shareholders.
Ownership tends to be more disperse after the offer.
1.5 Adverse selection and signalling approach
In a world of asymmetric information, a firm's equity may not be fairly priced.
Consider a firm whose equity is under-priced. When it issues new equity, there will be
wealth-transfer from existing shareholders to new shareholders. Unless the new capital
obtained can generate sufficiently large surplus, equity finance will not be considered.
On the other hand, for a firm whose equity is over-priced, equity finance will be an ideal
choice since existing shareholders can gain at the expense of new shareholders.
Under this logic, firms that issue new equity will probably be those overvalued. The
market rationally expects this adverse selection problem and adjusts its valuation of the
issuers downwards. The equilibrium may be that only bad firms obtain new equity capital.
If new equity capital is necessary for an investment opportunity, good firms will have to
give up the opportunity and under-invest.
To mitigate the underinvestment problem, a good firm can signal its quality to the
market. For the signal to be credible, the signalling process must be costly, and
differential costly for good firms and bad firms. The instruments with which to signal can
be equity selling price (Heikel and Schwartz (1986) Giammarino and Lewis (1989)), and
8
Agency problem of a firm's managers is temporarily ignored in this section
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certification by quality investigators (Heikel and Schwartz (1986), Chemmanur and
Fulghieri (1999), Armitage and Snell (2003), and Eckbo and Norli (2004)).
If signalling results in a non-pooling equilibrium, a firm's quality will be (partially)
revealed to the market, and asymmetric information will be (partially) resolved. The
market will update its valuation of the firm with the new information. SEOs price effects
arise. And the effects will be different depending on a firm's signalling choice.
1.5.1 Equity finance in a world of asymmetric information
Asymmetric information creates adverse selection in equity finance market. The market
rationally reacts to this problem and adjusts down its valuation of issuers. The
equilibrium outcome may be that under-priced firms under-invest and equity offers have
negative stock price effects.
Myers and Majluf (1984) formalize the above idea. In their model, a firm, for some
exogenous reasons, has to obtain new equity capital, E, to finance a new investment. The
firm's value consists of two parts: the future return stream from existing assets,a, and
that from the new project, b . The market can not observe a and b , but know the
distribution ofaand6.
The firm decides whether to issue new equity. The price of new equity is set by the
market. Assume the market is competitive. 9 The market's valuation of the firm
conditional on issue can be expressed as,
V = E(a + b + E\issue)




-(a + b + E)>a (1.1)
V - F F
- {b + E)>— a (1.2)
V V
Equation (1.2) has an intuitive interpretation: the firm will issue if and only if the gain
from the new investment exceeds the loss to new shareholders. Restate (1.2) as,
b > ———a — E (1.3)
V-E
9
The market expects zero profit.
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In equilibrium, the market's belief of the characteristics of an issuing firm is correct.
The equilibrium condition is:
Assume that the market does not collapse, that is, there exists V* that satisfies (1.4). The
graph below demonstrates the idea of the equilibrium.
Graph 1.1
b A
The firm will issue if and only if its a and b fall into the shaded area. For any value ofb ,
it is more likely to issue when its a is low. This generates the adverse selection problem.
Note that asymmetric information on b does not generate adverse selection. For any
value ofa, the firm is more likely to issue when its b is large.
Equity issue conveys a bad signal to the market. To see this, we compare the value of a
firm's existing asset conditional on issue with that of another firm conditional on non-
issue. It is clear that market reacts negatively to issuers.
1.5.2 Signalling with equity selling price
Myers and Majluf (1984) only allow firms to choose whether to issue or not. The
resulting equilibrium is generally inefficient: good firms under-invest. However, in
practice firms have more choices to make, e.g. equity selling prices and flotation methods.
a
-E
E(ab >—^—a — E) < E(a b < ———a — E)
V-E V-E
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Here comes the question: can a good firm use these choices to credibly convey inside
information to the market, so that it can obtain equity capital less costly and mitigate the
negative SEOs price effects?
The theoretical literature focuses on the choice of equity selling price and the choice of
whether to invite quality investigators. Giammarino and Lewis (1989) show that in high
growth industries, good firms can separate themselves with bad firms by offering deeper
placement discounts. Heinkel and Schwartz (1986) show that in uninsured rights offers,
good firms can signal their quality by setting higher subscription prices. 10 These
theoretical results are consistent with the empirical finding by Hertzel and Smith (1993)
and Wu (2004) on private placements, and Slovin, et al. (2000) on rights offers.
1.3.2.1 Signalling with private placement discounts
Hertzel and Smith (1993) find that despite selling at substantial discount, private
placements of equity elicit positive market responses. Armitage and Snell (2003) find a
similar result in the context ofUK open offers. The literature generally contends that the
positive market reaction comes from the certification by placement investors and the deep
discounts are the compensation to the investors for their information production costs, e.g.
Armitage and Snell (2003).
Giammarino and Lewis (1989) offer another explanation. They claim that the deep
placement discount can be a signal for good quality. Suppose that the value of a firm's
existing asset, a, is relatively trivial compared with the value of its new investment
opportunity, & . A good firm, with a larger b , is better able to give up ownership (or offer
placement discount) to obtain finance. We demonstrate this with the following simple
example.
Assume that two types of firms exist, good or bad. The values of their existing assets
area. A good (bad) firm's investment opportunity is worth bG(bB), with&G > bB . A
firm's type is private knowledge. To obtain external finance E, the maximum fraction of
ownership a good firm can offer a placee isS™* = G + "/G , and the maximum a bad/ "G
firm can offer is 5™" =^B + , where Vi = a + bi + E , i e {G, B}. It is easy to show,/ B
10 Note that the welfare implication of signalling in these models is not clear. In the model of Giammarino
and Lewis, the ability to signal with price does not help solve the under-investment problem. In that of
Heinkel and Schwartz, the structure does not allow the discussion of under-investment.
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A good firm is better able to give up ownership to obtain equity finance. This forms the
basis for signalling. The proposition 3 in Giammarino and Lewis (1989) show that in the
above case, there exists a semi-separating equilibrium where a good firm may signal its
quality by offering the placee a deeper offer discount.
One may understand this with Myers-Majluf s model. Adverse selection arises from the
asymmetric information of the asset values, while not from that of the investment value.
In fact, the value of investment opportunities mitigates the adverse selection problem by
enabling good firms to sell under-priced equity. One may imagine a case where the value
of new investments is so large that adverse selection problem is suppressed.
Therefore, a deep placement discount may signal a good growth prospect of a firm. In
reality, firms conducting private placements are usually small and are usually in high
growth industries. The values of their investment opportunities are usually well above the
values of their existing assets. For these firms, offer discounts can be an instrument to
signal the quality of their investment opportunities. Since these firms' values are mainly
from their growth prospect, the market will respond positively to offer discounts.
1.3.2.2 Signalling with rights-offer subscription price
In an uninsured rights offer, a firm's proceeds are not guaranteed since it is possible
that the market price falls below the subscription price before the new shares are fully
subscribed. To guarantee the proceeds, the firm can set a low subscription price. However,
Slovin, et al. (2000) find that subscription price discounts have a significantly negative
impact on the two day announcement AAR of their UK rights offers, which implies that
subscription discount is a bad signal of firm value. Thus, setting a low subscription price
may not help guarantee the proceeds since it adversely affects stock prices.
The result of Slovin, et al. (2000) also implies that subscription price may be a
signalling instrument for good firms. A good firm is better able to set a high subscription
price than a bad firm since the probability of arrival of bad news during the offer period
is lower for a good firm. This forms the basis of signalling. Heinkel and Schwartz (1986)
formalize the above intuition. They show that the equilibrium can be perfectly revealing:
firms of different qualities set different subscription prices, with better firms setting
higher prices. In what follows, we borrow the model of Heinkel and Schwartz (1986) to
demonstrate how price signalling works in uninsured rights offers.
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There are a set of firms. They have different qualities#which is unobservable to the
market. #e [#,#] . For some exogenous reasons, they have to make uninsured rights
offers at date 0.11 Each issuer specifies a subscription price P which may be contingent
on its quality.
At date 1, the offers expire, and issuers' value ,v , realize according to a
distribution /(• ; 6). The values are observable to the market. The function /(• ; •) is
common knowledge.
Since the issuers use uninsured rights offers, they have to assume the costs of issue
failures. An issue will fail if at date 1, the issuer's value is below the subscription price. If
12
an issue fail, the issuer will have to pay a penalty, C.
1 ^
An issuer's object is to maximize its stock price at date 0. Assume the market is
competitive. The date 0 stock price is the market's expectation of the issuer's date 1
value, V , subtracted by the expected penalty cost.14
An issuer's strategy is a price functionP{0). The market's strategy is a belief function
V(P). In equilibrium, belief is consistent with strategy, which is optimal given belief.
We will focus on separating equilibrium.
At date 0, an issuer with quality 0 solves the following problem:
p
Max V (P) — fCx f(v;0)dv (1.5)
p J
o
The market's valuation of a#issuer is,
+oo
V(0) = jvx f(v;0)dv (1.6)
0
In equilibrium, the market correctly infers the issuer's quality from subscription price,
V(P\0)) = V(0) (1.7)
And function P* (•) maximizes (1), which requires,
^jp-cxf(p'-e)=o (i.8)aP
Assume the maximum exists.
" The motivation of equity offers could be to finance a short-lived investment project.
12 The penalty can be from foregoing a profitable project, or from using some other expensive sources to
make up the shortage of fund.
13 The firm's manager may be on an incentive scheme in which his compensation is contingent on the stock
performance at that date.
14 Heinkcl and Schwardz assume away any dilution effects from equity offers.
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dV(P*)If an equilibrium exists, (1.8) indicates that——> 0, which means the higher the
subscription price, the higher the market valuation. Differentiate (1.7),
dV dP* d +7
W^=TelCxnv'0)dv(l'9>






To better illustrate the idea of the equilibrium, assume a uniform distribution of
/(■ ;#)over interval [0,6}. From (1.10), we have,
d0 2C
Then the equilibrium price function can be put as,
G2
P* (G) — + L (1.12)
4C
Since signalling is not productive, the lowest quality # issuer will not signal That is, it
Q2
will quote a price 0 to avoid the loss from issue failure. Thus,L = — . The equilibrium
price function can be pined down as,
G2 — G2
P* (G) = — (1.13)
4C
From (1.13), we can see that the equilibrium is perfectly revealing. Issuers of different
qualities will choose different subscription prices. The market perfectly infers the issuers'
qualities with the subscription prices, and adjusts its valuation accordingly.
All the issuers in this separating equilibrium have to assume signalling costs. The
signalling costs come from the expected losses from issue failure. Heinkel and Schwartz
(1986) show that the signalling cost is an increasing function ofG. Higher quality issuers
assume higher signalling costs.
1.5.3 Information production by the capital market
So far, we have assumed that the capital market is passive. It valuates a firm with its
prior and the signal received from the firm. But in the actual market, participants can
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engage in information production and become informed. These informed traders play a
crucial role in the secondary market known as price discovery. They actively incorporate
information into price and thus reduce the extent of asymmetric information.
Similarly, we expect that information production by the capital market will also affect
the primary market. Asymmetric information may not be sufficient for negative SEOs
price effects. Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999) show that if investors can obtain an
relatively accurate estimation of a firm with relatively low cost, a good firm's SEOs
decision will not convey a bad signal to the market and the firm will not have to undersell
its equity. Besides, the equity selling price will be more informative when the estimation
is more accurate and when the cost of investigation is lower. When the estimation is more
accurate, investors are better able to discern a good firm from a bad one, and thus a good
firm can sell equity at a higher price. Investigation will take place when an issuer sets a
high offer price. Investors' cost of investigation will be ultimately assumed by the issuer,
and the way to compensate investors is by offer discounts. When the cost of investigation
is lower, the cost for a good firm to set a high offer price will be lower since investors
require less compensation. Therefore, the firm can set a higher offer price.
By passively relying on the capital market to produce information, the negative SEOs
price effects can be mitigated. However, doing so may be quite costly. Since there is no
coordination in the process of information production, it is likely that there are huge
amounts of duplication of investigations. All these investigation costs will ultimately be
assumed by the issuer. This will be especially costly if the issuer is a young firm and is in
a high growth industry in which case the information is difficult to obtained and
evaluated. In this case, it is better for the issuer to limit the investigators to a small group
of professional investors.
When the cost of information production is high, instead of passively replying on the
capital market to produce information, a firm can invite some sophisticated investors into
the issue process. Hertzel and Smith (1993) and Cronqvist and Nilsson (2005) find that
when the degree of asymmetric information is high, it is more likely for a firm to conduct
equity private placements.
These sophisticated investors not only save costs in information production, but also
provide certification for the issuers. Slovin, et al. (2000), Armitage (2002) and Armitage
and Snell (2003) argue that the underwriters in UK bought deals and placement investors
in private placements and UK open offers will investigate issuers. Their willingness to
buy shares certifies to the market that the issuers are not overvalued.
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Bought-deal underwriters and placement investors commit not only a large amount of
fund but also reputation in an issue. They have more incentive to investigate a firm than
small investors, and are able to communicate the information credibly to the market. A
firm can invite them to justify its equity price in an issue. In what follows, we use the
model in Hertzel and Smith (1993) to demonstrate the idea of certification by quality
investigators.
A firm has a short-lived investment opportunity worth b , which requires an
amount E external equity finance. The firm's asset value isa(ae {aB,aG} ,aB <aG)
which is private information.
The firm has three choices: public offers, private placements or no offers. In a public
offer, the firm sells new equity to numerous small investors, while in a private placement
it sells to a placement investor. Assume that small investors are passive and competitive.
To obtain a benchmark result, assume a polar case where the placement investor can
costlessly investigate the firm and assess a perfectly. Also assume that the placement
investor can charge a payment T from the firm and that this payment takes the form of
offer discounts.15 16
We focus on a full separating equilibrium where a good firm chooses private
placements, and a bad one chooses public offers. If the equilibrium exists, the payoffs of
the two types of firms in the equilibrium are,
Goodfirms: ac +b-T
Badfirms: aB+b
For a good firm not to deviate, the following conditions must be satisfied,
U T ^ a K T baG+b-T> - -—-~(ar+b + E) (1.14)
aB +b + E G
aG + b -T > aG (1.15)
For a bad firm not to deviate, the following conditions must be satisfied,
aB+b> aB+b~T (1.16)
aB + b > aB (1.17)
15 This assumption can be justified if the result of investigation is verifiable so that an ex-ante contract can
exist between the placement investor and a firm choosing private placements.
16 The payment T can be the compensation to the placement investor for information production and for the
risk of holding undiversified securities, and can be a result of the placement investor's bargaining power.
Note that the first interpretation does not apply in the current set-up.
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aG + b + E aB + b + E
b>T (1.19)
Apparently, when T is sufficiently small, (1.18) and (1.19) can be satisfied.
Condition (1.18) means that private placements are employed by a good firm if the
proportion of ownership retained by existing shareholders under full information exceeds
the proportion retained if it is mixed with bad firms.
In this equilibrium, despite the fact that the new equity is sold at a discount,E/ + j > a
private placement elicits positive market reactions due to the certification by the
placement investor.
The above result is based on an extreme assumption that investigation by the placement
investor is costless and perfect. In the less extreme cases where investigation is costly and
imperfect, it is still reasonable to expect that the equilibrium of the game reveals
information if investigation is sufficiently perfect and not that costly, and if the payment
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to the placement investor is at a median level. If so, the market will react positively to
private placements due to the effect of certification.
Consistent with the idea of certification by quality investigators, Slovin, et al. (2000)
find that UK bought deals elicit positive market responses; Armitage (2002) and
Armitage and Snell (2003) find that UK open offers and private placements elicit positive
market responses. These results imply that certifications by bought-deal underwriters and
placement investors are sufficiently reliable in the UK, and that good firms can signal
quality to the market by choosing these flotation methods.
1.3.4 Choice of SEOs flotation methods based on adverse selection and
signalling approach
1 R
Choice of SEOs flotation methods is about obtaining fund with minimal expense. In a
world of symmetric information, this can be done easily, simply by choosing the flotation
method with the lowest direct cost. However, in a world of asymmetric information, the
17 For example, imagine a semi-separating equilibrium where good firms choose private placements, while
bad firms use a mixed strategy which assigns a positive probability to choose private placements.
18
Agency related problem will be discussed in the next section.
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problem of guaranteeing the success of an issue and selling equity at a good price arises.
This triggers signalling costs and information production costs. Sometimes, these implicit
costs are so high that all firms prefer to avoid them: in US, rights offers almost demise
despite the fact that they are less costly in term of direct costs than underwritten offers.19
In other cases, the fact that good firms are more able to bear these implicit costs forms
the basis of signalling. Since different flotation methods trigger different levels of
implicit costs, the signalling process may boils down to the choice of flotation methods.
In Heinkel and Schwartz (1986), good firms signal their qualities by choosing rights
offers and the associated subscription prices; bad firms avoid the signalling costs by
choosing US underwritten offers. In Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999), good firms signal
by choosing private placements where they incur the costs of investigation; bad firms
choose US underwritten offers where they incur no costs of information production but
obtain a low selling price.
Armitage and Snell (2003) study firms' choices between private placements and rights
offers. They claim that the placing process in private placements requires issuers to
undergo inspection, while there is no inspection in rights offers. Since good firms are
better able to pass the inspection, they may signal quality by choosing private placements.
However, in the UK, the signalling cost is substantial: placees often require deep
placement discounts from the issuers. Even good firms may not want to assume the
signalling cost, since alternatively they can pool with low quality firms to choose rights
offers in which new shares are sold at a higher price. Thus, maximising equity selling
prices may not be the motive for good firms to choose private placements. Armitage and
Snell (2003) argue that the motive for private placements is that firms attempt to signal
quality and correct market prices with a view to subsequent sales of shares.
In this section, we discuss a model by Eckbo and Norli (2004) which addresses the
choice between rights offers and private placements. They bring the take-up levels into
the picture and argue that the incentive for an under-priced firm to signal quality is
determined by the firm's take-up level. In previous discussion of rights offers, we
contend that offer discounts do not matter since non-subscriber can sell the rights. But if a
firm is under-priced, even though non-subscriber can sell the rights, there is still wealth
loss to outside investors since equity is undersold anyhow.
|l)
Brcaley and Myers (1981), Eckbo and Masulis (1992)
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If take-up level is high, e.g. 100%, an under-priced firm will have no incentives to
signal quality because outside investors can not purchase the under-priced equity. On the
other hand, if take-up level is low, in order to reduce wealth losses, the firm will assume
costs to signal quality so as to raise its equity selling price.
Eckbo and Norli (2004) consider a firm's choice problem among uninsured rights
offers, insured rights offers and private placements. In their model, what concern a firm
are the direct cost of an issue and the implicit wealth losses to outside investors in an
issue. Wealth losses occur when in an issue, the firm's equity is under-priced. The firm
can mitigate the wealth losses by choosing rights offers or by signalling quality. If its
take-up level is high, choosing rights offers can effectively reduce the wealth losses since
outside investors are unable to obtain the under-priced new shares. Alternatively, the firm
can signal quality by choosing insured rights offers or private placements in which the
firm will undergo inspection. The direct costs of uninsured rights offers and private
placements are assumed to be lower than that of insured rights offers. Eckbo and Norli
(2004) establish a pooling equilibrium in which good firms and bad firms will all choose
uninsured rights offers when their take-up levels are high; when their take-ups are at
median or low level, uninsured rights offers are the least favourable choice; at median
level, all firms prefer insured rights offers to private placements; at low level, all firms
prefer private placements to insured rights offers. We review the model in what follows.
The Model:
A firm has a short-lived investment opportunity worth b , which requires an
amount E external equity finance. The firm's asset value is a(ae {aB,ac} ,aB <aG)
which is private information. Market knows the probability distribution of asset
value: p(aG) = (p , p(aB) -\-<p . Current shareholders take up a fraction t of the new
shares. Take-up in private placement is scaled down to At , A e [0,1] . Eckbo-Norli
assumes / is publicly known.
Three flotation methods are available: uninsured rights (ur ), insured rights (ir) and
private placement ( pp) . The direct cost of issue is c,. (ze {ur,ir,pp} ). Eckbo-Norli
assumescur <cir,cpp <cir.
Denote the number of new shares issued as n, and the number of shares post offer asM .
A firm issues if and only if:
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(\-8(\ — t))(a + b +E-c) > a + tE (1-20)
Where 8 = n/,/M
The left hand side is the post-issue wealth of existing shareholders; the right hand side is
their wealth if no issue is made. tE reflects the fact that they contribute a fraction t of the
investment.
Whether (1.20) is satisfied depends on the issue price, denoted as P . Pxn = E .
Without loss of generality, normalizeM = 1. (1.20) can be rearranged as:
b_c_E(l-t)la + b +E-c-P]^0
P
We may interpret the left hand side as the existing shareholders' gain from issues. It is
made up of the gain from the investment excluding the direct issue cost (the second term)
and the wealth transfer to new shareholders (the third term).
P reflects the market's belief of the firm's value.20 The market forms belief according
to its prior belief of the firm's type, the result of investigation and the firm's choice in
equilibrium. A firm choosing uninsured rights will not undergo investigation.
Investigation will happen when a firm chooses insured rights and private placement. The
investigation is informative but imperfect:
Pr(e = aB\a = aB ) = y; Pr(e = aG \a = aG ) = y, with y > 0.5
The investigation will reveal the true type of a firm with probability y . With only prior
belief, the offer price P the market will accept is:
P = (\-</>)(aB +b +E-c) + </>(aG +b +E-c) (1.22)
As in (1.21), a firm's choice of flotation method is only affected by the last two terms of
left hand side. Sum up those two terms and denote the sum asC;.. C, can be interpreted as
the overall cost of flotation method i. It includes the direct cost, and the implicit cost of
wealth transfer.
E{\-t){a + b +E-ci-Pi) . , . ,
C;=c(.-+ — i E \ur, ir, pp\ (1-23)
From (1.23), one can see that when take-up is high enough, the implicit cost of wealth
losses in rights offers disappears, no matter what the equity selling price is.
The flotation game takes a sequential form. At the first stage, a firm can choose
among ur ,z'r and pp , as well as no-issue, ur and no-issue are always feasible choices. A
20 We again assume the capital market is competitive
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firm choosing ir or pp will undergo an investigation, and the issue can happen if the firm
pass the test. The game ends after the firm issues or if the firm chooses no-issue. If the
firm does not pass the test, the game proceeds into the second stage. The second stage is
similar with the first stage except that the issue method which the firm fails to undertake
in the first stage is no longer available. The game will proceed into the third stage if firm
does not pass the test again in the second stage. At the third stage, the choices remaining
are ur and no-issue.
A firm will fail in an investigation if it is judged as a bad firm. If a firm pass the test, it
will negotiate with the underwriter in ir or the placement investor in pp about the issue
price. Assume that a firm has all the bargaining power and can make take-it-or-leave-it
offer in a negotiation.
Eckbo-Norli focus on a pure-strategy pooling equilibrium where bad firms mimic good
firms' choice. For the equilibrium to exist, it is sufficed to check the participation
constraint of good firms. Because of pooling, the choice of a firm does not reveal any
information. The market's belief about a firm's type is formed with prior and the result of
investigation.
From (1.21) and (1.23), we know that a firm will choose the flotation method with
lowest C\. If take-up t is high, it is reasonable for a firm to choose ur since the direct cost
ofur is the lowest and the implicit cost of wealth transfer is decreasing in/. Eckbo-Norli
confirm this intuition in theirproposition 1.
Eckbo-Norli proposition 1: It is part of a pooling sequential equilibrium for issuers
with high current shareholder take-up t, such that t > max {tib, t] pp, tUr}, to follow the
flotation methodpath {ur }.
When take-up level is high, a good firm will have no incentives to signal its quality to
the market. Although its equity is under-priced, a good firm can employ rights offers to
minimize wealth losses to outside investors. And since the direct cost of insured rights
offers is higher than that of uninsured rights offers, a good firm will choose an uninsured
rights offer. Bad firms will try to pool with good firms so as to sell equity at a better price.
Since there is no cost of mimicking good firms, bad firms will also choose uninsured
rights offers. In what follows, we describe the construction of the { ur } equilibrium.
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There are five off-equilibrium strategies: {/>, pp,ur}, {pp,ir,ur}, {ir,ur}, {pp,ur} and
{no} . The last one represents no-issue. To verify the equilibrium in Eckbo-Norli
proposition 1, we need to prove that a good firm will not deviate to any of the five off-
equilibrium strategies.
To prove that, we need to obtain the market's belief of a firm's type contingent on the
off-equilibrium behaviours. Assume that the two types of firms are equally likely to
deviate from {ur }. The market's belief of a firm which passes the first test is:
</><=- -*
, -><P (1.24)
Its belief of a firm which passes the second test is:
(p2=(f> (1.25)
Eckbo-Norli claim that a firm which fails in the two tests and chooses back to ur is
believed as (f) since the market assumes the finn is playing the equilibrium strategy.
(p2=(f) (1.26)
With these beliefs, we can find out the market price of a firm that passes the first test,
the second test or fail in both tests. For example, for a firm that passes the first test and
conducts private placement will have a price as:
Plpp=(\-(pl)(aB+b + E-cpp) + <pl(aG+b +E-cpp) (1.27)
With these market prices and with (1.23), we can find out the off-equilibrium and
equilibrium cost for good firms: Cpp, C\r, Cpp, C2, andC°r. Clpp is the cost for a good firm
when it chooses private placements at the first stage, passes the test and obtain finance.
E(l-t)(ar +b +E-cm-PL)
CDD = c +— — ^(1.28)PP PP p\ V '
PP
C2 is the cost for a good firm when it fails in the test at the first stage, chooses private
placements at the second stage and pass the test. The rest can be interpreted similarly.
For the equilibrium in proposition 1 to exist, the following five incentive compatible
constraints for good firms must be satisfied:
c <yCl+(\-y)(yC2pp+(\-y)C°ur) (1.29)





Constraint (1.29) means a good firm should have no incentives to deviate to strategy
{ir,pp,ur}\ Constraint (1.30) means a good firm should have no incentives to deviate
to {pp,ir,ur}. The rest can be interpreted similarly.
Constraint (1.29) and (1.30) are not binding. The rest can be simplified as:C°ur < Cpp,
C°r <Cl and C°r <b . With these three constraints, we can solve for the three critical
values of take-up, {tlpp,tUr,tib }, above which the associated constraint is satisfied.
Eckbo-Norli proposition 2: It is part of a pooling sequential equilibrium that issuers
with current shareholders take-up t, such thatt <mm{t2pp,t2jr} andt >t2b, follow the
flotation path {pp,ir,ur} 21
The two concerns in choosing flotation methods are the direct cost and the wealth
losses. Given a low take-up, a low equity selling price will lead to wealth losses, no
matter what type of issues a good firm uses. A good firm will have incentives to undergo
inspection so as to correct the market's belief and raise the selling price.
Therefore, pp, ir dominate ur . Between pp and ir , when the take-up is low enough, the
additional losses from selling equity to outside investors in private placements become
relatively unimportant compared with the direct cost saved. Therefore, private placements
will be chosen.
Eckbo-Norli proposition 3: It is part of a pooling sequential equilibrium that issuers
with current shareholder take-up t, such that t <mm{t2pp,t2ir} andt>t2b , follow the
flotation path {ir, pp, ur}.
As in proposition 2, when take-up is low, good firms prefer to undergo inspection in
order to raise equity selling prices, pp, ir dominate ur . In the choice between pp and ir,
since take-up is not so low, it is better for a good firm to employ rights offers to reduce
21
In proving this proposition, Eckbo-Norli do not check the incentive constraints of bad firms. However,
they may be binding since pp is employed by good firms to signal quality and bad firms may be unwilling
to assume this signalling cost.
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the losses from selling under-priced equity to outside investors. Therefore, ir is
preferable to pp .
There may be overlapping among the ranges of/where each of {ur }, {pp,ir,ur}
and {ir, pp, ur} can be equilibrium. To choose among overlapping equilibriums, Eckbo-
Norli propose to choose the equilibrium with lowest expected cost. They further establish
the issue choice on the entire range of/:
Eckbo-Norli proposition 4: There exists take-up level t4pp and t4jr, with t4pp < t4ir .
{pp,ir,ur} is a Pareto dominant equilibrium for issuers with t < t4pp .
Forte. [t4pp,t4ir\, {ir, pp,ur} is Pareto dominant equilibrium. Fort>t4ir, {ur} is Pareto
dominant equilibrium.
When take-up level is high enough (/ > t4ir), the wealth losses to outside investors for a
good firm is trivial if the firm chooses rights offers. And since the direct cost of
uninsured rights offers is lower than that of insured rights offers, uninsured rights offers
will be the optimal choice.
When take-up is at median level (te \t4pp,t4ir]), the wealth losses become a concern
even for firms choosing rights offers. A good firm has incentives to undergo quality tests
to correct the market price and reduce the wealth losses from underselling its equity.
Insured rights offers dominate private placements in this range. The reason is that since
investigation is not perfect, a good firm passing the test will still be under-priced. Wealth
losses are still an important concern. Given a median take-up level, insured rights offers
can effectively limit the wealth losses comparing with private placements. Therefore,
insured rights offers are the dominant choice.
When take-up level is low enough (t<t4pp), private placements dominate rights offers.
Since take-up is low, a good firm has incentives to signal quality and therefore will
undergo quality tests. Private placements dominate insured rights offers in this range. The
reason is that given a low take-up, the gains from rights offers in limiting wealth losses is
small. On the other hand, the direct cost of private placements is lower compared with
insured rights offers. Therefore, private placements are the dominant choice.
Note that in this equilibrium, asymmetric information is not resolved with a firm's
choice of flotation methods. Since the equilibrium is pooling, all firms in the same take-
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up range follow the same flotation-choice sequence. However, the market can infer a
firm's type with both the firm's take-up level and its flotation choice. With these
information, the market can infer the firm's performance in the quality tests, e.g. if a firm
has a median take-up level and the firm choose private placements, the market can infer
that this firm has failed in a test before.
1.4 Agency cost and control approach
Agency cost and control approach explains the SEOs price effects by reconsidering the
notion that managers will maximize a firm's value. An essential feature of public
companies is the separation of ownership and control. The preferences of managers and
owners generally will not coincide. Incentive provision is necessary for managers to
behave optimally from owners' point of view. It has long been recognized that market for
corporate control can provide incentive for managers to behave well through take-over
threats. How well the threats can discipline managers depends on a firm's capital
structure. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) shows that a tender offer is more likely to arise and
succeed if the raider holds a substantial share of the firm at the time of offer. Since equity
private placements tend to create outside block-holdings, the take-over threats incumbent
management faces may become substantial afterwards, which provides incentives for the
management to maximize the firm's value. Therefore, equity private placements may
improve a firm's value and raise its stock price.
In what follows, we first introduce the organizational features of a public firm and
explain why and how agency problem can arise in the firm. We then focus on the
disciplinary power from the capital market and explain why the existence of large outside
shareholders can enhance this power. The main idea we want to present is that SEOs, e.g.
equity private placements, can affect a firm's value through affecting the disciplinary
power from capital market.
1.4.1 Some organizational features of public-traded firms
In a perfect capital market, property right theory predicts that the managers of a firm
should own all the firm's assets because they have important asset-specific investment
decisions to make or they have human capitals essential for the assets' use (Hart, (1995)).
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However in real world, the managers are often wealth-constrained and can not buy the
entire asset. Here comes the separation of ownership and (effective) control. Among
firms of this type, public-traded firms are of the least restricted form in that the firms'
owners (common shareholders) are not required to play any other roles and their residual
claims are freely alienable without any restriction.
Due to the separation of ownership and control, agency problem arises. The preferences
of managers and shareholders generally will not coincide. Firstly, managers do not
assume all the residual effects of their decisions. If running a firm requires efforts and the
efforts are costly to the managers, without any incentive schemes and discipline measures,
they will not behave in the shareholders' optimal interest since they only obtain part of
the residual surplus from their efforts. Secondly, it is acknowledged that there are private
benefits from control. Managers may divert company funds for their private consumption;
they may carry out unprofitable projects to build empires. With control rights, they can
pursue their objectives at the expense of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling (1976),
Jensen (1986)).
This incentive problem can not be solved costless-ly because complete contracting is
impossible. Firstly, it is generally impossible or prohibitively costly to bargain on and lay
down in the contract every future contingency and the associated action managers should
take. Secondly, managers are experts who know more about the relevant aspects of
decision-making. Thirdly, managers' efforts are generally not observable and can at most
be imperfectly inferred from outcomes.
Despite these problems, as Alchian (1968) noted, "millions of people hand billions of
their money over to managers against very limited explicit assurances their investment
will be handled responsibly." This can not happen without any forces that constrain
managers to behave in the optimal interest of shareholders. In what follows, we discuss
the internal discipline measure in a public firm. As Holmstrom and Tirole (1989) noted,
managers are also subject to the supervision by capital market, labour market and product
market. For the sake of our theme, we will discuss the supervision by capital market in
the next section.
The internal discipline measure includes monitoring and explicit contracting.
Managerial contracts are incentive schemes which attempt to align the interests of
managers and shareholders. An incentive scheme is a sharing rule of surplus. The
incentive-scheme design problem for shareholders is about finding a sharing rule under
which the management finds it in his interest to make a particular action that the
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shareholders desire. Principal-agent models offer a theoretical paradigm within which
this design problem can be studied. The general lesson is that management should be paid
more the more likely the outcome conforms the view that the management make the right
action.22
At the summit of the hierarchy of a public firm, the internal (decision) monitor is
performed by the board of directors. A firm's decision process can be separated into
decision making and decision monitor. Decision making is the process of initiating and
implementing a production decision; decision monitor is the process of ratifying a
decision initiative, monitoring agents' performance in implementation, and setting
rewards. Separation of ownership and (effective) control means most of the decision
making rights are delegated to the management. How decision monitor is performed? A
public-traded firm has diffused residual claimants (shareholders). It is costly for all of
them to engage in decision monitor. Besides, most of them are not qualified to undertake
this role. Therefore an efficient internal monitor system involves delegation of monitor
rights. In addition, it should also involve separation of decision making and decision
monitor. An individual agent should not be delegated exclusive rights on both at the same
decision. To efficiently control the management, an independent control layer, called
board of directors, is introduced between shareholders and management.
In a public firm, shareholders delegate all decision making rights and most monitor
rights to its board of director. The board then delegates most of the decision making
rights and many monitor rights to top-level management. But it retains the rights to
intervene in the firm's operation including ratifying and monitoring firm's important
decision, and rewarding or replacing top managers. With their votes, Shareholders retain
the ultimate control on the firm, more accurately on the board, by nominating the board
members and voting on some major company policies, e.g. merger and acquisition.
However, there has been criticism on the function of board in a public firm. Although
board members may have a reputation to protect, they are rarely paid contingent on their
performance.23 And there has been evidence that they are closely tied to management24
and thus are less likely to be too critical about its under-performance. The role of this
control layer will be subject to further study.
22 Holmstrom (1979), Shavell (1979)
23 Holmstrom and Tirolc (1989)
24 Mace (1971), Wu (2004)
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1.4.2 Capital market discipline
A firm's shares do not merely confer its shareholders the residual income rights, but
also the residual control rights. The control rights allow shareholders to replace
incumbent management who behaves opportunistically or who is unable to run a firm in
an optimal way, with a more efficient management team. Subject to the take-over threats
from capital market, incumbent management may constrain its opportunistic behaviour
and act more in the shareholders' interests.
However, the take-over mechanism may not work effectively. The motivation for a
raider to take over a firm may be his private information25 or his private benefits of
control. Grossman and Hart (1980) show that it is difficult for a tender offer26 to succeed
for purely informational motives. From shareholders' point of view, any offer an outside
raider makes reveal the fact that if the take-over succeeds, the firm's ex-post value will be
above the value of that offer. If each shareholder considers himself non-pivotal, his
dominant strategy is not to tender. Therefore, tender offers can not succeed. At ex-ante, a
raider will have no incentives to monitor a firm and search for improvement. The
disciplinary power from the capital market is weakened.
A solution to the take-over dilemma is by the design of dilution rights, which is to
exclude free-riding shareholders from the gains in a takeover. Grossman and Hart (1980)
prove that a higher right to dilute encourages raiders to invest to identify poorly run firms
and indirectly provides management more incentives to behave well.
Another solution is to create or consolidate outside block-holdings of a firm. Shleifer
and Vishny (1986) show that an increase in a large shareholder's holding increases the
large shareholder's investment in monitors, and thus the probability of value increasing
takeovers and the market value of the firm. This idea is supported by Wruck (1989). She
finds that the two day announcement AAR for equity private placements is significantly
positive. Since private placements tend to create large outside shareholders27, the positive
effects on the firms' value may come from the induced outside monitors and takeovers
with the creation of large shareholders.
23 For example, he may have identified a more efficient management team.
26 Takeovers can occur through mergers, tender offers or proxy contests. In a merger or a tender offer, the
party intending to take over the firm offers to purchase majority (50%) of the voting securities (generally
common stock) from other shareholders. The difference between mergers and tender offers is that mergers
are the voluntary choice by the target firm's managers and board, while tender offers are made directly to
the target firm's shareholders without the approval from its managers and board. Proxy contests are
mechanisms by which shareholders can change the firm's board of directors.
27 Wruck (1989) documents that it is rare that managers or management related investors purchase new
shares in private placements.
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1.4.2.1 Monitoring by large outside shareholders
The take-over dilemma can be put in terms of a shareholder-free-riding problem. Public
firms have diffused residual claimants. Monitoring management, searching for
improvements and implementing the improvements are in fact public goods. An outside
shareholder has to invest resources to monitor the firm's operation and identify
improvements. However, he can only internalize part of the gains. Therefore, each
shareholder has an incentive to free ride on others' efforts, which lead to an inefficiently
low level of monitors and takeovers.
A second best solution to this free-riding problem is to create or consolidate large
outside holdings of the firm (Shleifer and Vishny (1986)). Large outside shareholders
benefit most from an improvement of a firm's value. Therefore, they have more
incentives to monitor incumbent management and initiate take-overs than smaller
shareholders and outside raiders do. Besides, they are better able to win in a corporate
control contest, and thus have better ability to intervene when incumbent management
does not perform well. If a corporation finance decision, e.g. an SEO, creates large
outside shareholdings, it will improve the firm's value by increasing the disciplinary
power from capital market. In what follows, we borrow the model Shleifer and Vishny
(1986) to demonstrate why the existence of large outside shareholders is crucial for the
capital market to exert disciplinary power on managements.
The model:
A firm's shares are held by a large shareholder, witha fraction of stake, and a fringe of
atomistic small shareholders, with a total 1 — a fraction of stake. The firm is run by a
management team which is not related to the large shareholder.
Assume that there is no agency problem. However, the incumbent management may
not be able to maximize the firm's value. Outside shareholders can invest to search for
value improvements. Any possible improvements can only be implemented by removing
the incumbent management. The way to gain corporate control is by a cash tender offer.
Assume that the incumbent management is passive. They do not hold any shares of the
firm and do not undertake any resistance against outsider's takeover. The firm's
discounted profit under the incumbent management isE . Note that the firm's value may
be different from V if takeover by outsiders is possible.
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The game has two stages. In the first stage, the large shareholder can choose a research
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intensity, / , to search for improvements. This will cost him c(I) , with
c (/) > 0;c"(/) > 0 . With research intensity I , he can find an improvement with
value Z with probability I . The cumulative distribution ofZ is denoted as G(Z). Z is
private knowledge of the large shareholder, but the distribution G(Z) is common
knowledge.
At the second stage, the large shareholder can decide whether to make a tender offer,
and if he makes, how much premium to offer. In a tender offer, if he acquires at least
50% of shares, he gains control of the firm, in which case he can replace the incumbent
management and implement the improvement. If he acquires shares less than that, the
offer fails.29 Small shareholders, when presented a tender offer, can choose to tender or
not. Since their individual holding is insignificant, they believe that their decisions are
non-pivotal.
Let's assume that the improvement plan is found, and consider the tender offer game in
the second stage between the large shareholder and small shareholders.
Denote the offer premium as p(a), and allow it to be a function ofa . Given p(a), for
the large shareholder to offer, the following condition must be satisfied:
0.5Z - (0.5 — a)p(cc) -cT >0 (1.34)
0.5Z is the large shareholder's surplus from the improvement if the offer succeed;
(0.5 — a)p(a) 'is the overall premium he offers to small shareholders to accumulate 50%
of shares; cT is the fixed cost of a cash tender offer.30 For small shareholders to tender
their shares, the premium offered has to be at least their expectation of the value of the
improvement. Small shareholders form the expectation with three pieces of information:
the large shareholder found an improvement plan; he can cover his cost given p(a); their
knowledge ofG(Z). The first piece of information is not useful at the tender offer sub-
game since the second piece of information is sufficient to imply the first piece of
information. With the last two pieces of information, small shareholders will tender if and
only if:
p(a) > £[Z|0.5Z - (0.5 - a)p(a) -cT> 0] (1.35)
2S Small shareholders' individual holding is tiny. They have no incentives to monitor the firm.
29 The paper assumes he can return the acquired shares to small investors, that is, no cost of failure
30 For example, legal and administrative fees
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Assume that small shareholders will tend when they are indifferent between tendering or
not. Denote p* (a) as the premium satisfied (1.35) with equality.
Substitute p* (a) into (1.34). The equilibrium strategy for the large shareholder is to
bid K + p\a) ifZ satisfies (1.34), and no offers otherwise; that for small shareholders is
to tender their shares.31 Rearrange (1.34) as
0.5(Z-p\cc)) + ap\a)-cT >0 (1.36)
From (1.36), we can see that the premium offered may be above the realization ofZ . The
large shareholder can afford such a premium since he can subsidize the losses in the
tender offer with the gain from his existing shares.
Shleifer-Vishny Lemma 1: Takeover premium p\oc) is decreasing in a .
For a low realization ofZ, the large shareholder actually suffers losses to those small
shareholders who tender their shares. Fie would make such an offer since he can
subsidize the losses with the gain from his existing shares. When he original holding is
higher, given p* (fit), his losses in the tender offer is smaller, while his gain from his
existing shares is higher. Therefore, he can afford to make an offer when the value of
improvement Z is even lower. Small shareholders realize this and require a lower tender
premium. A companion lemma will be immediate:
Shleifer-Vishny Lemma 2: The critical value ofZ (a)for the large shareholder to
make a tender offer is decreasing in a.
With these two lemmas, we can turn to the large shareholder's investment problem at
the first stage. Given a , the large shareholder's ex-ante benefit from investment / is:
B(I, a) = Ix £[max {0.5Z - (0.5 - a)p* (a) - cT ,0} ] (1.37)
31 The above is the equilibrium with minimum bid. There could be other equilibriums depending on small
shareholders' out-of equilibrium beliefs. If small shareholders believe that when the large shareholder
offer p (ct), the value of improvement on average is actually above p (ct), large shareholder will have
to raise his bid. Put it in another way, small shareholders may believe that the choice of tender premium
signals some information. However, this belief can not survive refinement. Suppose in equilibrium, the
large shareholder who can profit by offering p (ct) has to bid above p (ct) . It is common knowledge for
all shareholders that he would like to offer the lowest premium regardless of the realization ofZ . If he
commits to offer p (ct) , it is for small shareholders' interest to tender their shares.
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Before the realization ofZ , the large shareholder has no supreme knowledge of the value
of the improvement. He realizes that small shareholders, with the same knowledge, will
demand the entire expected value of the improvement of their own shares. He rationally
expects that he can only profit from the improvement of the value of his own shares.
Therefore, (1.37) can be simplified as:
B(I, a) = I x (1 -G(Z c (a))x[axE[z\z>Zc (a)] -cT] (1.38)
axE[Z Z > Zc(a)]-cT is his expected gain in a tender offer; /x(l-G(Zc(a)) is the
ex-ante probability that a tender offer will happen in the second stage.
The large shareholder's optimal choice of research intensity in the first stage is
an/which maximizes: B(I, a)—c(/). To characterize the relation between the optimal
choice of/ andct , Shleifer-Vishny prove the following lemma:
Shleifer-Vishny Lemma 3: {axE[z\z > Zc(ctr)]-cr)x(l — G(Zc(cr)) is increasing
in a.
This lemma says that given that an improvement plan is found, the large shareholder's
expected gain is increasing with his original share holding. Although the expected value
of the improvement that will be implemented is lower, the increased probability of
implementation more than compensates that. Put it in another way, there is an additional
range ofZ which the large shareholder can benefit from whence gets higher.
The marginal benefit of research intensity, / , is
(1 - G(Z c {a)) x[ccxE[z\z>Zc(a)\-cT]
With lemma 3, we can see that this term is increasing ina. Therefore, the optimal choice
of I*(a) is increasing in a.
With/*(cr), the firm's ex-ante value can be expressed as:
V(a) = V +1'(a)(1 -G(Zc(a))E[Z\z >ZC(a)} (1.39)
/* (cr)x(1 - G(Zc (cr)) is the ex-ante probability that a tender offer will happen in the
second stage. /?[z|z > Zc (a)\ is the expected value of the improvement if a tender offer
happens. Shleifer-Vishny prove thatF(«)is increasing in a .
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Sh/eifer-Vishny proporsitional 1: an increase in a large shareholder's holding
increases the large shareholder's investment in monitor, the probability of value
increasing takeovers and the market value ofthefirm.
When# is higher, the large shareholder has better ability to pay for a takeover and he
can implement an improvement which he can not before. Since the large shareholder can
benefit from a larger set of improvements, his ex-ante incentive to identify improvements
increases. Because the set of improvements that can be implemented is larger and the
probability with which an improvement arises is higher, the firm's value increases.
The existence of a large shareholder is crucial for value increasing takeovers to occur.
When the large shareholder holds more shares, it will be more likely that improvements
arises, and it will be easier to implement an improvement in the firm. Therefore, if a
transaction results in new outside block-holdings or result in size increments of existing
block-holdings, the firm's value will be enhanced.
1.4.2.2 Some criticisms on the role of large outside shareholders
In the last section, we demonstrate that creation of large outside shareholdings can
improve a firm's value since capital market discipline works more effectively with them.
However, there have been theories that challenge the positive role of large outside
shareholders. Some argue that the creation of large outside shareholdings reduces the
market liquidity and thus adversely affects the informative-ness of the stock price, and
therefore will reduce the information necessary to evaluate and monitor management's
perfonnance (e.g. Holmstrom and Tirole (1993)). Some argue that large shareholders'
monitor not only limits managerial discretion but also depresses managers' initiatives (e.g.
Burkart et al. (1997)). The others argue that large outside shareholders, with their insider
information, may speculate on the stock price rather than exert efforts to monitor
management (e.g. Kahn and Winton (1998)).
Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) claim that the creation of large outside shareholders will
reduce the information necessary to evaluate and monitor management's performance.
The existence of large outside shareholders helps firm to employ takeover mechanism to
improve firm value, but it leads to low market liquidity of shares and limits the efficiency
of managerial incentive contracts. Stock market plays an important role in corporate
control contests. Less appreciated, it also allows managerial incentives to be provided
according to the performance of share prices. Speculators, interested in trading profits,
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spend resources to collect information and forecast the consequences of past managerial
actions. Through trading, share price eventually incorporates speculators' information.
This enables the firm to design an efficient managerial contracts contingent on share
price. When the firm consolidates a large shareholding, there will be fewer shares traded
and market liquidity will be lower. As in most market microstructure models, speculators
will find it difficult to profit on their private knowledge. Thus, marginal value of
information falls and they will spend less effort on collecting and evaluating information.
Therefore, there will be less information content that can be incorporated into price and
price will be less informative. As a result, managerial contracts based on share price will
be less efficient. So there is trade-off between employing takeover mechanism which
requires the existence of large shareholders, and incentive contract mechanism which
favours a diversified ownership.
Burkart et al. (1997) challenges the value of large shareholders by arguing that large
shareholders' monitor not only limits managerial discretion but also depresses managers'
initiatives. Managerial discretion is detrimental to firm value ex-post, but it may be
beneficial from ex-ante point of view. When manager expect that ex-post he can extract
some value produced by his ex-ante effort, he will have more incentive to show
managerial initiatives. As long as managerial initiative does contribute to firm value,
monitor on managers is not purely beneficial. There is trade-off between gains from
monitor and those from managerial initiative. Ownership structure can be viewed as a
commitment device to monitor. Existence of large outside stake is a commitment to
monitor and depresses managers' initiatives. Optimal ownership structure may not
involve large shareholders if managerial initiative contributes a lot to firm value. Burkart
et al. (1997) is consistent with the early literature on takeovers and managerial myopia
(Hermalin (1987), Laffont and Tirole (1987), and Stein (1988). This literature generally
agrees that too much takeovers make management value the future less than it should,
and thus distort its decision-makings.
Other literature further examines large outside shareholders' incentive to monitor a
firm's performance. Large outside shareholders, by monitoring management, can obtain
insider information of the firm. They can actually profit on their private information by
speculating in the open market. Sometimes, their incentive to speculate is consistent with
37
their incentive to monitor. But it may not always be the case. Huddart (1993) and
Admati, et al. (1994) show that in an active and anonymous stock market, an already
large outside shareholder may sell rather than monitor the firm. Kahn and Winton (1998)
further show that when a firm's insider information is difficult to access by the public, e.g.
small firms or firms in high-tech industries, profits from speculation may be of first-order
importance and large outside shareholders will have less incentive to monitor; when the
market has optimistic view upon a firm, large outside shareholders have less incentive to
monitor since monitoring reduces the value of their private information.
1.5 Conclusion
SEOs price effects may come from the market's interpretation of a firm's decision to
sell equity and the associated flotation method chosen. Asymmetric information of firms'
value gives rise to an adverse selection problem in equity finance market. The market
rationally expects the adverse selection problem and responds negatively to equity offers.
To mitigate the adverse effects of equity offers, a firm can signal its quality to the market.
The instruments for firms to signal can be equity selling prices and equity flotation
methods. If signalling is differentially costly to firms of different qualities, a non-pooling
equilibrium may exist. If so, firms' qualities will be revealed to the market and the
market will update its valuation according to firms' signalling choices.
SEOs price effects may also come from the improved or worsened outside monitors on
incumbent management. Due to the separation of ownership and control, agency problem
may arise in a public firm. The capital market can curb the agency problem through take¬
over threats. And the threats will be more substantial when a firm's large outside
shareholders hold more shares of the firm. Since an SEO may alter a firm's share-holding
structure, e.g. equity private placements tend to create outside block-holdings, the take¬
over threats the incumbent management faces may change with the offer, which will have
effects on the management's incentives to maximize the firm's value. Therefore, SEOs
can affect a firm's value through affecting the disciplinary power from the capital market.
32 For example, the market believes that a firm will perform badly. The firm's large outside shareholder
private observe a potential improvement. He can speculate on this private information by purchasing its
stocks and implementing the improvement.
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Chapter 2
Adverse Selection in London SEAQ, A Review
2.1. Introduction
London SEAQ is organized as a dealership market. Dealership markets rely on dealers
to conduct price discovery and liquidity provision which are the two core functions of a
stock exchange. Liquidity provision is about bridging the gap of time and quantity
between demand and supply. To ensure it in a dealership market, a dealer is obligated to
"I "3
make tradable quote anytime during the normal trading period . Price discovery is about
impounding information into price so that price is efficient and can be guidance for
resource allocation.
In a dealership market, dealers conduct price discovery by trading with informed
traders who invest in information acquisition and generate private information of a stock.
With their informational advantage, informed traders speculate a stock when its price
does not incorporate their private information. Their speculative behaviours impose an
adverse selection problem to dealers34: they buy as price is low and sell as price is high.
Although dealers suffer losses in these transactions, they obtain information necessary to
revaluate a stock and update its price.
In this section, we will borrow some canonical models to investigate the process of
price discovery in dealership markets. In particular, we want to answer the following
questions: how market makers (dealers) infer private information with transactions; why
adverse selection generates bid-ask spread in dealership markets; how the pattern of
adverse selection varies with some important trading decisions, e.g. trade size and trade
time, and with the organizational features of the market, e.g. automated trading or human
intermediate trading. Implicitly, we only focus on in price discovery with trades. Our
object is to lay down the theoretical background for our empirical work in Chapter 3
33 The normal trading period is from 8:00am to 4:30pm in London SEAQ. Before 8:00am and after 4:30pm,
there exists a indicative trading period in which quotes from dealers are not tradable unless they are willing
to.
34
Actually, it is an extreme adverse selection. Unless sufficient liquidity trading exists, market will collapse.
35 There are other mechanism to perform this function, e.g. overnight information flows, e.g. Lockwood
and Linn (1990), and information sharing among market makers, e.g. Cao et al. (2000).
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where we will rely on the response of price and spread to trades to detect the magnitude
of adverse selection.
2.2 Adverse Selection and Bid-Ask Spread
In dealership markets, dealers are obligated to set bid and ask prices associating with a
quantity, with interpretation that they are willing to sell up to that quantity at the ask and
buy at the bid. In this way, dealers make liquidity. Investors can trade against dealers'
quote and take liquidity.
The main question dealers concern is that some investors are better informed, and they
trade because the current price is not "correct" in the sense that it does not account for
their private information. Dealers suffer losses in these transactions. In order to avoid
further losses, dealers have to update their quotes in response to trades. When the next
investor is always better informed, which means dealers' quote is always incorrect,
dealers better shut down the market since they lose all the time. However there may be
liquidity traders who trade not because price is incorrect. The question is that when the
two types of investors coexist, whether dealers can sustain market, and if they can, how
price should be set. In what follows, we take a simple version of the model in Glosten
and Milgrom (1985) to answer this question.
Competitive dealers make a market for a stock. At date t, the stock has two equally
possible value, V and V , with V >V_ . Traders have two types, 0 = i, or u : with
probability^, a trader is of type i and informed about the stock value; with the remaining
probability, he is uninformed and will trade for liquidity reasons. Assume that all traders
can only trade one unit with market makers.
Market makers are obligated to make tradable quotes to the market: ask price at which
they sell to a trader and bid price at which they buy from him. At date t, their
V + V
unconditional expectation of the stock value is v, ==— . However, they will not quote
this price since they can do better by making their quotes conditional on the time t order
flow. Ask (bid) price is made contingent on a purchase (sale) from a trader. They
rationally expect that in equilibrium an informed trader will buy if and only if the true
value is V , and will sell if and only if the true value is V .
P,Ask = E, (V; buy) - Fx Pr(0 = i\buy) + v, x Pr(0 = u\buy) = nV + (1 - k)v, (2.1)
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pBid =E(yi sell) = Vx Pr(0 = i\sell) + v, x Pr(0 = u\sell) = nV_ + (1 -7t)v, (2.2)
There is a gap between the bid price and the ask price,
pAsk _pBid =7j.(V-V)
We can interpret this gap as bid-ask spread. The spread is the result of potential informed
trading. If there is no informed traders, e.g. n = 0, the bid price and the ask price will be
market makers' unconditional expectation of the stock value, v,. In this sense, spread is
the instrument for market makers to guard themselves against adverse selection. When
the degree of adverse selection is higher, e.g. n gets higher or V—V becomes larger,
spread will be wider.
However, even with bid-ask spread, market makers still lose to informed traders.
Whence [0,1), ask price is belowV and bid price is aboveV. Market makers recoup
these losses by trading with uninformed traders. At the end, what informed traders earn is
exactly what uninformed traders lose. Market makers earn zero profit. This feature is
consistent with another canonical model by Kyle (1985) on batch-auction market.
It is important that market makers can quote two prices in a dealership market. In this
model, no any single price can ensure market makers a zero-profit. That is, the market
can not exist if market makers can only quote one price.
Market makers' belief is updated after trading. At date t+1, their unconditional
expectation of the stock value v,+1 is exactly PtAsk after a date-/ purchase and PtB'd after a
date-/ sale. Their belief-update, measured by the difference between v(+1 and v, , is
ji —
±—(V-F) which is positively related to the degree of adverse selection.
2.3 Systematic Patterns of Adverse selection
In the above simple model, lots of informed traders' decisions are simplified away. In
real world, traders with private information may attempt a sufficient large-size
transaction to best exploit their informational advantages. They may time their trades
when the probability of liquidity-trading is higher so that the spread they pay can be
smaller. In a human intermediate market, they may even cooperate with and share private
information with market makers so as to obtain a better price. All these will affect the
pattern of adverse selection.
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2.3.1 Trade size and adverse selection
Easley and O'hara (1987) offer a model to relate trade quantity and adverse selection.
They establish a separating equilibrium where informed traders will only trade large
quantity despite a worse transaction price. The idea is that an informed trader has
incentive to trade large size so as to best exploit his private information. However, he
may not do so because market makers rationally expect the adverse selection in the large-
size market and will offer an unfavourable transaction price. But if there is sufficient
liquidity-trading in the large-size market, market makers can recoup their losses to the
informed by trading with liquidity traders, and price in the large-size market will be
improved. If this is the case, the informed may concentrate in the large-size market. And
trade size will be informative. In the follows, we simplify Easley and O'hara (1987)'s
model to discuss this issue.
A stock with random value V. An Information event "e" which affects the stock value
takes place. The event can be good or bad: L (bad) with probability <5; H (good) with
probability 1 - 5 .
V =E[V\e = L]
V=E[V\e = H]
Multiple dealers exist in the market. They are risk neutral and homogeneous. Dealers can
not observe event s. There are also a large number of risk-neutral traders. If event s takes
place, a fraction ofk can observe the signal and become informed.
In this model, traders are permitted to buy (sell) small size, B\Sl), or large size,
B\S2). B2>B\ S2>Sl.
To sustain the market, we assume exogenous liquidity trading. If they buy, uninformed
traders have probability X\ to buy B[ and X\ to buy B2 . If they sell, they have
probability Xls to sell S1 and X2S to sell S2 . Because uninformed may trade both size,
informed traders' identity will not be perfectly revealed.
Dealers trade for profit. They keep the market open solely because there are liquidity
trading. Their unconditional expectation of the asset value is SV_ + (1 -S)V .
The game processes as the following: Nature decides the nature of event 5. Then dealers
are asked to offer price (PB for each quantity (51 ,B2,S] ,S2). A trader is
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randomly drawn. He is free to trade the quantity he wants if he is uninformed, or takes
the profit maximizing quotes if he is informed.
Dealers, in order to set quotes, will form expectation of the nature of the event taking
into account the trader's choice.
8(C) = Pr(F = V\C) = 1 x Pr(e - L\C) + 0 x Pr(e = H\C) (2.3)
WhereCe {5',Jg2,S',52}
Because of competition among dealers and risk neutrality, the price for each quantity will
be set at the dealers' conditional expectation of the stock value.
When price is the same for large and small size, it is clear that the infonned will strictly
prefer to trade large size to maximize profit. But informed traders' choice will reveal
information to dealers, and dealers will offer a worse price for large size transaction. Our
question is that under what conditions will the informed stick on large-size transactions.
In what follows, we construct a separating equilibrium where this is the case.
Given that the informed only trade large quantity, small size trades are solely from
uninformed. Given a small size trade, dealers' expectation of the probability of a bad
event will be exactly their unconditional expectation of that.
8(Bl) = 8(Sl) = 8
Because a large sale to dealers may be from an informed trader, dealers increase the
probability they attach toV = V_. Similarly, they increase the probability ofV = V when
they receive a large buy order.
S(S') = s"+Xjl]~"] >S (2.4)K8 + Xs [1 - 7t\
8(B2) = 8 <8 (2.5)
7T(\~S) + X2B[\-7t]
/ris the probability of the arrival of an informed trader. From (2.4) and (2.5), We can see
d8(S2) _ d8(B2) Athat: —-—- > 0 , —-—- < 0
dx dn
Because of competition, the price dealers set will be the conditional expectation of the
stock value given the trader's choice:
Pl=SV + (\-8)V=Pl
P2 =8(S2)V_ + {\-S(S2))V <P2 =8(B2)}^ + {\-8{B2))V
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The necessary conditions for (2.6) and (2.7) are
^1+^- (2.8) S XlQ-x
4>1+4iz^. (2.9)B< Xl(\-x)
For the separating equilibrium to exist, the probability of arrival of informed traders, n,
must be sufficiently small, the uninformed must assign sufficiently high probability to
trade large size, and the size difference between a large trade and a small trade must be
sufficiently large.
Dealers can offer the following price schedule to sustain the equilibrium:
Ps(q)=P> ifq<Sl
= Ps2 if S'<q <S2
= V if S2 < q
Similar argument applies to buy side.
In the small-size market, there is no bid-ask spread, PB — Pxs . Spread arises because of
adverse selection. In this equilibrium, only liquidity traders trade small size. Market
makers face no adverse selection problem in the small-size market, and thus do not need
protection from spread. On the other hand, spread exists in the large-size market. And
one can easily observe that equilibrium spread,/^2 — P52, will be widened when adverse
selection gets more severe, e.g. a higher ;r.
2.3.2 Trade time and adverse selection
Trade time is a choice variable for traders. Kyle (1985) considers the best strategy for a
monopoly informed trader to exploit his long live information: breaking up his large
informed order and spread the trades over time. Not only informed traders, liquidity
traders may also time their trades strategically to minimize trade costs. From the previous
sections, we can see that it is exactly liquidity traders who pay the adverse selection costs.
It is of their interests to trade when the probability of informed trading is low, or to pool
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with other liquidity traders to trade at the same time. Therefore, traders do not enter
market randomly and adverse selection effect may have a systematic pattern.
Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) model the strategic timing by the two types of traders.
Traders in their model can choose when to trade, and possibly when to become privately
informed. Liquidity traders prefer to trade when market depth is high, which creates an
incentive for liquidity traders to pool their trades at the same time. Informed traders also
prefer to trade when market is deep, and thus will trade when liquidity traders pool their
trades. If informed traders have the same information, the introduction ofmore informed
traders intensifies the competition among themselves, and reduces their total gain from
information. As a result, liquidity traders' welfare improves. This creates an additional
incentive for liquidity traders to pool their trades. Information content of trades, or
adverse selection, is unchanged if informed traders' private information is given
exogenously. But if they can choose to be informed with a cost, information content of
trades increases when liquidity traders pool their trades.
2.3.3 Human intermediation and adverse selection
The theory introduced so far is about anonymous trading markets. In a market of this
type, informed traders act non-cooperatively and attempt to exploit their information
advantage. Although informed trading is crucial for price discovery, it creates burdens to
the rest of the market. As shown before, liquidity provision will be more costly when
informed trading and thus adverse selection gets more intense. In this sense, informed
trading is a public bad for an anonymous trading market: an informed trader profits with
his private information while shares with other participants the cost of a worsen-market
quality resulted from his trade.
Alternatively, a market can be organized as a human intermediate trading market, e.g.
LSE and NYSE. The general feature of this type of markets is that a relatively small and
stable group of professional traders repeatedly and un-anonymously trade with each other
on a long-term basis. This feature encourages reputation building and cooperation among
market participants. The reason is that repeated and un-anonymous trading makes
rewards and punishments possible. A trader with private information will have less
incentive to exploit his information advantage since he faces a possibility of future
punishment by his trading partners, e.g. his future trades may not be accommodated by
market makers or may receive a bad execution. On the contrary, he may have incentive to
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share his information with other market participants since he may be rewarded for his
cooperative manner, e.g. market makers offer price improvement to his order.
Information sharing is possible in this market and price discovery can be conducted in a
more cooperative manner: information can be impounded into price without sacrificing
the quality of liquidity provision.
There have been theoretical models on the working of human intermediate markets.
Garmill (1990) considers a "carrot" version of human intermediation. He argues that
market makers can heighten the competition among informed traders by only offering
price improvement to the first one who reveals private information. His idea is consistent
with Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) where competition among the informed reduces the
burden of adverse selection on liquidity traders. Lawrence, et al. (1992) considers a
"stick" version of human intermediation. They argue that market makers can mitigate the
effects of asymmetric information by improving price for those traders with good
reputation of not harming market makers with private information. In line with Lawrence,
et al. (1992), Gabriel and Thierry (2002) consider more specifically on how market
makers discipline informed participants. They argue that price improvement is an
incentive device for market makers to encourage reputation building so that traders do
not attempt to profit on market makers with their private information. In what follows, we
borrow the model in Lawrence, et al. (1992) to demonstrate the effect of human
intermediation on adverse selection and the welfare implication of this type of markets.
A stock with exogenous random value. Trading occurs at discrete time, 1, 2, .... With a
probability k , an information event takes place before each round of trading. Only
informed traders can observe it. The private information is short-lived, and will be public
after each round of trading. At each round, denote the expected stock value conditional
on public information as V*. The information event will lead to revision of stock value to
either V + a orV - a , each with equal probability, a can be interpreted as the amount
of private information.
A competitive dealer makes the market. He expects zero-profit. At each round, denote
the ask and the bid prices he sets as: PAsk = V* +sAsk , PB,d = V* - sB,d . . Assume
symmetry of bid ask, 5 = sAsk = sB,d . "s" can be interpreted as (effective half) spread.
Liquidity traders trade to satisfy exogenous liquidity needs. They have downward
sloping demand and upward sloping supply:
QAs)=q'-{(PM-r') = q*-& (2-10)
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Q,{s ) = q-+((V-P"u) =<]■-$(2.11)
The variables <7*, C, are common knowledge.
Informed traders trade for profit. To avoid infinite trading, we put an upper bound, qn
on the size of informed traders' aggregate order at each round of trading.
Anonymous trading market
In a market of this type, trading is anonymous. The dealer is passive in the sense that he
does not try to discretion between informed traders and liquidity traders. This implies he
will sets a single ask price and a single bid price.
At the beginning of each round, the dealer set bid-ask prices. After observing the quotes,
informed traders and liquidity traders submit their orders to the dealer.
Given that the dealer set spread 5, his revenues from liquidity traders are:
R(s) = 2s(q* - £s) . His losses to informed traders are: C(^) = — . Zero profit
condition requires R(s)=C(s).
Denote this pooling-equilibrium spread as sp :
_ g , -[(^,- +V)2 -8ocm,^2 (2m
"2£ 4C
sp is a function of 7r,(X,qn q . It is increasing in n, a, qt, because they represent the
probability of informed trading, the advantage of private information and the scale of
informed trading. A larger spread is required when adverse selection gets more severe.
sp is decreasing in q" which represents the scale of liquidity trading.
The pooling spread may not be Pareto efficient. If there exists a spread pair (s,, s,)
which satisfies s, <sp , si<sp , and C(Si) < R(s,) , the pooling spread is inefficient and
there will room for Pareto improvement in which both types of traders pay a smaller
spread while the dealer maintain a non-negative profit. The inefficiency of the pooling
spread comes from the sensitivity of liquidity trading to the size of spread. An increment
of spread always reduce the dealer's losses to the informed, but it may not always
*
increase his profits from liquidity traders. When spread is above—, increasing spread
actually reduces R(s) . Put in another way, an increment in spread may not always
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enhance dealers' ability to sustain the market since their ability to pay the informed
traders may be lower.
Lawrence, et al. (1992) proves that pooling spread is inefficient if and only
*
ifi? (sp)<0, which is equivalent to s = . This will be the case if and only
q *
ifa>sv [1h 1. This condition will be satisfied if adverse selection is too severe ormax L J
m-t
the scale of liquidity trading is too small.
Lawrence, et al. (1992) further proves that given n > 0, there always existsa for which
a pooling equilibrium exists and is inefficient. This implies that there is always possibility
of efficiency losses in an anonymous trading market. In what follows, we will show how
human intermediation can improve upon it.
Human intermediate market
In this section, a broker is introduced into the market. The broker, through repeated
trading with investors, possesses better information of them. He can help the dealer to
distinguish the informed from the uninformed. The dealer provides incentive for the
broker to tell truth with his punishment strategies.
The game processes as following: the dealer, at the beginning of each round, set two
prices: st, si, one for liquidity traders and the other for the informed. Traders submit
orders to the broker. The broker observes a noisy signal about each order's type. He then
submits the orders to the dealer and chooses whether to report the signals he receives.
The dealer, according to the signal the broker reports, offer the corresponding price to
each order. At the end of each round, the dealer, with a positive probability, receives
perfect signals about the signals the broker received, and then decides whether to punish
him.
Denote the probability with which the signal the broker receives is correct as <7 . Since a
signal with <7 =0.5 is totally uninformative, assumel > o >0.5. Denote the probability that
the dealer receives the signal the broker received as y.
We will focus on the truth telling separating equilibrium of this game. In this
equilibrium, the dealer offers two different sets of prices, and the broker chooses to tell
the truth.
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After the dealer announce s,,Sj, traders rationally anticipate that their perceived identity
will be truthfully reported by the broker, but will be misrepresented with probability 1 - <j .
The expected terms of trades for the two types of traders are:
s' =os, +(l-0>,. (2.13)
s; = OSi + (1 - <7)s, (2.14)
Their trading decisions will be 2{q" - £s,e) for liquidity traders, and qi for informed traders.
From the dealer's post, the expected profit from traders is:
2s',{q (2.15)
Zero profit condition requires (2.15) to be equal to zero.
Informed traders' participation constraint is: s.<a. Liquidity traders participate
when*?* > £sj.
Given any s,,si such that s, , the broker has an incentive to lie to the dealer.
IfSj > s,, when he perceives the trader as an informed one, he has incentive to report the
trade as a liquidity trade. The reason is that the trader can save a cost equal to sj - s, if the
broker reports his trade as uninformed one, and the broker can extract part of this gain.
On the other hand, ifs( < st, the broker has incentive to report a perceived liquidity trade
as an informed trade since doing so can encourage liquidity trading and he can earn more
commissions.36
We believe that the truth-telling equilibrium should have the feature thats, > s,. In a
properly organized market, liquidity costs should be controlled at a low level. Besides,
liquidity trading is sensitive to s, in this model. As discussed before, a large s, may be
detrimental to the market.
Given thats,. > s,, the dealer has to provide an incentive for the broker to tell the truth
when the broker observes an informed trades. Assume that the broker has all the
bargaining power and can extract all the gains from strategically misreporting, —st. To
sustain truth telling, the dealer's strategy should be able to wipe out all the broker's gain
from misreporting. Lawrence, et al. consider the following strategy: if the dealer find that
the broker misreports, he will punish the broker by offering a bad price in the next N
36 The issue of commission is not formally modelled. However, the validity of the following discussion will
not be affected.
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uninformed orders37. That is, he will charge a spread sr Assume that the broker is in a
competitive brokerage industry. If he is punished, to maintain his business, he has to pay
the penalty sf - s, himself when he receives an order from a perceived liquidity trader.
In equilibrium, the following condition must be satisfied:
s, -s,< - s,) + c] (/C)
c represents an additional punishment by the dealer. Lawrence, et al. interpret it as the
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cost of under-provision of facility. Apparently, the above IC constraint will be satisfied
with a sufficiently large N.
To compare the welfare implication of the two types of markets, Lawrence, et al. (1992)
establish that given the same market parameter, the expected spread liquidity traders pay
in the human intermediate market never exceeds the pooling spread in the anonymous
trading market; if pooling equilibrium in the anonymous trading market exists and is
inefficient, human intermediate market can achieve Pareto improvement when the dealer
has sufficient ability to sanction the broker's opportunistic behaviour, e.g. y or c is
sufficiently large.
As in the previous section, the pooling equilibrium in an anonymous trading market
may be inefficient when adverse selection is too intense. Human intermediation can
improve efficiency in the sense that liquidity traders and informed traders can both get
better execution. The idea is that when adverse selection is too intense, in an anonymous
trading market, market makers have to set a wide spread to guard against informed
trading. Since liquidity trading is sensitive to the size of spread, market makers' profits
from liquidity traders may drop. And this will impair market makers' ability to organize
the market which results in an even wider spread. Adverse selection creates heavy burden
to a market of this type.
However, in a human intermediate market, because of the separation of informed orders
and liquidity orders, the conflict between price discovery and liquidity provision is
mitigated. Liquidity traders can enjoy a low cost of liquidity provision and become more
active. Market makers may profit more from liquidity traders and become less vulnerable
to informed trading. If so, both types of traders can enjoy a better execution quality in a
human intermediation market.
37 In the punishment phrase, the broker has incentive to report any orders as liquidity ones. But this may
trigger further punishment. However, Lawrence, et al. has no discussions on this issue.
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In London SEAQ, dealers conduct price discovery by trading with informed traders.
Informed traders speculate a stock when its price does not incorporate their private
information. Their speculative behaviours impose an adverse selection problem to dealers.
The adverse selection problem forces dealers to update their valuation of a stock. The
magnitude of the update is positively related to the degree of adverse selection.
Dealers suffer losses from trading with informed traders. Spread arises to compensate
dealers for the losses. When adverse selection gets more severe, dealers suffer more
losses to informed traders and spread gets wider.
Adverse selection may have systematic patterns. Informed traders may attempt a
sufficient large-size transaction to best exploit their informational advantages. They may
time their trades when the probability of liquidity-trading is higher so that the spread they
pay can be smaller. Therefore, the degree of adverse selection may relate to trade size and
trade time. Human intermediation may effectively separate the market into an informed-
trade market and a liquidity-trade market. Thus, adverse selection may concentrate in a
market segment which is under market makers' control.
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Chapter 3
Detect information content of trades in LSE with
application to examine the Signalling Hypothesis in the
SEOs Literature
3.1 Introduction
Right issues were almost the only SEOs method employed in the UK before the late
1980s. After that, companies have increasingly opted to issue equity with private
placements. One of the frameworks in which an equity private placement takes place in
the UK is known as an open offer. It is a hybrid of private placement and rights issue.
Before an open offer is publicly announced, new shares are placed to a small group of
investors. However, current shareholders retain the rights of first refusal, and they can
'claw back' their entitlement from the placees. But if they do not take up, they can not
sell the rights. Therefore, wealth transfers will occur if offer price is set at discount which
happens most of the time in practice. Take-up rates are generally low in UK open offers
(Armitage and Snell (2003)).
Most of the research in UK SEOs, e.g. Slovin, et al. (2000), document negative
announcement price effects of rights offers when alternative issue methods are available.
Despite being priced at substantial discount, UK open offers elicit positive market
reaction (Armitage (2002) and Armitage and Snell (2003)), which is consistent with the
finding for private placements in US, e.g. Wruck (1989), Hertzel and Smith (1993). The
literature posits two sets of theories to explain the price effects of various issue methods.
The first and most prevalent one suggests that the price effects of private placements and
open offers come from the new outside block-holdings the offers create. These block-
holders can partially internalise a firm's gains from their monitoring efforts and thus have
incentive to monitor the firm's performance. The presence of these new block-holders
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increases the possibility of value-increasing takeovers. Therefore, market responses
positively to private placements and open offers.
The second set of theories study the price effects in a context of asymmetric
information. A firm's value is not known by public. But it can costly signal its quality
with its choice of SEOs methods since a flotation method is differential costly to firms of
different qualities. If signalling results in a non-pooling equilibrium, then asymmetric
information is resolved or partially resolved, and post-issue stock-price effects occur. In
the placing process of UK open offers and private placements, potential placees will
investigate the issuers and decide whether to buy (Armitage (2002)). Issuers of different
qualities are differentially able to pass the investigations, with high quality issuers being
better able to. Thus, high quality issuers may employ private placements or open offers to
signal quality (Armitage and Snell (2003)). If so, market will respond positively to open
offers and private placements.
There have been lots of empirical researches, e.g. Wruck (1989) and Cronqvist and
Nilsson (2000), on the first set of theories, referred to as agency costs and control
approach. They provide evidences that private placements enhance the disciplinary power
from capital market so that agency problem of management is better controlled.
Although some empirical works are devoted to the second set of theories, e.g. Hertzel and
Smith (1993), and Wu (2005), they do not test directly the hypothesis of private
placements as a signalling device. For example, they find that firms with high degree of
asymmetric information are more likely to employ private placements (Wu (2005)), and
the abnormal returns post equity private placements are positively related to the degree of
asymmetric information (Hertzel and Smith (1993)). We contend that their findings do
provide some evidences for the signalling hypothesis, but are not sufficient. Firstly, they
have not established that firms of high degree of asymmetric information suffer negative
market responses when choosing other SEOs methods. Secondly, the choice problem for
firms with low degree of asymmetric information is missing in their discussion. The role
of private placements for these firms is not clear. Thirdly, to identify the degree of
asymmetric information, they employ some proxies, such as firm ages and existence of
venture capitalist in the firm's IPO, which, although is reasonable, can not be perfectly
rationalized. And most of these proxies are invariable even though the degree of
asymmetric information changes during SEOs.
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This thesis intends to provide firm evidences for the signalling hypothesis. In the
context ofUK open offers and rights offers, we attempt to establish that good firms signal
quality with open offers.
If good firms do signal quality with open offers, asymmetric information of firms'
values must be resolved with equity offers. The reason is that the market can observe a
firm's choice of flotation methods and can infer the firm's quality from its choice. Thus
insider information will be revealed to the market with equity offers.
To examine the resolution of asymmetric information, we can rely upon transactions in
the secondary market. If asymmetric information of a firm's value is resolved, the
amount of private information about the firm is reduced. As a result, in the secondary
market, informed traders' informational advantage over market makers is lessened.
Adverse selection in the transactions of the firm's stock will be less severe.
Therefore, the hypothesis of resolution of asymmetric information can be tested by
identifying the changes of adverse selection in the secondary market transactions during
equity offers. Negative changes suggest that asymmetric information is resolved with
equity offers.
In section 3.5, with price impact method, we find that information content of trades
marginally significantly falls after both rights offers and open offers. This result suggests
adverse selection gets less severe post equity offers. And it in turn implies that
asymmetric information is resolved with equity offers. Together with Armitage and Snell
(2003)'s finding of positive price effects of UK open offer and negative price effects of
rights offers, our result suggests that asymmetric information is resolved with firms'
choices of equity flotation methods, and that open offers are employed by good firms to
signal quality to the market.
To provide evidence for the signalling hypothesis, the main hypothesis to test is that
asymmetric information is resolved with equity offers. An essential ingredient for this
test is a measure of the degree of adverse selection in the secondary market transactions.
Microstructure literature posits that the degree of adverse selection can be revealed with
the size of spreads and the magnitude of the impact of trades on prices (Glosten and
Milgrom (1985)). Based on that, empirical methodologies, such as simple spread
comparison (e.g. Kothare (1997)), decomposing spread models (e.g. Huang and Stoll
(1997)) and price impact methods (e.g. Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers (1987)), have
been devised to measure the degree of adverse selection. In this thesis, we will start with
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some simple methods and then move on to more delicate methods to test the hypothesis
of resolution of asymmetric information.
The thesis is organized as follows. In section 3.2, descriptive statistics for offer
characteristics, firm characteristics, trading characteristics and spread characteristics are
provided. In particular, we are interested in the changes in spreads during equity offers.
Since spreads compensate market makers for their losses to informed traders, we expect
the size of spreads to fall during equity offers if asymmetric information is resolved.
In section 3.3, we run regressions of spreads on a set of variables known to be unrelated
to adverse selection. The spread changes unrelated to the changes in adverse selection
may be controlled for with the regressions. And the changes in the residual spreads
during equity offers may be a result of changes in adverse selection. If asymmetric
information is resolved, we expect the residual spreads to fall during equity offers.
Besides, we investigate the explanatory power of firm size, price level, volume and
volatility on the cross-sectional variation of percentage spreads, and on the cross-
sectional variation of changes in percentage spreads.
In section 3.4, we employ decomposing spread models to directly identify the spread
component related to adverse selection. The spread literature contends that spreads have
three components: order processing cost component (Demsets (1968)), inventory holding
component (Stoll (1981)) and adverse selection component (Glosten and Milgrom
(1985)). Order processing cost creates the bid-ask bounce with order inflows, while the
other two components do not. Adverse selection component is incorporated into spreads
in a forward looking way, while inventory holding component is in a backward looking
way. The decomposing spread models in Glosten and Harris (1988), Huang and Stoll
(1997) and MRR (1997) are constructed based on these features of the three cost
components. However, these decomposing spread models fail to produce sensible results
with our data-set. We contend that this may be due to the high degree of human
intermediation in London SEAQ. A critique of the application of this methodology in
human intermediated markets will be provided.
In section 3.5, we employ price impact method to identify the degree of adverse
selection. A trade has temporary impact and permanent impact on price. The degree of
adverse selection can be measured by a trade's permanent impact on price. If asymmetric
information is resolved with equity offers, permanent impacts of trades should fall during
equity offers. Besides, we will investigate the pattern of adverse selection in London
SEAQ. Adverse selection may be related to trade size (Easley and O'hara (1987)).
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Human intermediation, which is an important feature of London SEAQ, may effectively
separate informed trades with liquidity trades and thus may affect the pattern of adverse
selection (Lawrence, et al. (1992)). Adverse selection may be asymmetric between block
purchases and block sales (Gemmill (1996), and Keim and Madhavan (1996)). We will
investigate these issues with the measure of adverse selection obtained with the price
impact method.
Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
3.2.1 Sample description
A sample ofUK open offers and rights offers is obtained from Professor Seth Armitage
and Professor Andy Snell. The sample of open offers consists of 148 offers in London
stock exchange with announcement date from June 1998 to August 2001. That of rights
offers consists of 88 offers with ex-rights date from July 1998 to July 2001. In the sample
of rights offers, all except 2 offers are insured-rights offers. This is consistent with the
sample characteristics in Slovin, et al. (2000). Professor Seth Armitage also provides us
the information about the announcement date (the ex-rights date), the offer price (the
subscription price), the number of shares outstanding and the number of new shares
issued for each open offer (right issue).
For stocks in our sample, we search for their transaction data in London stock exchange
Transaction-Data-Service. We use an issuer's name to identify the tradable instrument
code of its common stock. According to it, we search all transaction records and quote
records in a period of 41 trading days surrounding the announcement day (ex-rights day
for right issues). We include a stock only if its transaction data and its market makers'
quote data are available in the database. Our sample is now limited to 107 open offers
and 31 rights offers.
For each stock in the final sample, we pick up its transaction data and quote data in the
41-day event period according to its tradable instrument code. Transaction data includes
trade time, trade price, trade quantity, buy-sell indicator, trade type indicator, publication
indicator, price format indicator and market segment code for every transaction. Quote
data includes the best bid-ask prices and the time when a best bid-ask starts to be
effective. Since trade data and quote data are recorded separately in the data base, we
match each trade with the quote prevalent when the trade took place. Although
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publications of trades with sizes above 3 NMS are not immediately, dealers
accommodating or facilitating the trades are required to report immediately to the
exchange the details of transactions including the time when the trades are executed.
Therefore, the delay of publications does not make the matching problematic.
Through out data searching, we found that almost all stocks in our sample are traded in
dealership market (SEAQ and AIM). To eliminate the influence from the organizational
form of the markets, we exclude the stocks traded in SET or SETmm. Our final sample
contains 100 open offers and 29 rights offers. All the right offers are insured rights offers.
3.2.2 Descriptive Statistics for Firm Characteristics
In this section, some descriptive statistics on offer characteristics and firm
characteristics are generated to illustrate the features of the two types of offers. In
particular, we focus on the ratio of new shares issued over total shares, gross proceeds
from equity offers, issuers' market value, the ratio of gross proceeds over issuer's market
value, offer discounts and offer prices. We find that in our sample, rights offer firms are
generally larger than open offer firms; rights offers are on average larger than open offers
in that the proceeds from offers are larger; new shares in rights offers are sold generally
at a higher price than those in open offers. Table 1 summarizes the mean and median
statistics. T statistics for difference in mean between the two types of offers are provided.
For the open offers, the mean and the median of the ratios of new shares over total
shares post offer are 24.7% and 20% respectively. For the rights offers, the mean and the
median are 22.(5% and 20% respectively. Although the mean ratio of the open offers is
above that of the rights offers, the difference is not significant.
The mean and the median gross proceeds for open offers are £18 million and £10
million respectively. In Hertzel and Smith (1993) on US private placements, the mean
and the median gross proceeds are $11.4 million and $5.4 million. The size of our open
offers is larger than their private placements. The Mean and the median of gross proceeds
in our rights offers are £156 million and £22 million. Slovin et al. (2000) reports the
mean and the median gross proceeds as £74 million and £27.5 million in their UK insured
rights sample. Our median is similar with that in Slovin et al. (2000), but our sample
contains some large offers which push up the mean. Eckbo and Masulis (1992) report a
mean of $60.4 million and a median of $21.6 million in US insured rights offers.
Compared with US rights offers, British rights offers are on average larger. The mean and
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the median gross proceeds of our rights offers are both above those of our open offers. T
test for the difference in the mean gross proceeds between them has a one-sided P-value
of 13%, which is marginally significant.
For our open-offers stock, the mean and the median ratios of gross proceeds to firms'
market value are 34% and 25% respectively.39 The mean and the median ratios for our
rights-offers stocks are 25% and 20%.40 Both the mean and the median ratio of our open-
offers stocks are higher than those of our rights-offers stocks. T test for the difference in
the mean has one sided P-value 6%. Since the gross proceeds in our rights offers are on
average larger than those in our open offers, it suggests that the firms choosing rights
offers are larger than those choosing open offers.
P — P /
Issue discount is calculated as _1 e/p . Pe is the exercise price and P_x is the closing/ -i
mid-point in secondary market the day before the announcement (ex-rights day) of equity
offers. The mean and the median issue discounts for our open offers are 16% and 9.5%.
As in Wruck (1989), we find that some firms' shares are placed at premiums. The
maximum premium in our sample is 350%>, which is larger than that {100%) in Wruck
(1989)'s sample.41 The mean and the median private placement discounts in Hertzel and
Smith (1993) are 20%> and 13%, which is similar to ours. The mean and the median
subscription discounts in our rights offers are 20% and 19%. 3 firms' shares are issued at
premium, with maximum premium of 8%. It is strange that a rights offer is issued at
premium, since investors can purchase shares in the secondary market. But taking into
account the transaction cost (the bid-ask spread) in secondary market transactions, it is
still sensible for some rights offers to be priced at slight premiums. Slovin et al. (2000)
reports the mean and the median discounts of 17% and 16% in their insured rights offer
sample. Eckbo and Masulis (1992) report the mean and the median discounts of 20.4%o
and 19.5% in their US insured rights offer sample. Both results are similar to ours. T test
for the difference in the mean discount between our open offers and rights offers has one
sided P value of 12%. The discount in our rights offers is larger than that in our open
offers at a marginal significance level.
j9 Market value is measured as the multiplier of pre-offer outstanding shares and the average trade price
from event day -20 to -1.
40 Slovin et al. (2000) reports a mean and a median ratio of 40% and 20% for their insured rights offers.
41 Xenova Group pic made a placing and open offer on July 13, 2000. The offer price was 345p per unit.
The closing mid point in secondary market the day before announcement was 76.5p. The offer premium
was 351%.
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The mean and the median market values of our open-offer firms are £126 million and
£38 million. Herztel and Smith (1993) report a mean and median of $95 million and $46
million in their US private placement sample. Wu (2005) reports those of $93 million and
$51 million in his US private placement sample. Our UK open offer firms are larger than
their US private placement firms. The mean and the median market value of our rights
offer firms are £934 million and £130 million. This confirms that our rights-offer firms
are larger than our open-offer firms. T test for the difference in the market value between
our two types of issuers has one sided P value 0.14, which is marginally significant.
Slovin et al. (2000) reports those of their UK insured rights firms of £324 million and
£111 million. Our median is similar with theirs, but our mean is about 3 times larger than
theirs. This implies that our rights offer sample contains some offers made by very large
firms.
The mean and the median of the offer prices of our open-offers stocks are £2.2 and
£0.75. Those of the subscription price of our rights-offers stocks are £4.2 and £2.8. T test
for the difference in mean has one sided P value of 0.03. The new shares of our rights
offer firms are priced significantly higher than those of our open offer firms.
3.2.3 Descriptive Statistics for Spread and Trading Characteristics
In this section, descriptive statistics for spreads and changes in spreads is generated.
Spread is the compensation to market makers for providing liquidity. One of the
components of spreads is the adverse selection cost component (Glosten and Milgrom
(1985)). It is the compensation to market makers for trading with informed traders. If
asymmetric information is resolved with equity offers, adverse selection will become less
severe post equity offers and market makers will suffer fewer losses to informed traders.
Therefore, the adverse selection cost component of spreads should fall. Assume that the
other cost components of spreads do not change. We should observe that spreads get
smaller after rights offers and open offers.
We also provide descriptive statistics for price level, volume and volatility of the two
types of stocks. Statistical tests are carried out to test the difference of trading
characteristics between the two types of stocks, and for each type of stocks, the difference
between pre-offer period and post-offer period.
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3.2.3.1 Data Filter
We focus on the trading period of 41 days surrounding the offer announcement (ex-
rights) day. The pre-offer trading period is from day -20 to day -7; the post-offer trading
period is from day 1 to day 20. For each stock, there is a sequence of trades and a
sequence of best bid-ask quotes. Each trade is matched with the best bid-ask effective
when it took place. Since some trades and quotes did not reflect the nature of liquidity
provision and price discovery, we set up the following fdter for trades and quotes:
1. Trades without firm quotes are eliminated. London SEAQ's daily trading period
starts at 7:30am and ends at 5pm. From 7:30am to 5:00am, the market is run with
indicative quotes from market makers (indicative quoting period). Market makers
are not obligated to quote, and if they quote, the quotes are not firm. That is, these
quotes are not tradable unless the market maker is willing to. Cao et al. (2000)
suggest that market makers share information among themselves in this period.
They signal the direction in which price should moves to other market makers by
crossing and locking the inside quotes. Price discovery is conducted without trades.
At 8:00am, the market enters into normal trading period. Each market maker is
required to enter firm quotes. A trader can have his order executed at these quotes
without uncertainty given that his order is below the quote size. At 4:30pm, the
market turns again into indicative quoting period. Firm quotes reflect market
makers' beliefs of asset value, while indicative quotes may be just an instrument to
acquire and transfer information. It is inappropriate to use indicative quotes to
evaluate market makers' beliefs of the informational characteristics of the
associated trades. Thus, trades without firm quotes are eliminated.
2. Quotes that are not firm are eliminated. Although not reported, we do find some
cases in the indicative quoting period where inside quotes are locked. When inside
quotes are locked, there is no bid-ask spread. But this does not reflect the quality of
liquidity provision since these quotes are not tradable. In less extreme cases, spread
may be small in the indicative quoting period. But again, this may be related to
something other than market quality.
3. Trades between market makers are eliminated. Market makers organize the market
by entering firm quotes and accommodating traders' orders. They need to hold
inventories of a stock. After transactions, their inventory holding may be away from
the optimal level. To reverse his holdings back to the optimal, a market maker can
trade with other market makers in the Inter-Dealer-Broker market. Tonks and Snell
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(1998) find that the execution quality of these trades is usually good. This may be
due to the long-term relation among market makers, or may be because it is
desirable for them to trade with each other since their inventories move in opposite
direction. The execution quality of these trades does not reflect market quality.
4. Trades where market makers buy above mid-point or sell below mid-point are
eliminated. Market makers can accommodate a trade by trading as principle, or
facilitate a trade by trading as agent. Execution quality of principle trades reflect
market quality, while that of agency trades is result of bilateral bargaining between
trading counter parties and may not relate to market quality. Unfortunately, we lost
the information about a trade's type as principle or agency trade when we collected
the data. However, with a small experiment sample, we find that the execution
prices of agency trades are weird and unacceptable to market makers: traders buy
below mid-point or sell above it. Therefore, we eliminate trades with such
characteristics.
5. Trades with trade-type label "B", "X", and with publication label "C", "X" are
excluded. Trades with "B" are broker to broker trades. We exclude them for the
same reason we exclude trades between market makers. Trades with "C" and "X"
are trades that cancelled later on.
3.2.3.2 Descriptive Statistics for Spreads
Table 2 summarizes the changes in proportionate bid-ask spreads around issue
announcement date (ex-rights date) for our open offer stocks (rights offer stocks).
Spreads are the main transaction costs traders assume in stock exchanges. It can be a
measure of quality of liquidity provision. We employ four measures of proportionate
spread: proportionate quoted spread, time weighted proportionate quoted spread,
proportionate effective spread and volume weighted proportionate effective spread.
Proportionate quoted spread for stock / is defined as:
N? is the number of quotes of stocks / during event time; bidtj and askjj are the bid-ask
prices of the j th quote; mid.. is the associated mid point. This simple average may not




persist for a short time, while equilibrium spreads are large. We use time weighted (%)
spread to conquer this problem. It is defined as:
V". .ask,, - bid,, / .' )X'»-
Time (%)Quoted Spread, —
h,
7=1
ty is the time for which j th quote persists.
In a dealership market, trades may not always take place at quoted prices. There can be
price improvements where trades are executed inside the best bid-ask. Price improvement
is an instrument for market makers to discriminate between those traders who have
market power and those who do not (Rhodes-Kropf (2005)), and an incentive device to
encourage reputation building so that traders do not attempt to profit on market makers
with their private information (Gabriel and Thierry (2002)) and to encourage traders'
information sharing with market makers (Garmill (1990)). A quoted price is an
ambiguous indicator of market makers' trading interests, and can not capture the
possibilities of price improvements. A more accurate indicator is the actual transaction
price. This give rise to two other spread measures.
y-11 P* ~ m'dik |
{%)Effective Spread, =—
n;
The above is the proportionate effective spread for stock i. N] is the number of trades of
stock i .Pik is the trade price of the£th trade; midjk is the associated mid point. Volume
weighted proportionate effective spread is defined as:
bp*-mid%dw
(%)Volume Effective Spread, =— -
ix
k=I
Vik is the volume ofk th trade of stock /.
For each spread measure, we take simple average across stocks. Label the four overall
average spread measures as volume (%<>) effective spread, (%) effective spread, time (%>)
quoted spread and (%) quoted spread.
The volume (%) effective spread of our open offer stocks decreases insignificantly from
6.8% before issue announcement date to 6.5% after, with 46% of the firms experiencing
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decreases. The proportion is not significantly different from 50% by binomial test Z
statistics. The mean log-ratio of the spread changes is also insignificant. For our rights
offer stocks, the volume (%) effective spread increases insignificantly from 4.28% before
ex-rights date to 4.34% after, with 52% stocks experiencing increases. The proportion is
not significantly different from 50%. The mean log ratio of the spread changes is
insignificant.
The (%) effective spread of our open offer stocks increases insignificantly from 6.5%
before announcement date to 6.6%> after, with 53% experiencing increases. The
proportion is not significantly different from 50%. The mean log-ratio of the spread
changes is insignificant. The (%) effective spread of the rights offer stocks decreases
insignificantly from 4.3%> before ex-rights date to 4.1 % after, with 55% stocks
experiencing decreases. The proportion is not significantly different from 50%. The mean
ratio of spread changes for these stocks is also insignificant.
The time (%>) quoted spread of the open offer stocks increases insignificantly from
7.2% before announcement to 7.8% after. The mean log-ratio of spread changes is
insignificant. Although the average change in spreads is insignificant, the proportion of
the open offer stocks experiencing changes is significant, with 62% of stocks
experiencing increases in spread. The time (%>) quoted spread of the rights offer stocks
increases insignificant from 4.79% before ex-rights date to 4.8% after, with 59% of
stocks experiencing increases. The proportion is not significantly different from 50%.
The mean log-ratio of spread changes is also insignificant.
The (%) quoted spread of the open offer stocks increases insignificantly from 7.6%>
before to 7.8% after. 59% of these stocks experience increases, which is not significantly
different from 50%. The mean log ratio of spread changes is also not significant. (%)
quoted spread of the rights-offer stocks increases insignificantly from 4.8% before to 5%
after. 55% of these stocks experience increases, which is not significantly different from
50%. The mean log-ratio of spread changes is also insignificant.
Overall, we find little evidence of spread changes after open offers and rights offers.
Although the spreads of our open-offer stocks increase in 3 out of 4 measures, the
changes are insignificant. The proportion of our open-offer stocks experiencing increases
in spreads are above 50% in all four spread measures, but only in one measure, the
proportion is significantly different from 50%. For the rights-offer stocks, spreads
increase in 3 measures and the proportion of stocks experiencing increases is above 50%.
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But none of these changes are significant and none of the proportion measures are
significantly different from 50%.
Our finding contrasts with Kothare (1997). He finds that US rights offer stocks
experiences significant increases in spreads during equity offers. He argues that rights
offers tend to increase the concentration of a firm's ownership structure and thus reduce
liquidity trading of the firm's stock. Trade orders are more likely from informed traders.
Dealers have to increase spreads to guard themselves against the informed. Although
Kothare (1997) finds that ownership concentration is higher in his sample, the literature
on SEOs contends that a rights offer generally does not alter a firm's ownership structure
since new shares are offered on pro rata basis. Reduction of liquidity trading post rights
offers may not be universally true.42
Difference-in-mean tests show that our rights-offer stocks have significantly smaller
spreads than our open offer stocks do in all four spread measures. Benston and Hagerman
(1974) and Stoll (1978) show that proportionate spreads are negatively related to price,
trading volume and firm size, and are positively related to the risk of a security. In our
sample, the rights offer firms are on average larger than the open offer firms, and have
higher share prices (summarized in Table 3). These may contribute to the relatively
smaller spreads of our rights offer stocks.
For both our rights-offer stocks and our open-offer stocks and both the pre-offer and the
post-offer period, the two quoted-spread measures are larger than the two effective-
spread measures. This implies that quoted spreads tend to overstate liquidity cost. Price
improvement is possible in human intermediate markets, e.g. London SEAQ. Long-term
trading relation between market makers and market participants encourages reputation
building. The incentive provision takes the form of price improvements.
3.2.3.3 Descriptive Statistics for Trading Characteristics
Table 3 summarizes trading characteristics of the two type stocks in the pre-offer and
the post-offer period. A stock's price level is measured by the average mid point during
an event period. Average price level of our open-offer stocks in the pre-offer period is
£2.27; that of our rights offer stocks is £4.82. A difference-in-mean test shows that in the
pre-offer period, our rights-offer stocks on average have stock prices significantly higher
than our open-offer stocks. Average price of our open-offer stocks in the post-offer
42
Actually his finding of increase in dollar volume post rights offer may be inconsistent with reduction of
liquidity trading.
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period is £2.31; that of our rights-offer stocks is £4.86. A difference-in-mean test again
shows that our rights-offer stocks on average have significantly higher prices.
The average number of trades per day is 31 in the pre-offer period, and 34 in the post
offer period for an open offer stock in our sample. That for a rights offer stock is 20 in the
pre-offer period, and 19 in the post-offer period. Although the open-offer stocks on
average have more trades than the rights-offer stocks in both pre and post offer period,
the difference is not significant.
The average number of shares traded per day in the pre-offer period is 257 thousand for
an open-offer stock, and 290 thousand for a rights offer stock. Post equity offers, the
number of shares traded per day for an open-offer stock rises to 381 thousand, while that
for a rights-offer stock drops to 179 thousand. The activeness of trading seems to change
in different directions for the two types of stocks.
The average pound volume per day for an open-offer stock is £256 thousand in the pre-
offer period and £273 thousand in the post-offer period. That for a rights-offer stock is
£402 thousand pre-offer and £547 thousand post-offer. The rights-offer stocks have
higher volume than the open-offer stocks both pre and post offer. However, difference in
mean tests show that the difference is not significant.
Volatility is measured by the standard variation of mid point during an event time. The
average volatility of our open-offer stocks is 0.206 pre-offer and 0.212 post-offer. That
for our rights-offer stocks is 0.272 pre-offer and 0.431 post-offer. The rights-offer stocks
on average seem to be more risky than the open offer stocks, but tests show that the
differences in mean are not significant.
Table 4 summarizes the changes of trading characteristics during equity offers for the
two types of stocks. This time, we employ paired difference tests. For each type of stocks,
we calculate the mean log-ratio of changes in the above trading-characteristics measures:
price level, the number of trades per day, shares traded per day, volume per day and
volatility. We also count the proportion of stocks experiencing increases in each measure.
Trading seems to be more active post open offers, as the mean log ratios of changes in
the number of trades, the number of shares traded and pound volume are positive.
However, none of these changes are significant. 54% of stocks experience increases in
the number of trades; 57% experience increases in the number of shares traded; 56%
experience increases in pound volume. But none of these proportions are significantly
different from 50%).
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For the rights-offer stocks, there is little evidence that trading activity becomes more
active or less active post offers. None of the mean log ratios of changes in the number of
trades, number of shares traded and pound volume is significant. The proportions of
stocks experiencing increases in these measures are no different from 50%.
The mean log ratios of changes in mid prices are insignificantly negative for both types
of stocks. 57% of our open offer stocks experience price drops post equity offers, which
is not significantly different from 50%. 76% of our rights offer stocks experience price
drops. The proportion is significantly different from 50%. Thus, we have a minor
evidence of the post-rights-offer price falls which are widely documented in the literature,
e.g. Slovin et al. (2000) and Eckbo and Masulis (1992).
The mean log ratio of changes in volatility is positive for the open-offer stocks, and is
negative for the rights-offer stocks. But both are insignificant. 59% of the open offer
stocks experience reduction in volatility. The proportion is marginally significant. Since
volatility of a stock's price can be a proxy for the amount of private information of the
stock, this may suggest some resolution of asymmetric information with equity open
offers. 55% of the rights-offer stocks experience reduction in volatility. The proportion is
not significantly different from 50%.
We also test whether the changes in mean log ratios are different between the two types
of stocks. We find that there is some difference in the changes of volatility. While
volatility of the open-offer stocks tends to be lower post offer, the price of our rights-
offer stocks seems to be more volatile. The difference is 95% significant with one sided
P-value. This may suggest that there is resolution of asymmetric information with equity
open offers, but not with rights offers. However, since volatility is a noise measure of
asymmetric information, whether resolution of asymmetric information does occur with
equity offers will be subject to further investigations.
3.2.3 Summary for Section 3.2
For all the 4 spread measures, we find that spreads do not experience significant
changes during rights offers or open offers. Since spread compensates market makers'
losses to informed traders, our finding suggests that the degree of adverse selection does
not change post equity offers and thus there is no resolution of asymmetric information
with equity offers.
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For all the 4 spread measures, Rights offer stocks have significantly smaller spreads
than open offer stocks do in both event periods. Benston and Hagerman (1974) and Stoll
(1978) show that proportionate spreads are negatively related to price level. Since our
rights offer stocks have significantly higher stock prices than open offer stocks do in both
event period, the smaller spreads of rights offer stocks may be a result of higher stock
prices.
Quoted spread measures, time weighted or not, are larger than effective spread measure,
volume weighted or not. This suggests that transaction prices are better than quoted
prices. Quoted spread measures tend to exaggerate trading costs in London SEAQ where
trades are often human intermediated and price improvements are possible.
In our sample, rights offer firms on average have higher market values than open offer
firms do. Compared with those of our open offers, the proceeds of our rights offers are
larger; offer prices are higher; offer discounts are larger.
For both types of stocks, trading volume and volatility do not experience significant
changes during equity offers. Right offer stocks seem to experience post-offer price falls.
There is no significant difference between trading volume and volatility between the two
types of stocks. Rights offer stocks on average have a higher price level than open offer
stocks do.
3.3 Spread regressions
Our main hypothesis is that asymmetric information is resolved with equity offers. If
this is true, spreads should be smaller post equity offers since market makers suffer fewer
losses to informed traders. However, the result in Section 3.2 shows that spread does not
change after open offers or rights offers, which is not consistent our hypothesis.
Another possibility is that although market makers reduce spreads for lower adverse
selection, for some other reasons they increase spreads so that spreads as the whole do
not change. The spread literature suggests that spreads consist of three components: order
processing cost component (Demsetz (1968)), inventory holding component (Stoll
(1981)), and adverse selection component (Glosten and Milgrom (1985)). Adverse
selection component is the part of spreads which compensates market makers' losses to
informed traders. It is possible that although adverse selection component falls, the other
two components rise such that the sum of the three does not change. In order to identify
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the change of adverse selection component, we must control for the factors that affect the
other two components.
In this section, we propose two regression models to net out the changes in spreads due
to the change in adverse selection. We regress the 4 spread measures obtained in the last
section on variables related to order processing cost component and inventory holding
component to obtain the residual spreads. If the residual spreads change during equity
offers, the changes may probably be induced by the changes in adverse selection since
the changes in other cost components have been controlled for. If the residual spreads of
both types of stocks significantly fall during equity offers, it may suggest resolution of
asymmetric information.
3.3.1 Methodology
Previous empirical works on spreads suggest that proportionate spread is negatively
related to firm size (Barclay (1997)), trading volume (Stoll (1978)) and price
(Bessembinder (1997)), and positively related to volatility (Benston and Hagerman
(1974)). Firm size can be a proxy of market liquidity, and affects market makers'
inventory holding cost. Trading volume is a measure of activeness of trading. When a
market maker's inventory holding deviates from optimal level, the probability that he can
reverse his holding back to optimal through trading depends on the activeness of trading.
As a result, inventory holding cost will be higher when trading volume is lower.
Volatility is a measure of the risk-ness of a security. High volatility implies frequent
inflow of private information. Thus volatility is positively related to adverse selection
component.
To capture the change in adverse selection component during equity offers, we propose
the following two spread-regression models43:
Spread(%) = J30 + In{Firm size) + f32 /, . + J33 In{Trading Volume)- / rr ice
+ [3^ In(Volatility) + (53Dp + fd^DR + fd^DPR + £
Spread(%) = J30 + (dx In(Firm size) + fd2 Vp . -I- Jd3 In{Trading Volume)- / rr ice (J-,)
+ fi5Dp + fd6DR + /?7Dpr + £
43 We admit that the relation between inverse of price and percentage spread lacks of economic
justifications. In the appendix, we provide another set of estimations in which the variable for the inverse of
price is not included. The results lead us to the same conclusion: no resolution of asymmetric information.
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Each firm contributes two sets of observations: the pre-issue and the post-issue
observations. Firm size is measured by a firm's market capitalization. A firm's market
capitalization is the number of shares outstanding multiplied by the average price level of
those shares in an event period. The information about the issuers' outstanding shares is
provided by Professor Seth Armitage. Note that in the post issue period, the new equity
raised is included to determine a firm's market capitalization. Price is measured by the
average mid point of transactions during the 20-day trading period. Trading volume is
measure by the pound volume per trading day. Volatility is measured by the standard
variance ofmid points of transactions.
Firm size, trading volume and volatility are in log form since previous literature
suggests log transformation provides better fit (e.g. Barclay (1997)). Dp is the dummy
variable for the post-offer observations (0 for pre, 1 for post). DR is the dummy for the
rights-offer observations (0 for open offers, 1 for rights offers). DPR is the interactive
dummy between Dp and DR .
Dp is designed to capture the change in spreads for the open-offer stocks during equity
offers; DPR is to capture that for the rights-offer stocks. After we control for order
processing cost and inventory holding cost, J35 and J3S + /?7 may indicate the spread
changes induced by changes in adverse selection.
Our main hypothesis is that asymmetric information is resolved with equity offers.
When asymmetric information is resolved, adverse selection will be less severe. If so, the
adverse selection component of spreads should fall post equity offers. Therefore, the
hypothesis can be tested by,
H0 : J35 =0 or (3S + /?7 = 0, or both (Asymmetric information is not resolved)
H,-P> < 0 and fi5 + ft-, < 0 (Asymmetric information is resolved)
We will rely on specification (b) to test the hypothesis. In specification (a), we include all
the factors related to spreads to examine their effects. However, volatility is a measure of
information flows and may contaminate our measure of changes in spread induced by the
change in adverse selection. Therefore we exclude it from specification (b).
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While specification (a) and (b) are good in explaining the cross-sectional variation of
spreads, we are more interested in the change in spreads during equity offers.
Specification (c) and (d) are better at this issue:
A,Spread = J30 + y3xAFirm size + /32A?r ice + /32AVolume + j34AVolatility + £ (c)
ASpread = J30 + AFirm size + j32AVrice + j33AVolume + £ (d)
The change of a variable is measured by the log °^a™a^eposJ/yarjafoie ■ ^eca" that in
our descriptive statistics, the mean spread change is insignificant. But again, this does not
immediately imply that the spread change induced by changes in adverse selection is
insignificant. To extract the information-related-spread change, we need to control for
those changes related to order processing component and inventory holding component.
Changes in firm size, price level and volume will be used to net out the spread changes
we want.
Each firm contributes one set of observations. For each specification, we separately ran
regressions for the rights-offer stocks and the open-offer stocks. The constant terms may
measure the spread changes related to adverse selection. Our main hypothesis can be
tested with specification (d) by:
H0 : f}°pe" = 0 orj3fsht = 0, or both (Asymmetric information is not resolved)
H] : jd°pe" < 0 and j3P,gh' < 0 (Asymmetric information is resolved)
3.3.2 Results for Specification (a) and (b)
Table 5 presents the regression results for specification (a) and (b). First we focus on
the specification (a). For all four measures of spread, coefficients for firm size, inverse of
price, volume and volatility have the signs predicted by the microstructure literature.
Larger firm sizes are associated with lower percentage spreads; higher stocks prices are
associated with lower percentage spreads; higher trading volumes are associated with
lower percentage spreads; higher volatility of stock prices is associated with higher
percentage spreads. Except the coefficients for volatility, all the coefficients for firm size,
volume and inverse of price are significant at least at 90%. Volume seems to be the most
powerful variables in explaining the cross-sectional variation of spreads (%). R2 is
around 50% which is similar with the previous results in the spread literature, e.g.
Barclay (1997) and Bessembinder (1997). And these variables seem to have better ability
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to explain quoted spreads than effective spreads since/?2is higher in the quoted-spread
regressions.
Of coefficients for volatility, an interesting feature is that they are significant in our
regressions of quoted spreads, but not in those of effective spreads. Quoted spread is an
instrument for market makers to guard themselves against informed trades. This notion is
supported by our regressions of quoted spreads which suggest that market makers for
stocks of higher risk quote wider spreads. But because of human intermediation,
transactions may not always take place at quoted prices. From the regressions of effective
spreads, the relation between volatility (risk) and effective spread is not significant. This
implies that actual transaction prices are less influenced by adverse selection than quoted
prices are. With the fact that transaction prices are better than quoted prices44, this
suggests human intermediation alleviates adverse selection problem and facilitate
liquidity provisions.
We now turn to specification (b) to test our main hypothesis:
H0 : J35 - 0 or jB5 + J37 = 0, or both (Asymmetric information is not resolved)
< 0 and /?5 + /?7 < 0 (Asymmetric information is resolved)
In the regression results for specification (b), the coefficients for firm size, inverse of
price and volume still have the correct signs, and are significant at least at 90%. The
spread changes that originally are captured by volatility will now be captured by DP,DPR .
From table 5, only in one regression, /?5 has a sign consistent with the hypothesis.
All J3S in the four regressions are insignificant. Only in one regression, /?5 + (31 has a sign
consistent with the hypothesis, but in this case,/?5's sign is not correct. All /35 + fd1 are
insignificant. Therefore, we accept the null hypothesis: asymmetric information is not
resolved with equity offers.
3.3.3 Results for specification (c) and (d)
We first focus on specification (c) where all the factors related to spreads are included.
The result is presented in panel A, table 6. The coefficients for changes in firm size,
changes in price level, changes in volume and changes in volatility have the signs
predicted by microstructure theory in almost all regressions. When a firm's size goes up,
transaction cost of its stock goes down; when stock price goes up, proportionate spread
44 The results in Section 3.2 suggest that effective spreads are smaller than quoted spreads.
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goes down; when trading of a stock becomes more active, its spread gets smaller; when a
stock becomes more risky, its spread gets larger.
However, these coefficients are not as significant as before. Changes in firm size and
changes in volatility have no substantial explanatory power in this specification. Almost
all of their coefficients are insignificant. Together with the result of specification (a) and
(b), this suggests that firm size and volatility are powerful in explaining the cross-
sectional variation of spreads, but for a specific stock, the changes of spreads are not
significantly related to the changes of them. When market makers quote prices and
decide the transaction prices, they may have formed beliefs about the nature of the
potential private information of a stock and the liquidity characteristics of it. They may
revise their beliefs according to certain variables. But from the regression, it seems that
firm size and volatility are not the candidates.
Price changes and volume changes remain to have substantial explanatory power. Most
of their coefficients are significant. Significantly negative coefficients of price changes
suggest that when price goes up, market makers do not enlarge spreads, or at least do not
enlarge it to accompany the price increases. This may be a result of competition between
market makers. Volume seems to be an important variable for market makers to update
their beliefs about a stock's liquidity characteristics. A stock becomes more liquid when
trade volume is higher. And the risk of holding non-optimal inventories is lower.
Therefore, market makers ask for less compensation and spreads fall.
To test the main hypothesis, we turn to specification (d). The result is presented in
Panel B, table 6. The coefficients for firm size, price level and volume are similar with
those in specification (c). We then focus on the constant term. Firstly, only in 2
regressions of the rights-offer stocks, the constants have signs consistent with the
hypothesis. The constants in all regressions of the open-offer stocks have positive signs,
which is inconsistent with the hypothesis. Besides, none of the constants are significant.
This suggests that there are no significant changes in proportionate spreads after we
control for the changes not related to adverse selection. This leads us to accept the null
hypothesis: asymmetric information is not resolved with equity offers.
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3.3.4 Summary for Section 3.3
After we control for variables related to order processing cost component and inventory
holding component, we do not find any significant spread changes during equity offers.
This suggests that asymmetric information is not resolved with equity offers.
Firm size, inverse of price and volume have significant explanatory power on the cross-
sectional variation of all the 4 percentage spread measures. Larger firm sizes are
associated with lower percentage spreads; higher stocks prices are associated with lower
percentage spreads; higher trading volumes are associated with lower percentage spreads.
Volatility has significant explanatory power on the cross-sectional variation of the 2
percentage quoted spread measures, with higher volatility, wider quoted spread.
Volatility can be a measure of information inflows. Higher volatility implies a higher
probability of informed trades. Our result confirms the notion that quoted spread is an
instrument for market makers to guard themselves against informed trades.
However, volatility has no significant explanatory power on the cross-sectional
variation of the 2 percentage effective spread measures. Because of human
intermediation, transactions may not always take place at quoted prices. Our result
suggests that actual transaction prices will be less influenced by adverse selection. With
the fact that transaction prices are better than quoted prices, this suggests human
intermediation alleviates adverse selection problem and facilitate liquidity provisions.
Changes in firm size and changes in volatility have no explanatory power on the
changes of spreads during equity offers. On the other hand, price changes and volume
changes remain to have substantial explanatory power. Significantly negative coefficients
of price changes suggest that when price goes up, market makers do not enlarge spreads,
or at least do not enlarge it to accompany the price increases. This may be a result of
competition between market makers. Volume seems to be an important variable for
market makers to update their beliefs about a stock's liquidity characteristics. A stock
becomes more liquid when trade volume is higher. And the risk of holding non-optimal
inventories is lower. Therefore, market makers ask for less compensation and spreads fall.
3.4 Decomposing Bid-Ask Spread
In section 3.3, we do not find any significant spread changes during equity offers after
we control for factors related to order processing cost component and inventory holding
component. However, this result should be taken with cautions. In the spread regressions,
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we try to control for factors not related to adverse selection in order to extract the spread
changes relevant. So far, we can only identify factors like firm size, price level and
volume. It is possible that some factors we have not identified systematically increase
spreads during equity offers, and therefore even though asymmetric information gets
lower, we do not observe a fall of spreads.
In this section, we will attack the question by directly identifying the degree of adverse
selection. Decomposing spread model in Madhavan et al. (1997) will be employed to
directly identify the adverse selection cost component of spreads. If equity offers resolve
asymmetric information, the adverse selection cost component should fall post equity
offers. However, from the estimation results we find no evidence of resolution of
asymmetric information. Moreover, the estimations produce some incredible coefficients
which can not be rationalized. At the end of this section, we offer some possible reasons
for why the decomposing spread models do not work for London SEAQ.
3.4.1 Overview of the Spread Theory
The spread literature contends that spreads have three components: order processing
cost component (Demsets (1968)), inventory holding component (Stoll (1981)) and
adverse selection component (Glosten and Milgrom (1985)).
Traders' trading interests are different in dimension of time and size. They may not
obtain liquidity immediately due to lack of opposite-side trading. To facilitate continuous
trading, market makers commit to match traders' demand and supply in those two
dimensions by accommodating traders' trading interests. Market makers should be
compensated for the costs incurred in this liquidity-provision process. Demsets (1968)
refer to this cost as order processing cost. To provide liquidity, market makers have to
hold inventories. Portfolio theory predicts that they should have an optimal holding of
inventory. However, trading with traders will drive their holdings away from the optimal.
And they will incur undiversified risk, which will not be rewarded. This loss will
ultimately be bom by traders. Stoll (1981) refers to this cost as inventory holding cost.
Informed traders play an essential role in price discovery process as they produce and
impound information into market. The way they do so is by trading with market makers.
While trades from informed traders are essential to the efficiency of stock exchange, it
imposes direct losses on market makers: Inform traders buy exactly as price is lower than
"true" price and sell as price is higher than that. Eventually, market makers will transfer
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the losses to (liquidity) traders. This cost for traders is referred to as adverse selection
cost (Glosten and Milgrom (1985)). These three cost components give rise to the
existence of spreads.
To test our main hypothesis, we need to extract adverse selection cost component from
spreads. To do so, it is necessary to understand the relation between transaction price and
market makers' valuation of an asset, and how each cost component affects this relation.
First ignore the inventory holding component and adverse selection component. Denote
market makers' valuation of a security given all the public information as V. Denote
order processing cost as c. Since market makers will ask for compensation c in a trade,
they will not buy or sell the security at priceV. Instead, they will buy from traders at
price V — c (bid price), and sell to them atF + c(ask price). Denote the order inflow
as Q (Q = l traders buy from market makers; Q=-l traders sell). Then the transaction
price can be expressed as V + cQ.
Market makers understand that the value of the security may not be V since their
valuation is formed without private information. Informed traders have access to the
private information, and they can profit with the information advantage. Market makers
believe that on average they will lose i to a trader due to his possibility of being informed.
i is the adverse selection cost component and is positively related to the possibility of
informed trades. Since market makers can make order contingent quotes, they can quote
regret-free prices by incorporating i into bid and ask price separately. Ask price will
be(F + i) + cQ, and bid price will be (V-i)-cQ. While in above, we interpret/as the
losses of market makers to informed traders, a more intuitive interpretation is that i is
their beliefs about the difference between the true value of the security and their current
valuations when they receive a order.
The last component to incorporate is inventory holding component. If inventory
holding cost is ignored, market makers' current valuation of the security is exactly at the
mid price (mid point of bid-ask price). However, when inventory holding cost is
considered, the mid price may not indicate their valuation. When inventory deviates from
optimal holdings, market makers have incentive to reverse it back: they want to sell if
they hold too much and want to buy if they fall short of it. To encourage liquidity traders
to trade in the desirable direction, market makers can reduce the gap between ask (bid)
price and their valuation, and enlarge that between bid (ask) and their valuation, if they
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hold too much (fall short) and want to sell (buy) (Stoll (1981)). Therefore, inventory
holding cost can drive the mid price away from market makers' valuation.
Order processing cost creates the bid-ask bounce with order inflows, while the other
two components do not. Adverse selection component is incorporated into spreads in a
forward looking way, while inventory holding component is in a backward looking way.
The decompose spread models in Glosten and Harris (1988), Huang and Stoll (1997)
and MRR (1997) are constructed based on the above theories. The most important
difference among these models is the different specification of market makers'
information revealing strategy. In MRR (1997), and Huang and Stoll (1997), the strategy
is based on trade time; in Glosten and Harris (1988), it is based on trade size. Even in
MRR and Huang-stoll, the strategies are different: in MRR, market makers infer
information from future trades; in Huang-stoll, they infer information from past trades.
Huang-stoll is the only model that attempt to distinguish between order processing
component and inventory component. To do so, they also specify market makers'
inventory-reversal strategy. In what follows, we first describe the construction of these
models and then apply them to our analysis.
3.4.2 Decompose spread models
3.4.2.1 Huang and Stoll (1997)
Market makers' valuation update is driven by two sources: (1) Public information
shock which is not associated with trading; and (2) the trade flow last period which may
reveal relevant information about the asset value.
V,= rM+£,+«!&_, <3.1)
S is the average spread, a is the fraction of spread attributed to adverse selection
component. Equation (3.1) implies that market makers consider the possibility of
informed trading and will adjust their belief according to the last period trade direction.45
For market makers' information revealing strategy, Huang-stoll posits that it is the
unexpected trade flows that reveal information. There are many sources causing serial
covariance between successive order flows, e.g. inventory holding component can
induces order flows of a certain direction. Huang-stoll claim that if an order flow is in the
45
However, it seems that market makers' behaviour is not optimal in this model. Instead of utilizing only
past order flow, they can actually form valuation with future order flows since they can quote order
contingent prices (Glosten and Milgrom (1985)). Bid ask prices should not only be ex-ante efficient, but
also ex-post efficient.
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expectation of market makers, it should have no effects on their valuation of the asset.
The unexpected trade flow last period can be expressed as Q,_x - E(Q,-\ \Qt-i) • Q,~i is the
actual trade flow last period. E(Q,_X \Q,.2) is the expected trade flow last period:
£(&_, 10,_2) = -*0,_2 + (1 - n)Q,_2 = (1 - 2k)Q,_2 (3.2)
;ris the probability of trade flow reversal (the probability of continuation isl- k). With
equation (3.1) and (3.2), market makers' valuation updating process can be expressed as:
V, = Vr_t +£,+ - (1 - 2k)Q,_2 ] (3.3)
Given the existence of inventory holding costs, market makers will adjust the bid-ask
price relative to their valuation to induce inventory equilibrate trades when their
inventory holding deviates from the optimal level. The distance between quoted mid
point and their valuation is the part of spread set up to equilibrate inventory.
K-V.+P^LQ, (3.4)^ z"=l
Mt is the quoted mid point for time t trade. /? is the faction of spread attributed to
inventory component. Is is the actual inventory holding before time t transaction.
i=l
Assume a constant spread, the actual transaction price will be half of effective spread
above or below the quoted mid point.
P,=M/+~Qr (3.5)
In the original model, there is a random term in (3.5) for rounded error. Since LSE allows
for decimal trading, we can ignore the rounded error. Combining equation (3.3), (3.4) and
(3.5), the change of transaction prices between subsequent periods can be put as:
A/(=|a-(l-«-«fS-,-(l-2*)a|fi-,+£, (3.6)
Equation (3.6) can be estimated by a simple linear regression.46
3.4.2.2 Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans, (1997)
MRR (1997) do not estimate the proportion of spreads attributable to each cost
component. Instead, it estimates directly the compensation to market makers for
46
K can be estimated separately by a linear regression: Qt = (1 — 2?r)Ql_i + £
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processing order, holding inventory and trading with informed traders. Unlike Huang and
Stoll (1997), spread is not involved in the model. But it can be recovered by summing up
all the compensations to market makers.
Denote two forms of compensations to market makers as:47
0: Per trade loss to informed traders. It can also be interpreted as the permanent impact
of unexpected trade-flows on market maker's valuation.
(f): Cost per trade for supplying liquidity (it includes order processing cost and inventory
holding cost)
Market makers' valuation update can be expressed as:
K=K-i+m -m,\Q,-x\) + e, (3.7)
We can see that in the MRR model, market makers are allowed to use future information
to form their belief. This is consistent with the microstructure literature, e.g. (Glosten and
Milgrom (1985).
MRR lump order processing cost and inventory holding cost component into a category
called cost per trade for supplying liquidity. Transaction price is determined by,
P,=Vl+<pQl (3.8)
Combining (3.7) and (3.8) yields,
P,= +d(Q,-E\Q,\Q,-A) + 4Q, +£, (3-9)
With equation (4.9), we have Vt_x — Pt_t - (pQ,_x. Putting it back to (3.9) yields,
AP, = (0 +m -00,-.-J + *, (3.10)
The only unobservable term in (3.10) is the expected trade flow given the last period
trade. As in Huang and Stoll (1997), the expected trade flow can be calculated as:
E[Q\Q^\ = (\-2K)Qt_, (3.11)
For simplicity, denote 1 - 2n as p , and interpret it as probability of trade continuation.
Combining (3.10) and (3.11), we have
AP, ={e + (t>)Q,-{</> +pO)Q,_, +e, (3.12)
4R
With p , we can determine <j), 9 from regression (3.12). 6 may be interpreted as the
adverse selection cost component; (f> may be interpreted as the order processing cost and
47 MRR (1997) lump order processing cost and inventory holding cost component in one category. The
reason they can not decompose these two cost components is that they do not use the relation between
quoted mid point and market makers' valuation.
4S
p can be estimated separately by a linear regression: Qt = pQ+ £
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inventory holding cost component. According to the definition of effective spreads, we
can recover the effective spread from (3.12) by settingQt = 1,(9,= 0 . The effective half
spread is (<p + 6) .
3.4.2.3 Glosten and Harris (1988)
The most important difference between Glosten and Harris (1988) and the above two
models is that GH emphasizes on information revelation with trade sizes, while the other
two models assume fixed order size. As MRR, GH does not estimate the proportion of
spreads attributable to each cost component, but directly estimates the cost per trade for
each cost consideration.
The market makers' valuation update in GH is:
V, = Vt_, +0,Q, +£, (3.13)
(9,, as that in MRR, is the cost due to adverse selection in time t transaction. As we stated
above, it is expected to be a positive function of order size. Note that while#is constant
in MRR, it is time varied in GH because of the variation of order size across trades. To
allow for the relation between cost and size, GH specifies a linear relation between #, and
order sizeOt:
Orz0+zxO, (3.14)
(9, is the size of time t trade. zx allows for the possibility that adverse selection cost is a
positive linear function of trade size; z0 allows for the possibility small trade is initiated
by informed traders.
Equation (3.13) is similar with (3.7) in MRR except that belief update in (3.13) is
driven by trade flow and size, but not the unexpected trade flow.
Transaction price is set by taking into account the cost of liquidity provision:
Pt=Vt+0,Q, (3.15)
(pt is the cost due to provision of liquidity in time t transaction. 0, includes order
processing cost and inventory holding cost in transaction t.
GH also specifies a linear relation between 0, and order size:
<p, =c0+C\O, (3.16)
Equation (3.16) allows for economies or diseconomies of scale in liquidity provision.
Combining (3.13-3.16), transaction price can be expressed as:
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P, = V,_I+(z0+z]O,)Q,+(c0+clOl)Q,+£, (3.17)
Price change between subsequent trades is:
&P, =c0(Q, -Q,-\) + c^O,Qt -Ot_xQt_x) + z0Q, +z]OlQ, +£, (3.18)
c0,c,,z0,z, can be uniquely identified from regression (3.18). The effective half spread at
time t transaction can be recovered by 0, + (pt.
To make the model parsimonious, GH suggests doing a model specification search.
Microstructure theory, Easley and O'hara (1987), suggests that a small trade is unlikely
to be initiated by an informed trader and it should have little impact on market makers'
valuation. This implies that in equation (3.15), the constant z0 should be zero and
slope z, should be positive.
Theories do not offer much insight about how the cost of liquidity provision varies with
trade size. Empirical evidence in Glosten and Etarris (1987) find thatc, = 0. And this
gives rise to a more parsimonious model for estimations:
AP, =co(Q, ~Q,-\) +Z\0,Q, + £, (3.19)
3.4.3 Empirical Results
In this part, we employ the MRR model to extract adverse selection component from
spreads.49 Estimation is carried out with GMM.
3.4.3.1 Estimation procedure
The MRR regression equation is,
AP,=(0 + <p)Q, -((/> + pO)Q,_x + £,
The three parameters (9, (p, p) determine the behaviour of transaction prices. The GMM
procedure imposes that the expectation of the following four population moments is zero:
E[f(AP„ Q„ Q,.x, 9,<p,p)\ = 0
49 The Glosten-Harris model and Huang-Stoll model simply fail in most of our regressions. In the
estimations of Glosten-Harris model, the term capturing the relation between trade sizes and informative-
ness of trades is rarely significant. In those of Huang-Stoll model, the term capturing inventory-adjustment
effects is rarely significant.
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Given (0,0,/?),£", is defined asA/ ~{O + 0)Q, -(0 + pO)Q,_x. £0is a constant drift term.
The second equation defines this constant term as the average price error. The first
equation is the definition of the first order autocorrelation ofQt .50 The last two equations
are the orthogonal conditions.
3.4.3.2 Estimation results
To endow estimation significance, we include stocks which have at least 30 trades in
both pre and post offer periods. Our reduced sample consists of 73 open offers and 27
rights offers. Data filter in Section 3.2.3.1 applies.
Separate estimation is conducted on each event period for each of these stocks.
According to the type of a stock (open offers/rights offers) and the event period (pre/post),
we calculate the mean estimated coefficients, the mean standard error, the standard
deviations of the estimates, and the median of the estimates for adverse selection
component 0 and the temporary component 0. With the coefficients estimated, we also
calculate the implied spread 2(0 + 0), the proportion of the adverse selection component
Q
in the implied spread , the proportion of each cost component in trade price, and the
0 + 0
implied spread as a percentage of trade price. Summary statistics is provided for these
implied measures. The result is summarized in table 7.
Firstly, the estimation results are disappointed, especially the estimation of adverse
selection components. 92% of the coefficients for 0 is insignificant for the pre-issue open-
offer sample; all of those are insignificant for the post-issue open-offer sample. There are
even some estimates (about 30%) are negative, although the negative ones are all
insignificant. Similar things happen in the estimation for the rights-offer sample.
Although the estimation result is highly unreliable, we continue to interpret to see
whether they make any economic sense. For the open-offer stocks, the mean value of
adverse selection component 0 is £0.005 and 0.24% of trade price for the pre-issue sample,
and £0.013 and 0.28% of trade price for the post-issue sample. The mean value of
50 Recall that p is the probability of trade continuation in the MRR model.
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temporary component 0 is £0.028 and 2% of trade price pre-offer, and £0.027 and 2.3%
for post-offer. The mean implied spread is £0.065 and 5% of trade price for the pre-offer
period, and £0.082 and 5.2% for the post-offer period. Adverse selection component
contributes 5% of spread pre-offer and 2.5% post-offer.
For the rights-offer stocks, the mean value of adverse selection component #is £0.017
and 0.04% of trade price for the pre-issue sample, and £0.009 and 0.1% for the post-issue
sample. The mean value of temporary component 0 is £0.06 and 1.4% of trade price pre-
offer, and £0.05 and 1.5% post-offer. The mean implied spread is £0.15 and 3% pre-offer,
and £0.11 and 3.2%> post-offer. Adverse selection component contributes 2.3%> of spread
pre-offer and 100% of that post-offer. The last number is incredible. After we check each
individual regression, we find that in 3 regressions, the estimators of adverse selection
component are so negative that the implied spreads are negative. This push the proportion
of# on spreads above 100%.
The mean standard error and the sample standard deviation confirm the results of
individual regression in that the estimators of adverse selection component are no
different from 0.
While we feel meaningless to continue with MRR, for the sake of procedure
completeness, we test the hypothesis of reduction of asymmetric information by
comparing#between pre offer and post offer for each type of offers. We use group mean
tests to test the hypothesis. For each stock/, we get two estimators of adverse selection
components: #,Pr'' and #/w . Reduction of asymmetric information can be measured
by #/'e - #/M'. Significance of the reduction can be measure by T ratio.
Q^ve Q^OSt
■JVAR(0fTe) + VAR(0lPos')




For the open-offer sample, t ratio of the reduction of adverse selection components is -
0.13, and t ratio of the reduction of adverse selection components as percentage of
spreads is -0.37. Both suggest that there is no resolution of asymmetric information. For
the rights-offer sample, t ratio of the reduction of adverse selection components is 0.11,
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and t ratio of the reduction of adverse selection components as percentage of spread is -
0.08. Again, no resolution of asymmetric information. Of course, we should not rely on
this result since the methodology itself is not reliable.51
In what follows, we try to save the MRR model. The insignificance of adverse selection
component may be due to the existence of uninformed trades.52 It may be the case that
small trades make up a large fraction of transactions and therefore the MRR estimator
of# is diluted toward zero. To save the MRR model, we may get rid of small trades and
leave only trades with price impacts in the trade-sequence. We admit that this is not far
way from cooking data.
We try this on a restricted sample: only stocks with at least 200 trades (10 trades per
day) on each event period are included. The restricted sample contains 25 open-offer
stocks and 10 rights-offer stocks. For each of these stocks, we first conduct a price impact
analysis53, and try to identify an upper bound of trade size below which trades on average
do not have price impacts. After the upper bound is identified, trades with size below it
are picked out of the trade sequence. Then we apply MRR to this new trade sequence.
The result is summarized in table 8. It looks slightly better than before: fewer
estimators of adverse selection component are insignificant; fewer are negative. For the
open-offer stocks, the pre-offer mean value of adverse selection component is £0.01 and
0.26% of trade price; the post-offer mean value of#is £0.03 and 0.33%. For the rights-
offer stocks, the pre-offer mean value of#is £0.06 and 0.41% of trade price; the post-
offer mean value of#is £0.014 and 0.24%>.
However, the proportion of insignificant estimators of# is still close to 1. The mean
standard error and the standard deviation of # still suggest that adverse selection
component is not significant. So we believe that MRR is not a valid methodology, at least
for London SEAQ.
For the sake of completeness, we conduct group mean tests of reduction of adverse
selection component. T ratios are all insignificant for the open-offer stocks and the rights-
offer stocks, which suggest asymmetric information is not resolved with equity offers.
But again, this result should be subject to further investigation.
51 A critique on decomposing spread models will be provided in Section 3.4.4.
52 In the next section, we establish that small trades do not have impacts on market makers' beliefs about a
stock value.
53 Price impact analysis will be introduced in the next section.
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3.4.4 Critique ofDecomposing Spread Model
The three decompose-spread models introduced in Section 3.4.2 are all motivated by
Glosten and Milgrom (1985). Market makers infer information with order flows and
update their beliefs accordingly. The crucial ingredient of a decompose model is market
makers' information-revealing strategy. MRR and Huang-Stoll propose that market
makers infer information from unexpected order flows, which seems convincing in an
automated trading market where trading is anonymous.
However, London SEAQ is a human intermediated market where a small group of
participants (market makers, brokers and financial institutions) frequently trade with each
other on long-term basis. Can market makers do better than simply focusing on the
unexpectedness of trade flows? Recent literature has suggested that there exists
information sharing between market participants, not only between market makers (Cao
et al.(2000)), but also between market makers and traders (Glosten (1989), Garmill (1990)
and Benveniste et al. (1992)). Glosten (1989) and Garmill (1990) suggest that
institutional design, e.g. human intermediation, can reduce the burden of asymmetric
information. Garmill demonstrates that market makers can heighten competition among
informed traders by compensating only the first one to reveal private information.
Benveniste et al. (1992) argues that market makers can mitigate the effects of asymmetric
information by improving price for those traders with good reputation of not harming
market makers with private information. No matter the "carrot version" or the "stick
version" of price improvement, it suggests that the adverse selection market makers face
is no longer a pure probabilistic problem. So is it rational to propose market makers'
information revealing strategy as purely updating according to unexpected order flows?
We strongly feel that this is not correct, especially for London SEAQ which is famous for
its high degree of human intermediation.
Although they are not appropriate for human intermediate markets, are they sensible for
automated trading markets? In a market of this type, participants can observe trade size
and trade time. As in Easley and O'hara (1987) on trade size and Admit et al. (1988) on
trade time, these two choices of traders can reveal information to the market. We don't
think that unexpectedness of trade flows itself can summarize all these information.
Huang-Stoll also proposes market makers' inventory reversal strategy. They believe
that mid-point can be an instrument for market makers to induce inventory equilibrate
trades. In London SEAQ and other dealership markets like NASDAQ, there exists a
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separate market (IDB for LSE, ECM for NASDAQ) where market makers can trade with
each other to off-load unnecessary inventory. That is, when trades result in their holding
non-optimal inventory, they have at least two choices to reverse their holdings back to
optimal: they can adjust mid-point to induce trades in the direction they want, or they can
trade directly with other market makers with opposite holdings. With data for London
stock exchange, Reiss and Werner (1998) documents that inter-dealer trades take place
when dealers are experiencing extreme inventory position. They argue that inter-dealer
trades facilitate risk sharing among dealers. Besides, in our next section, we will show
that after a transaction, mid-point continues to drift in the direction of the trade, which is
inconsistent with mid-point as an instrument to reverse inventory. All these are against
Huang-stoll's hypothetic inventory strategy. As a matter of fact, estimated coefficients
for Qt_2 in Huang-stoll model most of the time are insignificant. Since Qt_2 is the term to
capture movement of mid-point motivated by inventory consideration, its insignificance
supports our notion that market makers choose to trade with other market makers through
IDB to off-load inventory.
Glosten and Harris (1988) propose a linear relation between adverse selection effect
and trade size. In all dealership markets, market makers quote not only prices, but also
sizes. Prices are tradable given that order size is below the quote size. Orders with size
above quote size will be subject to bilateral negotiation between traders and market
makers. Human intermediation is unavoidable for these trades. Recent literature (e.g.
Barclay and Warner (1993)) documents that it is median trades that move prices. The
logic is that informed traders do not want to expose their identity, and thus break up their
block orders into median ones and spread the trades over time. All these suggest median
size trades may be the main source of adverse selection. If so, the relation between
adverse selection and trade size will not be linear. Glosten-Harris's model fails to allow
for this possibility.
3.5 Price Impact Analysis
Price impact method is another way to identify the degree of adverse selection. In this
section, we employ it to test the hypothesis of resolution of asymmetric information with
equity offers. A trade has two types of impacts on price: temporary impact and permanent
impact. The permanent impact of a trade can be used to measure the amount of private
information impounded by this trade, and can be a measure of the degree of adverse
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selection. If equity offers resolve asymmetric information, the permanent impact of a
trade should be smaller post equity offers.
It has been argued that adverse selection has a systematic pattern related to trade size
(Easley and O'hara (1987)). In our analysis, we will group trades into 3 size categories,
small, median, or large. Small trades are defined as the smallest 20% purchases and
smallest 20% sales below quote size. Median trades are defined as the biggest 20%>
purchases and biggest 20%> sales below quote size. Large trades are defined as trades with
size above quote size.54 We then identify the size categories of which trades have
significant permanent impacts. For these size categories, we compare the permanent
impacts of trades between the pre-offer period and the post-offer period. If the permanent
impacts fall significantly after equity offers, it suggests resolution of asymmetric
information during equity offers.
Beside the main hypothesis, we also investigate the pattern of adverse selection in
London SEAQ and firms' choices of flotation methods. Adverse selection may be related
to trade size (Easley and O'hara (1987)). Block purchases and block sales may not be
symmetrically informative (e.g. Keim and Madhavan (1996)). Human intermediation,
which is an important feature of London SEAQ, may effectively separate informed trades
with liquidity trades and thus may affect the pattern of adverse selection (Lawrence, et al.
(1992)). When the degree of asymmetric information is high, it may be more likely for a
firm to conduct equity private placements (Hertzel and Smith (1993) and Cronqvist and
Nilsson (2005)). We will investigate these issues with the measure of adverse selection
obtained with price impact method.
3.5.1 Methodology
The methodology employed in this section follows that in Holthausen, Leftwich and
Mayers (1987, 1990). Trade flows have impacts on price: temporary impact and
permanent impact. Temporary impact is the price concession which compensates
liquidity providers. Permanent impact comes from the information impounded by trade
flows. It drives market makers to revise their beliefs about security value. The size of
permanent impact is positively related to the degree of adverse selection. If choices of
equity offer methods resolve asymmetric information, permanent impact of trades should
be smaller in the post-offer period than in the pre-offer period.
54 The motivation and the detail of our grouping method will be introduced in the next section.
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The permanent impact of a trade can be measured by the market makers' belief revision
about the security value during that trade. Since market makers' beliefs on average can be
measured by mid point, mid-point returns can be used as a measure of the revision. To
control for any systematic return patterns, e.g. SEOs price effects, we need a bench-mark
return which is considered to be the return when there is no permanent impacts from
trades. A commonly employed bench-mark return for a trade is the average mid-point
returns of a sequence of trades before that trade. The excess return of that trade over its
bench-mark return is considered to be the permanent impact of that trade.
Market makers' beliefs may not be adjusted immediately after a trade. Post trade
transparency in LSE is low in that the exchange allows for the late publication of trades
with size above 3 NMS. The trading counterparties of such a trade have information
advantage over other market participants. The relevant market maker can use this
advantage to update his belief or even make profits on it. However, other market makers
will for a period lack of necessary information to make update. Therefore, the overall
belief updating process of market makers may be gradual. On the other hand, since trades
can be human intermediated, these trades will be subject to negotiations before they are
executed. This creates the possibility of information leakage. Burdett and O'Hara (1987),
and Keim and Madhavan (1996) document pre-block-trade price movements in NYSE
which is consistent with information leakage hypothesis. The above definition of
permanent impact of a trade may thus underestimate the true belief revision since market
makers may start to adjust well before that trade because of information leakage, or not
until late after it because of late publication.
To allow for these possible belief-revision behaviours, we not only calculate the return
of that specific trade, but also the mid-point returns of a series of trades before and after it.
Following convention, we focus on the return sequence from the 5th trade before that
trade to the 5th trade after it. The benchmark return is the average mid-point return of the
trade sequence from the 20th to the 10th trade before that trade. Label the specific trade as
the 0th trade. Mid point returns of the -4th, -3rd, -2nd, -1st trade, and those of the 2nd, 3rd, 4th,
5lh trades are calculated; mid point to trade price return of the 0th trade, and trade price to
mid point return of the 7st trade are calculated. The bench-mark return is subtracted from
these returns, and it yields the excess returns.
Previous literature (e.g. Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers(1990), and Gemmill (1996))
employ trade price to trade price returns to measure excess returns. We claim that using
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trade prices are obscured by the noise associated with bid-ask bounces.55 Instead, we
employ mid point returns to measure excess returns. Firstly, microstructure literature
generally contends that market makers' beliefs of a stock's value on average can be
measured by mid point, e.g. Glosten and Milgrom (1985). Secondly, mid point returns are
not subject to the noise from bid-ask bounces and therefore illustrate the impacts from
trades better. Essentially, our method shares the same spirit with that in Koski and
Michaely (2000) who use ask price returns or bid price returns to measure excess returns.
th
We use mid-point-to-trade-price return for 0 trade and trade-price-to-mid-point return
for 1st trade in order to assess total price impacts from trades. Total price impact of a
trade is the sum of the trade's temporary impact and permanent impact. We can measure
it with the cumulative abnormal return at the 0th trade. Using mid prices and trade prices
at the same time is not as unorthodox as it sounds. In Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers
(1987) and Keim ad Madhavan (1996), they used the trade price of a block trade and the
market closing prices 1-day before and 1-day after the block trade to measure the block
trade's price impact in NYSE.56 The mid prices in our analysis resemble the closing
prices in their work. However, we claim that their method is not appropriate for our
analysis. During the time between a specific trade and market closing, other trades with
information content, e.g. median trades, may take place fairly frequently. These trades
may move prices. If we use the market closing prices and the trade price of that specific
trade to measure the price impact of that specific trade, the measure will likely be
contaminated by the impacts from other informed trades.
The previous works mainly focus on the price impacts of block trades. In our work,
block trades may not be enough to address the pattern of adverse selection since it is very
likely that trades other than block trades can contain information. According to Barclay
and Warner (1993), median trades are even more informative than large trades since
traders, in order to conceal their identity, break up their large informed orders into
median ones so as to avoid human intermediation.
We group trades in London SEAQ into three size categories: small trade, median trades
and large trades. Small trades are defined as the smallest 20% purchases and smallest
20% sales below quote size. Median trades are defined as the biggest 20% purchases and
55 For example, the excess return measure in Gemmill (1996) is fairly volatile. Statistical inferences are
essentially not easy to drawn in his paper.
56 In NYSE, the price formation mechanism during the day is different from that at market closing. During
the day, prices are formed with a hybrid mechanism between continuous auction and dealership. At market
closing, a batch auction takes places to clear the market.
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biggest 20% sales below quote size. Large trades are defined as trades with size above
quote size.
Previous literature use dollar volume to define the size of a trade. We do not think that
this method is appropriate for us since we do not have prior knowledge of the relation
between adverse selection and pound volume in LSE, and even ifwe have, this relation is
likely to be varied across stocks. We believe that a better method should utilize quote size.
Quote size summarize market makers' information of the trading and informational
characteristics of a stock. In SEAQ, orders above quote size have to be subject to
negotiation between the relevant market maker and the trader who initiates it. This
segment of the market is similar with the up-stair market in NYSE.57 One can understand
our large trades as the block trades in NYSE. When the sizes of their orders are below
quote size, traders can ensure the transaction by electronically taking the quotes made by
market makers. Or they can employ brokers to negotiate with market makers for price
improvement. Under Barclay and Warner's logic, traders who break up their large
informed orders should have the sizes of their broken orders close but below quote size,
and should submit them electronically. Thus the median trades in Barclay and Warner
(1993) should be corresponding to the median trades in our analysis. One might argue
that why we do not use NMS to define trade size category, as in Naik et al. (1998). We
believe that quote size contains more information than NMS. The reason is that the
exchange regulations require quote size to be at least one NMS. If the chosen quote size
is different from one NMS, the difference must reflect market makers' knowledge about
the degree of adverse selection since quote size is an effective instrument for them to
guard against adverse selection.
We will investigate the permanent impacts of the three types of trades. We expect their
impacts are different. Our main object is to pick up those types of trades which are
informative, and check whether their permanent impacts change after equity offers. If the
permanent impact of informative types of trades drops after both open offers and rights
offers, then choices of equity-flotation-methods resolve asymmetric information.
The detail of the excess-return calculations is introduced in what follows. Take large
purchases as an example. We first spot all the large purchases of a stock. Denote the
number of large purchases as NLB. Label the large purchases with i=l, 2, TVLB. For
57 A big difference is that market makers most of the time trade as principle, but up-stair brokers work as
marketing agents to facilitate the trades
89
each purchase /, we construct two trade sequences for it: a trade sequences from -5lh to
5lh , and a bench mark sequence from -20th to -10th.
The t,b trade return Ru is calculated as,
Rit = Log{—*-)
Mu. i
For t=-19,-18 ...-10, and -4, ...-1, and 1..., 5.
Mitis the mid point of the/''* trade. For t=0, the return is calculated as,
R,o = Log(-T2-)M,.-.
Pt 0 is the transaction price of the/ purchase. For t=l, the return is calculated as:
RiA = Log{--M-).
i, 0
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The cumulative excess return for the /1,1 trade, t --4, -3...0, ...5, is calculated as:
CRX, = (3.2 i)
j=~4
The total price impact of large purchases can be measured by CRXo. The permanent
impact of large purchases can be measured by CRX,with/ = 1, 2...5. Which t to choose
depends on how fast information is incorporated into prices.
3.5.2 Data
Price impact analysis requires enough a long trade sequence in an event period. From
our original sample, we select stocks with at least 200 trades (10 trades per day) in each
event period into our price-impact-analysis sample. Our new sample contains 25 open
offer stocks and 10 rights offer stocks.
For each stock, we obtain extra data of market makers' quotes. The data contains
information about the NMS, every quote submitted, quote time, quote size and identity of
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the market maker who submits a specific quote. From these, we can generate information
for each stock about the number of its market makers, how many trading days each of the
market makers is active, and the maximum and minimum of quote size. We can also
calculate the average number of market makers per day in each event period. All these
are summarized in table 9.
Quote size is restricted to be above one NMS unless a market maker obtains special
permission from the exchange (Naik et al. (1998)). In most of the stocks (20 of the 25
open offers stocks, and all the rights offer stocks), market makers' quote sizes are
between one NMS and three NMS. Market makers for a stock do not necessarily quote
the same size. This may reflect differential capacities of the market makers and different
beliefs about the information characteristics of the stock. Each of them sticks on a
specific size and changes it at most once in the event period.
The choice of quote size with which we define trade size category is not unique when
market makers do not quote the same size. We prefer to use the maximum quote size
because informed traders are free to trade up to this quote without exposing his identity.
We content that a quote with maximum size may not always be the best quote and thus
informed traders have a trade-off between taking the best quote and taking the largest size.
Our point is that we want all our large trades to be human intermediated.
For all the open-offer and all the rights-offer stocks, the average number of market
makers per-day in the post-offer period is at least the same with that in the pre-offer
period. This suggests that there is entry of market making. New market makers may join
the business either during the pre-offer period58 (3 cases for the open-offer stocks and 2
cases for the rights-offer stocks) or during the post-offer period (6 cases for the open-
offer stocks and 2 cases for the rights-offer stocks).
There is no systematic change of quote size during equity offers. For the open-offer
stocks, average quote size stays the same in 15 stocks. For the other 10 stocks, 5 increase
and 5 decrease. For the rights-offer stocks, average quote size stays the same in 5 stocks.
For the other 5 stocks, 3 increase and 2 decrease.
With the detail of quoting behaviour, we can set up a more delicate trade-data filter in
addition to the data filter in Section 3.2.3.1. Each stock has two trade sequences, pre and
post. In each sequence, we first specify the trades that fall into any of the three trade-size
38 One can identify it by comparing the average number of market makers per-day with the number of
market makers in Table 9, Panel A and B. If the later is larger, one can infer that new market maker joins
the business in that event period.
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category. In the following cases, a trade will be excluded from our three size groups even
though its size is within any of the three size ranges.
1. Trades with size below the minimum quote size and price outside the best bid ask
are excluded. Order preferencing breaks the trading rule of price and time priority.
That is, an order may not be forwarded to the market maker who is the first one
that quotes the current best prices. But the exchange requires the relevant market
maker to offer best execution. He must at least match the best price available to
the order. A trade with size below minimum quote size should obtain a price as
least as good as the best bid or ask. The existence of such abnormal trades may be
because the recorded errors of either quote time or trade time. In this case, the mid
point of the trade can not reflect market makers' belief of stock value.
2. The first and the last trade of a day are excluded. Since before the first trade of a
day or after the last trade of a day, there is a long non trading period. Market
makers' beliefs may be revised due to overnight information flow (Lockwood and
Linn (1990)). That is, the belief revision may not be solely due to the information
content of the trade.
3. Agent trades are excluded. Most of the time, market makers in LSE accommodate
orders with their own capacities. But they can also act as a marketing agent to
match buy and sell. In this case, trade impact is not directly toward market makers.
Although we lost information about a trade's identity as principle or agent trade,
we find that transaction prices of agent trades are odd in that purchases by
customers are executed below mid point and sales are executed above mid point.
We exclude trades with such odd characteristics.
We rule out the above three types of trades to be our 0th trades, but we do not get rid of
them from the trade sequence. When these trades act as time t (t ^ 0) trades, we set their
mid point return as zero.
Table 10 summarizes the trade sample. For the pre-offer open-offer stocks, we identify
6398 small purchases. The average trade size is 4% of quote size. 4038 small sales, on
average 6% of quote size; 5599 median size purchases, on average 60% of quote size;
4303 median sales, 65% of quote size; 2437 large purchases, 370%> of quote size; 2359
large sales, 385% of quote size.
For the post-offer open-offer stocks, 4077 small purchases are identified. Their sizes on
average are 5% of quote size; 3269 small sales, 6% of quote size; 3669 median purchases,
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59% of quote size; 3429 median sales, 64%o of quote size; 1899 large purchases, 473% of
quote size; 2128 large sales, 522% of quote size.
For the pre-offer rights-offer stocks, 1073 small purchases are identified. They on
average have sizes of 4% of quote size; 626 small sales, 5% of quote size; 983 median
purchases, 63% of quote size; 578 median sales, 69% of quote size; 572 large purchases,
410% of quote size; 562 large sales, 615% of quote size.
For the post-offer rights-offer stocks, 1065 small purchases are identified. Their sizes
are on average 3% of quote size; 509 small sales, 4% of quote size; 950 median
purchases, 47% of quote size; 460 median sales, 61% of quote size; 476 large purchases,
522% of quote size; 323 large sales, 505% of quote size.
Trade sizes in the three categories are similar across the above four samples. Small
trades are about 5% of quote size. Median trades are about 60% of quote size and 12
times larger than small trades. Large trades are about 500% of quote size and 8 times
larger than median trades.
3.5.3 Empirical results
With the methodology described above, we calculate the excess return of trade series
from -4,h to 5th for each trade in our sample. The excess returns are then accumulated to
yield the accumulative excess returns. According to trades' identities (rights offer/open
offer, pre-offer/post offer, small/median/large), we group them into 24 sub-groups.
Cumulative excess returns are taken average within a sub-group, and T-stats for the
significance of the average cumulative excess returns are calculated. The result is
presented in table 11.
First, in any sub-group, there is a surge of cumulative excess return from trade -/ to
trade 0. This is because the return from trade -/to trade 0 is calculated as mid-point to
trade price return. The surge comes from the existence of effective half spread, and is not
solely due to revision of beliefs (note that effective half spread consists of both temporary
impact and permanent impact of a trade). Cumulative excess returns drop radically from
trade 0 to trade 1. The return between them is calculated as trade price to mid point return.
This radical drop is due to the vanishing of temporary impact of trade 0. If market makers
update their beliefs immediately, permanent impact of trade 0 can be evaluated with the
cumulative excess return at trade /. If their revision of beliefs is not immediately due to
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lack of information about trade 0, e.g. non-transparency of the market, permanent impact
of trade 0 should be evaluated with the cumulative excess return at subsequent trades.
In any sub-group of small trades, the permanent impact is small in scale compared with
median and large trades. Through trade 1 to trade 5, the absolute value of the cumulative
abnormal return ranges from 0.001% to 0.09%, on average about 0.02%. None of them is
significant or significant in right direction (for small purchases of the pre-offer open-offer
stocks, the cumulative abnormal return is significant in wrong direction. As Gemmill
(1996), we interpret them as uninformed trades). Since small trades in all sub-groups
have small and insignificant permanent impacts, we conclude that small trades are
uninformed trades for both the open-offer stocks and the rights-offer stocks, and for both
the pre-offer and the post offer period.
In any sub-group of median trades, purchases have positive cumulative abnormal
returns evaluated at any trades subsequent to trade 0; sales have negative cumulative
abnormal returns. All the cumulative abnormal returns subsequent to trade 0 are
significant. The scales of the cumulative abnormal returns are much larger than those of
small trades, about 0.25%. This implies that median trades have permanent impacts on
market makers' beliefs. That is, median trades contain information. The absolute values
of cumulative abnormal returns continue to drift up through trade 1 to trade 5. Individual
excess returns of trade 1 to trade 5 are almost all significant, which implies that market
makers' revisions of belief are not immediate and they continue to revise their beliefs
after a median trade.
The cumulative abnormal returns of large trades have similar pattern with those of
median trades. Purchases have positive cumulative abnormal returns; sales have negative
cumulative abnormal returns. All the cumulative abnormal returns subsequent to trade 0
are significant. Large trades have permanent impact on market makers' beliefs, which
implies that large trades also contain information. And the scale of the permanent impact
is even larger than that ofmedian trades, evaluated at any trade subsequent to trade 0. But
the difference is much smaller than the difference between median trades and small
trades. The absolute values of the cumulative abnormal returns continue to drift up after a
large trade, which implies that market makers' belief revision is not immediate.
3.5.3.1 Information content and trade size
Easley and O'hara (1987) claimed that information content of a trade may be related to
its trade size. To maximize profit, informed traders will make large orders when market
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price is different from the true asset value. However, if liquidity traders only make small
orders, informed traders will have to mimic the liquidity traders and submit small orders
because adverse selection is so severe that the market for large trades can not exist. But if
there is enough large size liquidity trading, Easley and O'hara (1987) show that there
exists a semi-separating equilibrium where informed traders only trade large size orders.
In Easley and O'hara's semi-separating equilibrium, small trades are not informative,
while large trades are. Our work provides evidence for their theory. Small trades, both
purchases and sales, both of the open offer stocks and of the rights offer stocks, and both
in pre-offer and post-offer period, have no permanent impacts on price, while median and
large trades have significant permanent price impacts in all categories. This suggests that
a trade's information content does relate to its size. And it also implies that in London
SEAQ, there is enough liquidity trading of median and large size so that the median and
the large size market can be sustained.
The next question is whether a trade's information content increases universally with its
size? By comparing the information content of median-size and large-size trades, we find
that the answer is not straight-forwards. Large purchases have significantly larger
permanent impacts on price than median purchases, both of open-offer stocks and of
rights-offer stocks, and both in pre-offer and in post-offer period. On the other hand,
large sales are not more informative than median sales. Especially, for the sales of the
rights-offer stocks in pre-offer period, large sales' permanent impacts are even smaller
than those of median sales, although the difference is not significant.
Previous theoretical and empirical works have considered the issue of informed traders'
choice between median trades and large trades. When an informed trader attempts to
achieve a large total share position, he can either make a block trade, or break up the
large order into median ones and spread the trades over time. One of the motivations for
breaking up a large order is his concern of the price impact of the large order. In NYSE
and London SEAQ, a trade who attempts a large trade has incentive to conceal his
identity so as to reduce the information-related price impact. If he can not be certified as
a liquidity trader, he has to pay a large price concession to liquidity providers. An
informed trader faces the possibility of being identified as informed if he submits a large
order. It may be in his interest to make several median trades that spread over time. This
argument is consistent with Kyle (1985). In Kyle's setup, an informed trader's optimal
strategy is to make a sequence of informed trades until price fully incorporates all his
private information. Barclay and Warner (1993), with NYSE data, provide evidence that
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informed traders will concentrate their trades in median size59. The cost of breaking up a
large order can be the adverse price movement due to information leakages or some fixed
cost of trading, e.g. brokerage commissions.
On the other hand, Gammill (1989) provides a reason for why informed traders may
make a large block trade. He presents a "carrot" version of human intermediation, which
suggests that market makers will use price improvement to encourage informed traders to
share information with them.
Our empirical results on the comparison of median trades and large trades suggest that
when an informed trader attempts a large purchase, he is more likely to submit a block
order than when he attempts a large sale. Based on Kyle (1985) and Gammill (1989), this
implies that market makers are less harsh to traders with positive private information. For
this reason, informed buyers have less incentive to break up their large purchase orders.
3.5.3.2 Asymmetric between purchases and sales
Previous research has documented that market response differently to block purchase
and block sales. Gemmill (1996) with LSE data, and Keim and Madhavan (1996) with
NYSE data find that block purchases have larger permanent impact than block sales.
We document a similar pattern in our large-size trades. For both types of stocks, the
absolute values of the cumulative abnormal returns of large purchases are universally
higher than those of large sales, evaluated at any trade subsequent to trade 0 (Table 11-A,
B, C, D). The difference is significant or marginally significant60 for the open-offer
stocks and the pre-offer rights-offer stocks. This suggests that large purchases tend to
have more information content than large sales. In Gemmill (1996), large sales do not
contain information and the asymmetric between purchases and sales is more significant.
The difference between the two results may be due to the definition of large trades. In his
work, a trade is considered to be a large (block) trade if its size exceeds 3 times normal
market size which triggers the delay of publication. In our work, 3 times normal market
size is generally greater than the maximum quote size from market makers. We expect
that the size of large trades in Gemmill's sample is larger than that of ours.
The literature has proposed theory to explain the asymmetric of informative-ness
between large purchases and sales. Chan and Lakonishok (1993) argue that for
institutional investors, there are many liquidity-motivated reasons to dispose a stock, but
59
They define median size as 500 to 9,900 shares.
60 One sided test
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choosing to buy a specific stock out of numerous alternatives is likely to convey
information. Saar (2001) argues that the difference of information contents between buys
and sells comes from institutional investors' trading strategies: they buy a stock only
when they discover favourable information, but they sell a stock when they find
unfavourable information or no special information.
Interestingly, in the median-size category, the asymmetric between purchases and sales
goes the other way around. As in table 11-A, B, C, D, median sales tend to have larger
absolute permanent impacts than median purchases. The difference is significant or
marginally significant for the open-offer stocks and the pre-offer rights-offer stocks. This
suggests median sales tend to have more information content than median purchases.
Taking into account the asymmetric between large purchases and large sales, we suspect
that informed traders handle large purchases and large sales with different strategies:
when they attempt a large informed purchase, they tend to directly negotiate with market
makers and make a block transaction; when they attempt a large informed sale, they may
try to conceal their identities, and break down the order and off-load them bit by bit by
taking market makers' quotes. This intuition is subject to further research.
3.5.3.3 Resolution of asymmetric information
To examine the hypothesis of resolution of asymmetric information, we can compare
the pre-offer permanent impacts of informed trades with those in the post-offer period. If
asymmetric information is resolved, permanent impacts of informed trades should be
smaller in the post-offer period. Since we have established that small trades do not
contain information, we can focus on the permanent impacts of median trades and large
trades.
In table 11-A and B, for the open offer stocks, the absolution values of the cumulative
abnormal returns of the median trades, both purchases and sales, in the post-offer period
are smaller than those in the pre-offer period, evaluated at any trade subsequent to trade 0.
The cumulative abnormal returns of the large purchases in the post-offer period are also
uniformly smaller than those in the pre-offer period. For the large sales, the result is a bit
ambiguous. The absolute values of CAR in the post-offer period are greater than those in
the pre-offer period at trade 1, 2 and 3, but they become smaller at trade 4 and 5. Overall,
we get a feeling that price impacts of informed trades in the post-offer period are smaller.
That is, for the open-offer stocks, trades are less informative after equity offers. The
comparison can be best illustrated by Graph 3.1. The pre-offer CAR is represented by a
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black line; the post-offer CAR is by a red line. Subsequent to trade 0, the black line most
of the time dominates the red line.
One thing interesting is that although price impacts of the post-offer informed trades are
smaller than those pre-offer, the execution quality of informed trades in the post-offer
period is worse. From the graph, the peak of a line represents the effective half spread of
trade 0. The peaks of the red lines are always above those of black lines. Market makers
for the open-offer stocks offer less price improvement when the degree of asymmetric
information is lower. We think that this is consistent with "carrot" version of human
intermediation: the overall "bonus" offered by market makers to informed traders who
share information with them is smaller when there is less private information in the
market.
Graph 3.1 Comparison ofprice impacts between pre offer and post offer for the open-
offer stocks.
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For the rights-offer stocks, in the post-offer period, the absolute values of CAR of the
median and the large purchases, and the median sales are smaller than those in the pre-
offer period, evaluated at any trade subsequent to trade 0. From Graph 3.2, we can see
that after trade 0, the black line dominates the red line in the graph for the median trades
and the large purchases. That is, the permanent impacts of informed trades are lower in
the post-offer period in these trade categories. Again for the large sales, the result is
different. The permanent impacts of the large sales increase after equity offers. Overall,
although there is some evidence of decreases in permanent impacts of informed trades
after equity offers, the result is less clear for the rights-offer stocks.
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Graph 3.2 Comparison ofprice impacts between pre offer and post offer for the rights
offer stocks
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For the rights offer stocks, execution quality seems to change in the direction of
changes in the permanent impacts of trades: the large purchases and the median sales get
better execution after equity offers when they become less informative; the large sales get
worse execution when they become more informative. This pattern is different from that
of the open-offer stocks where execution quality changes in the opposite direction of the
change of informative-ness of trades. This seems to suggest a "stick" version of human
intermediation for the rights-offer stocks: market makers punish informed traders by
requiring more price concessions.
In order to test the hypothesis of resolution of asymmetric information, we construct the
following regression model:
I CAR,| = /?„, + /?„ ^0,M Pr ^ Pit^OMPo Pll^OLPr + Pit ^OLPo Pit ^RM Pr + Pkt^RMPo
+ Pi I DRLPT P%, DRLPo + £t
(3.22)
Where | CAR, | is the absolute value of the cumulative abnormal return evaluated from
-1th trade to 1th trade, t e [7,5].
Dom Pr: Dummy for median trades of pre-offer open-offer stocks.
DOMPo : Dummy for median trades of post-offer open-offer stocks.
DOLPt : Dummy for large trades of pre-offer open-offer stocks.
Dqlpo '■ Dummy for large trades of post-offer open-offer stocks.
DRMPr: Dummy for median trades of pre-offer rights-offer stocks.
DRMPo : Dummy for median trades of post-offer rights-offer stocks.
DRLPi : Dummy for large trades of pre-offer rights-offer stocks.
Drlp<, '■ Dummy for large trades of post offer-rights-offer stocks.
We will run 5 regressions as/may take value from 1 to 5. Regressions are conducted with
White, H. (1980) Heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimate. /?0, captures
the price impact of small trades. From the previous analysis, small trades do not have
significant permanent price impact. We expect that the constant term will be insignificant.
Coefficient of a dummy variable captures the cumulative excess return of the type of
trades the dummy represents. Resolution of asymmetric information can be tested by:
Ho ■ Pu = Pi, and Pi, = A/and Pi, = Pi,and Pi, = Ps, (no resolution)
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H, :((/?„ > ) or (£,, > p,,)) and ((/?5, >/?6,) or (/?7, >#,,)) (resolution of
asymmetric information)






















































Small trades Price Impact -0.0133% T-ratio -1-1
























Small trades Price Impact -0.0111% T-ratio -1.109
























Small trades Price Impact -0.0102% T-ratio -1.274


























Small trades Price Impact -0.0061% T-ratio -1.059
























Small trades Price Impact -o.oo48% T-ratio -1.379
The results are presented in Table 12. First as we expected, constant terms are never
significant. Small trades do not have permanent impacts. Secondly, the coefficients for
the 8 dummy variables are uniformly significant in all regressions. This indicates that
median trades and large trades have permanent price impacts and are informative.
The coefficients for the post-offer dummies are uniformly smaller than the
corresponding pre-offer dummies in all regressions. That is, J3U > Pn > Pzt > Pm i
Pn > PbfPi, > Arf°r/G 5]- This gives us some feeling of resolution of asymmetric
information.
We further conduct tests of the significance of the reduction of permanent impacts after
equity offers. We find that /?3, > J34l, (5lt > J3&l are not significant in all regressions. That
is, the permanent impacts of large trades are not significantly smaller after equity offers
for both open-offer and rights-offer stocks.
But for median trades, there is evidence of reduction of permanent impacts. Fort =4
and t = 5, f3u > /?,, and J35l > /36, are significant at 90%. Thus we may argue that for both
the open-offer and the rights-offer stocks, information content of median trades decreases
after equity offers. Given that the information content of large trades insignificantly
decreases, we conclude, weakly, that asymmetric information is resolved with equity
offers.
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Asymmetric information of firms' value gives rise to an adverse selection problem in
equity finance market. The market rationally expects the adverse selection problem and
responds negatively to equity offers. It has been argued that firms, in response to the
inefficiency induced by adverse selection, may signal their unobservable values through
choices of equity flotation methods (e.g. Eckbo and Masulis (1992)). In the placing
process of UK open offers and private placements, potential placees will investigate the
issuers and decide whether to buy (Armitage (2002)). Issuers of different qualities are
differentially able to pass the investigations, with high quality issuers being better able to.
Thus, high quality issuers may employ private placements or open offers to signal quality.
Armitage and Snell (2003) formalize this intuition and establish that there exists a
separating equilibrium where only good firms choose open offers to signal quality.
Our empirical findings support the signalling argument in Armitage and Snell (2003).
Under their theory, high quality firms signal quality by choosing open offers or private
placements. The market can observe a firm's choice of flotation methods and can infer
the firm's quality from its choice. Thus, insider information about a firm is revealed to
the market with equity offers. The amount of private information about the firm is
reduced. As a result, in the secondary market, informed traders' informational advantage
over market makers is lessened. The information content of informed traders' orders
decreases.
Our findings confirm this theory. We find that the information content ofmedian trades
marginally significantly decreases and that of large trades insignificantly decreases.
Overall, our findings suggest that asymmetric information is resolved with equity offers.
Together with Armitage and Snell (2003)'s finding of positive price effects of UK open
offer and negative price effects of rights offers, our result suggests that asymmetric
information is resolved with firms' choices of equity flotation methods, and open offers
are employed by good firms to signal quality to the market.
3.5.3.4 Comparison of information content of trades between open-offer and rights-
offer stocks
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999) model the equity selling choice between public offers
and private placements. They establish that when a firm's value is more difficult to
evaluate, it is more likely for the firm to choose private placement. This theoretical result
is confirmed by the empirical findings in Hertzel and Smith (1993) and Cronqvist and
Nilsson (2005).
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Our firms' choices between rights offers and open offers may also be affected by a
similar concern. In an open offer, a firm will communicate its inside information to a
small group of placement investors. While in a rights offer, considering the disperse
ownership of a public firm, the inside information will have to be transmitted to
numerous investors. When the inside information is difficult to evaluate, it is reasonable
for a firm to choose open offers so as to save the information-transmission costs. The
statistics derived in Section 3.2 seems to support this intuition. In our sample, firms
choosing open offers tend to have smaller market values than those choosing rights offer
do; trading is less active, both in terms of pound volumes and share volumes. This
suggests our open-offer firms are small and new firms, and are followed by fewer
analysts. And therefore, their values may be difficult to evaluate.
In the follows, we test Chemmanur and Fulghieri's theory from another angle. If a
firm's value is more difficult to evaluate, the amount of private information remained in
the market should be larger. This implies that informed trading in its stock should be
more intense. If a firm of this type will choose open offers, then the permanents impacts
of informed trades of the open-offer stocks should be higher than those of the rights-offer
stocks. We construct the following hypothesis:
Ho ■ flu = fi„ondfi2l =A,
H,:(A,>A,) or (A, > A,)
H0 hypothesis says there is no difference of permanent impacts of trades between the
open-offer stocks and rights-offer stocks. H] says there is difference between them. We
only compare the permanent impacts before equity offers because the pre-offer
information characteristic is a better approximation of the information environment
where a firm decides its flotation-method choice. The results are summarized in Table 13.
For alHe [1, 5 ],/?„ > J35l and /?2, > J3bl. This suggests the magnitude of the permanent
impacts seems to be larger for the trades of open-offer stocks than those of rights-offer
stocks. However, except J322 > /3b2, none of differences is significant.
Even though f322 > (3b2, we favour to use / = 5 to compare the permanent impacts since
market makers' updating behaviour may be different for the two types of stocks. For an
instance, [322 > f3b2may be simply because market makers are more sensitive to trades of
the open-offer stocks and update their beliefs quicker.
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Since there is no significant difference in the permanent impacts of trades when/gets
larger, we would accept the H0 hypothesis. That is, our finding does not support the
intuition that firms with more private information are more likely to choose open offers.



























































































3.5.3.5 Human intermediation in London SEAQ, "Stick" or "Carrot"
LSE is famous for its liquidity provision. Large trades can be efficiently accommodated.
Human intermediation is an essential factor that contributes to this feature. In a human
intermediated market, a small group of participants repeatedly and un-anonymously trade
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with each other in a long-term basis. Reputation building is encouraged. Cooperation
between market makers and investors becomes easier to achieve. When market makers
and investors cooperate in the process of price discovery, adverse selection can be
effectively controlled. Liquidity provision becomes less costly. Large block trades can be
accommodated without too much adverse price effects.
Theoretical literature provides two types of explanations on how human intermediation
reduces the burden of asymmetric information. Garmill (1989) argues that market makers
can heighten competition among informed traders by compensating, through price
improvement, only the first one to reveal private information. Benveniste et al. (1992)
argues that market makers can mitigate the effects of asymmetric information by
improving price for those traders with good reputation of not harming market makers
with private information. We call the first one "Carrot" version human intermediation,
and the second one "Stick" version.
To understand how human intermediation works in London SEAQ, we investigate the
relation between the informative-ness of a trade and its execution quality. If market
makers provide a better execution when a trade potentially gets more informative, we
tend to accept that market makers encourage informed traders to share information with
them by offering price improvement and human intermediation works in a "Carrot"
format. On the contrary, if execution quality gets worse when a trade potentially gets
more informative, we tend to accept that human intermediation works in a "Stick" format.
Execution quality of a trade is measured by the trade's total price impact (the effective
half spread).61 In our previous analysis, we have established some differences in the
informative-ness of trades between relevant trade-categories. For example, for both types
of stocks, large purchases are more informative than median purchases in both the pre-
offer and the post-offer period. For both types of stocks, median trades are less
informative post equity offers. To find out market makers' attitude towards informed
trading, we may investigate the relation between the change in permanent impacts of
trades across relevant categories and the change in total price impacts across these
categories. If the changes in permanent impacts and total impacts move in the same
direction, we tend to accept that human intermediation works in a "stick" format.
Otherwise, "carrot" format. We admit that the following analysis is rather informal. Our
object is to raise a meaningful hypothesis for further research.
6'Total price impact is measured by the cumulative abnormal return at trade 0.
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For the open-offer stocks, large purchases are more informative than median purchases
in both event periods. From Table 14, Panel 1-A, we find that large purchases, despite
their higher informative-ness, on average obtain better execution than median purchases.
In the pre-offer period, the total price impact of large purchases is 1.92%, and that of
median ones is 2.08%. The difference, 0.16%>, is significant. In the post-offer period, the
total price impact of large purchases is 2.24%o, and that of median ones is 2.73%>. The
difference, 0.5%, is highly significant.
During equity offers, information content of median trades drops. From Panel 1-B, we
can see that the total price impact of median trades of open-offer stocks changes in the
opposite direction during equity offers: the total price impact is higher when information
content of trades decreases. For median purchases, the total price impact in the pre-offer
period is 2.08%, and that in the post-offer period is 2.73%. The difference, -0.66%, is
highly significant. For median sales, the pre-offer total price impact is -2.17%, and the
post-offer one is -2.52%, the difference, -0.36%, is highly significant.
These suggest that for open-offer stocks, market makers offer better executions when
trades potentially get more informative. This is consistent with the "carrot" version of
human intermediation: market makers encourage informed traders to share private
information with them by offering better execution.
For the rights-offer stocks, the pattern is not clear. Compared with that of median
purchases, the total price impact of large purchases is smaller in the pre-offer period, and
is larger in the post-offer period. But the differences are not significant. Across the two
event periods, the total price impact of median purchases remains pretty the same. The
total price impact of median sales gets significantly smaller post equity offers: the total
price impact drops from -1.56% to -1.34%, and the difference, 0.22%, is significant. That
is, the execution quality of median sales gets better when they become less informative.
This is an evidence of "stick" version of human intermediation: market makers offer
price improvement to traders with a reputation of liquidity trading. Overall, we lack of
evidences to establish the pattern of human intermediation for the rights-offer stocks.
It is interesting that the patterns of human intermediation appear to be different between
the two types of stocks. From previous analysis, we find that our open-offer firms are
generally small ones with relatively small market capitalization, and trading of their
stocks are less active than that of rights-offer stocks. Although the previous test does not
establish a definite result, information content of trades does seem to be higher in our
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open-offer stocks62. Based on these, we set up the following hypothesis: human
intermediation works in a "carrot" format when private information is more costly to
obtain and adverse selection is more severe; it works in a "stick" format when
information of a stock can be generated less costly and market makers face less threat
from informed trading.
We believe that this hypothesis does not lack of theoretical basis. For large well known
firms, there is less uncertainty in their operations; information necessary to evaluate their
values is available cheaply since they are followed by more analysts; the difficultness of
evaluation tends to be low since they are likely to engage in stable industries. Market
makers are able to produce information about them efficiently. Therefore it is not
necessary for market makers to maintain relation with informed traders by offering
"bonus" to them. On the contrary, for small young firms, there tends to be more
uncertainty in their operations; information about them is not widely disseminated and is
not costless-ly available since they tends to be closely held and are less focused by
analysts; their value tends to be more difficult to evaluate since they may engage in high¬
tech industries. It is not efficient or even not possible for market makers to produce
information about these firms solely by themselves. An alternative for market makers is
to build relation with informed traders and offer "bonus" to those who supplies them
private information.
3.5.4 Summary for Section 3.5
For both the open-offer and the rights-offer stocks, information content of median
trades decreases after equity offers. Given that the information content of large trades
insignificantly decreases, we conclude, weakly, that asymmetric information is resolved
with equity offers. Together with Armitage and Snell (2003)'s finding of positive price
effects of UK open offer and negative price effects of rights offers, our result suggests
that asymmetric information is resolved with firms' choices of equity flotation methods,
and that UK open offers are employed by good firms to signal quality.
In London SEAQ, information content of trades is related to trade size. Small trades,
both purchases and sales, both of the open offer stocks and of the rights offer stocks, and
both in pre-offer and post-offer period, have no permanent impacts on price, while
median and large trades have significant permanent price impacts.
62 Permanent impacts are uniformly larger from trade 7 to 5 for open-offer stocks than rights-offer stocks.
Some are significant. A complete table is provided in the appendix.
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However, a trade's information content may not increase universally with its size.
Large purchases have significantly larger permanent impacts on price than median
purchases, both of open-offer stocks and of rights-offer stocks, and both in pre-offer and
in post-offer period. On the other hand, large sales are not more informative than median
sales. Especially, for the sales of the rights-offer stocks in pre-offer period, large sales'
permanent impacts are even smaller than those ofmedian sales, although the difference is
not significant.
For the comparison between purchases and sales, large purchases tend to have more
information content than large sales. The difference is significant or marginally
significant for the open-offer stocks and the pre-offer rights-offer stocks. In contrast, in
the median-size category, the asymmetric between purchases and sales goes the other
way around: median sales tend to have larger absolute permanent impacts than median
purchases. The difference is significant or marginally significant for the open-offer stocks
and the pre-offer rights-offer stocks.
Our results suggest that informed traders handle large purchases and large sales with
different strategies: when they attempt a large informed purchase, they tend to directly
negotiate with market makers and make a block transaction; when they attempt a large
informed sale, they may try to conceal their identities, and break down the block order
into median ones and off-load them bit by bit by taking market makers' quotes. Our
results also implies that market makers are less harsh to traders with positive private
information.
The magnitude of the permanent impacts seems to be higher for the trades of open-offer
stocks than those of rights-offer stocks. However, the difference is not significant.
Therefore, our finding does not support the intuition that firms with more private
information are more likely to choose open offers.
For open-offer stocks, market makers offer better executions when trades potentially
get more informative. For rights-offer stocks, it seems that market makers offer better
executions when trades potentially get less informative. Since informative-ness of trades
of open offer stocks seems to be higher than that of rights offer stocks, we set up the
following hypothesis: human intermediation works in a "carrot" format when private
information is more costly to obtain and adverse selection is more severe; it works in a
"stick" format when information of a stock can be generated less costly and market
makers face less threat from informed trading.
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3.6 Conclusions
In the context of UK open offers and rights offers, we find that information content of
trades marginally significantly falls after both rights offers and open offers, which
suggests resolution of asymmetric information with equity offers. Together with
Armitage and Snell (2003)'s finding of positive price effects of UK open offer and
negative price effects of rights offers, our result suggests that asymmetric information is
resolved with firms' choices of equity flotation methods, and that UK open offers are
employed by good firms to signal quality.
In London SEAQ, information content of trades is related to trade size. Small trades are
not informative, while median trades and large trades are informative. However, a trade's
information content may not increase universally with its size. Large purchases are more
informative than median purchases, while the difference in informative content between
large sales and median sales is not significant. For the comparison between purchases and
sales, large purchases are more informative than large sales, while median purchases are
less informative than median sales. These results suggest that informed traders handle
large purchases and large sales with different strategies: when they attempt a large
informed purchase, they tend to directly negotiate with market makers and make a block
transaction; when they attempt a large informed sale, they may try to conceal their
identities, and break down the block order into median ones and off-load them bit by bit
by taking market makers' quotes. Our results also imply that market makers are less
harsh to traders with positive private information.
With some preliminary evidence, we set up a hypothesis of the pattern of human
intermediation in London SEAQ: human intermediation works in a "carrot" format when
private information is more costly to obtain and adverse selection is more severe; it works
in a "stick" format when information of a stock can be generated less costly and market
makers face fewer threats from informed trading.
With our empirical results, we claim that decomposing spread models should not be
applied to analyse a market with high degree of human intermediation. The hypothetic
information revealing strategies embedded in these models are too naive to capture the
actual price discovery process in such a market. Instead, we favour the price impact
method since it does not arbitrarily impose any restrictions on market makers' behaviour.
This is important for the application in a market with high degree of human
intermediation since human intermediation enables a wide range of information revealing
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strategies for market makers. Although the price impact method is not a structural model,
it can serve as a first-stage procedure and disclose the major behaviour patterns ofmarket
makers. A properly constructed decomposing spread model should be built based on the
information obtained in the first stage.
Firm size, inverse of price and volume have significant explanatory power on the cross-
sectional variation of all our 4 percentage spread measures. Larger firm sizes are
associated with lower percentage spreads; higher stocks prices are associated with lower
percentage spreads; higher trading volumes are associated with lower percentage spreads.
Volatility has significant explanatory power on the cross-sectional variation of our 2
percentage quoted spread measures. With higher volatility, wider quoted spread.
However, it has no significant explanatory power on the cross-sectional variation of our 2
percentage effective spread measures. This result suggests that actual transaction prices
are less influenced by adverse selection. With the fact that transaction prices are better
than quoted prices, this suggests human intermediation alleviates adverse selection
problem and facilitate liquidity provisions.
Price changes and volume changes have significant explanatory power on the changes
of spreads during equity offers. Significantly negative coefficients of price changes
suggest that when price goes up, market makers do not enlarge spreads, or at least do not
enlarge it to accompany the price increases. Volume seems to be an important variable
for market makers to update their beliefs about a stock's liquidity characteristics.
Significantly negative coefficient of volume suggests that when a stock becomes more
liquid, market makers ask for less compensation for providing liquidity.
Quoted spread measures, time weighted or not, are larger than effective spread measure,
volume weighted or not. This suggests that transaction prices are better than quoted
prices. Quoted spread measures tend to exaggerate trading costs in London SEAQ.
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Chapter 4
Hold Up with Endogenous Outside-Option
4.1 Introduction
The hold-up problem arises when a party has to make sunk relationship specific
investments of which the return is vulnerable to ex-post expropriation by the party's
trading partner. Facing the potential of being held up, the party may be reluctant to make
socially desirable investments (see Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978) for discussion
and Grout (1984) for the first formalization).
The inefficiency generated by the hold-up problem has motivated much of the modem
contract theory and organizational theory. These theories presume that to encourage
relationship specific investments, a transaction relationship has to be effectively governed
in the sense that a party's right to his investment return is protected.63 They study the
hold-up problem in an environment where comprehensive contracting is impossible and
therefore allocation of control or power bears significance. Various remedies to hold-up
have been proposed, ranging from vertical integration (Klein, Crawford, and Alchian
(1978), and Williamson (1985)), allocation of asset ownership (Grossman and Hart
(1986), and Hart and Moore (1990)), contractual renegotiation design (Chung (1991), and
Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (1994)), option contracts (Noldeke and Schmidt (1995,
1998)), production contracts (Edlin and Reichelstein (1996)), relational contracts (Baker,
Gibbons and Murphy (2002)), to hierarchical authority (Aghion and Tirole (1997)).
The main purpose of this paper is to re-examine the formalization of the hold-up
problem. We depart by allowing a party to dedicatedly invest in his outside option in
order to capture its value. Our departure is based on two presumptions. First, relationship
specific investments per se are not sufficient for a party to create and realize the value of
his outside option. Second, the party is able to separately work on its value. These
contrast with most of the previous formalization of hold-up where relationship specific
investments are sufficient for outside option values and thus the option to invest outside
63 Che and Sakovics (2004) challenge this usual presumption. By allowing for investment dynamics, they
find that the hold-up problem need not entail underinvestment when the parties are sufficiently patient.
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is superfluous. For example, in the Fisher Body v. GM case, Fisher Body had to make an
investment highly specific to GM in the stamping machines and dies necessary to
produce the automobile bodies demanded by GM. Previous works on hold up presume
that although the investment by Fisher Body was less valuable outside the Fisher-Body-
and-GM relationship, it had effectively created a value in Fish Body's outside option: by
investing in the production relationship with GM, Fisher Body was ready to supply to
other manufacturers. Rather differently, we presume that if Fisher Body wanted to supply
to manufacturers other than GM, he could and would have to invest to re-configurate his
production process so as to accommodate the needs of other manufacturers.
In an ideal world where transaction parties behave cooperatively, Fisher Body would
not make these additional investments since they were not productive. However, facing
the risk of being held-up by GM, Fisher may invest for self-protection, since if GM
attempted to renegotiate a lower price by threatening to reduce demand or terminate his
supply completely, he could switch to produce for other firms. Thus by allowing a party
to invest in his outside option, we find an extra source of inefficiency in the hold-up
problem: parties may make unproductive investments for bargaining power to avoid
being held-up.
Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978) had elaborated a related idea: "...the presence of
possible opportunistic behaviour will entail costs as real resources are devoted to the attempt to improve
bargaining positions in the event such opportunism occurs." There is subtle difference between this
argument and ours. While we focus on the ex-ante investment stage, Klein, et al.
emphasize the ex-post bargaining stage. They assert that in the presence of the hold-up
problem, the ex-post bargaining is costly because parties will engage in inefficient
behaviours such as searching for informational advantage over their trading partners
(Klein (1988)). Despite the difference, underlying these two arguments is the premise that
absent an effective governing mechanism, parties to a long-term relationship will engage
in socially undesirable behaviours to protect themselves against other parties'
opportunistic behaviours.
Appealing as it is, the formal analysis of the hold-up problem seems to pay little
attention to this premise. For the sake of our theme, we focus on the ex-ante investment
stage. For example, in the hold-up problem set down by Grossman and Hart (1986),
transaction parties are not allowed to separately invest in their outside options, and the
values of their outside options are merely a by-product of the parties' relationship
specific investments. Since a party's outside option provides bargaining strength during
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ex-post negotiation, the party has extra incentives to make relationship specific
investments and the existence of outside option partially offsets the underinvestment
problem induced by hold-up.
We claim that this type of formulation of hold-up is incomplete. The missing part is
that outside option can actually be a source of non-cooperative and inefficient behaviours.
Consider the following example. A buyer purchases an intermediate good from a seller.
The good worth 60 if the seller invests, while nothing if not. The investment cost is 10.
After the seller makes investment choices, they bargain over the surplus with the equal
bargaining strength. Nash bargaining solution is employed to determine the payoffs. In
this scenario, the hold-up problem does not create inefficiency. Although being held-up
by the buyer, the seller still capture a positive return from his investment, 30-10 = 20.
Now imagine that the seller can separately invest 10 to generate a value of 40 in his
outside option. Assume that he can only trade either with the buyer or with his outside
customer. Inefficiency arises: the seller will make both investments. The social surplus
drops from60-10 = 50 to 60-10 -10 = 40 . The second investment from the seller is
just to accumulate bargaining strength, and is not productive at all. If we further consider
some realistic assumptions: for example, the seller has limited wealth of 15, the outcome
will be even worse. He will give up the socially efficient relationship with the buyer and
the social surplus drops further to 40 -10 = 30.
In a stylized setting, we will show that after considering the possibility of separately
investing in outside option, the hold-up problem is potentially more severe than
previously observed. Parties to a transaction may make investments which are not
productive in social point of view. More importantly, the inefficient investment may even
crowd out relationship specific investments, which may result in relationship-breaking in
a socially efficient relationship.
The second purpose of this paper is to justify the use of exclusive contracts. A contract
is said to be exclusive if it prohibits at least one party to the contract from trading with
outside parties. There are two opposite views of the role played by exclusive contracts.
The opponents argue that they serve anticompetitive purposes by erecting a barrier to the
entry of competitors (Aghion and Bolton (1987), Bemheim and Whinston (1998), and
Segal and Whinston (2000b)). The advocates claim that exclusive contracts can be
efficiency enhancing when exclusive-rights holders are the important investing parties.
The reason they provide is that exclusive contracts enhance the protected parties'
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bargaining position, and consequently they are less exposed to the hold-up problem and
have more incentive to make relationship specific investments (Marvel (1982), Klein
(1988), Masten and Snyder (1993) and Mathewson and Winter (1994)). Segal and
Whinston (2000a) formally study the effect of exclusive contracts on investment
incentive. They find that exclusive contracts do offer the protected parties a larger share
of surplus. However, when the parties' investments are fully specific to the relationship,
exclusive contracts are neutral to investment incentive.64 On the contrary, if the
investments have external effects, exclusivity matters.
Based on our set-up, we find that exclusive contracts can affect investment incentive.
The presence of exclusivity sufficiently reduces the sensitivity of a party's payoff to his
investment in his outside option. As long as his investment in the outside option is less
productive than his relationship specific investment, his incentive to invest outside will
be wiped out. Our finding does not contradict the Irrelevance result in Segal and
Whinston (2000a) since a party's investment in our setup can be purely external.
Furthermore, we find that exclusivity improves efficiency when relationship specific
investments are sufficiently productive, but worsens it when they are sufficiently
unproductive.
After we finished this paper, we found that Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2002) also
allow separately investing in outside option. However, they did not study the interaction
between relationship specific investments and investments in outside option. Moreover,
their assumptions preclude the case of relation-breaking: overall surplus in a relationship
is always above that in parties' outside option.
The paper is organized as follows: in section 1.1, we briefly review the hold-up
problem and the incentive effects of exclusive contracts. In section 2, we provide a model
to address the effect of allowing for separate investments in outside option. In section 2.1,
we analyze how exclusive contracts can solve the inefficiency induced by this investment
option. Section 3 concludes the analysis.
4.1.1 A brief review of the Literature
4.1.1.1 Hold-up problem
When two parties enter into a long-term relationship, they often have to make
investments which are geared towards their partners. This type of investments, referred
64 Dc Meza and Selvaggi (2003) show that this irrelevant result does not hold if ex-post bargaining is non-
cooperative.
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by the literature as relationship specific investments, is less valuable outside the
relationship. Once the investments are sunk, a party can not rely on the market to
discipline his partner, and his investments return will be vulnerable to expropriation. This
problem, known as hold-up, will discourage parties from making socially desirable
investments.
Consider the following case. A buyer purchases one unit of goods from a seller. The
gross surplus of this trade, <p, is random and can take two value: (j)L ov(pH . The buyer can
make non-contractible relationship specific investment, x e [0,1], to enhance the expected
surplus: with probability x the surplus is (f)H , and with the remaining probability the
surplus is (pL. The investment cost is c(x) . Assume c' > 0, c" >0 and c(0) = 0 .
After the investment is made, the value of (/> realizes and the two parties bargain over
surplus with equal bargaining strength. Nash bargaining solution is employed to
determine the payoffs.
The social optimal investment is,
x* =argmax^i +x((f)" ~(f>L)-c(x)
X
Assume an interior solution: x* > 0.
The buyer assumes all the ex-ante investment cost, while can not prevent the seller from
sharing his investment return. His optimal investment choice is,
x = arg max— (j)L + — {(/>" -(j)L)- c(x)
x 2 2
Clearly the hold-up problem causes under-investment: x < x*.
4.1.1.2 Exclusive contracts and investment incentive
Advocates of exclusive contracts mostly discuss its beneficial effects in the hold-up
frameworks. They claim that exclusive contracts can enhance an exclusive-right holder's
ability to protect his relationship specific investment against opportunistic hold-up, and
thus encourage him to make socially desirable investments. Most of the informal
discussions explain exclusivity as a device to eliminate horizontal or vertical externalities
of parties' relationship specific investments. Areeda and Kaplow (1988)) and Mathewson
and Winter (1994) focus on the case of horizontal externalities: a party's investment can
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be used by his outside competitors to deal with the party's partner in the relationship.
Mathewson and Winter (1994), for example, suggest that a franchisor can provide
incentives for his franchisee to invest in local promotions by granting him exclusive
territories which excludes non-investing outlets from sharing benefits. Marvel (1982) and
Masten and Snyder (1993) focus on the case of vertical externalities: a party's investment
can be used by his trading partner to deal with outside parties. Marvel (1982), for
example, comments on the case Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co. that
exclusivity had an efficiency rational since the pattern manufacturer, Standard Fashion
Co., could not protect its property rights to successful pattern design if its dealers could
handle the products from its rivals. The reason is that its dealers were able to switch
customers to similar patterns offered by its rivals who could make no investments on
fashion designs but just copy the designs that proved to be successful. Different from
above, Klein (1988) and Frasco (1991) claim that exclusive contracts can be a substitute
for quantity contracts to protect a party's relationship specific investments when
specification of quantity is too costly. Klein (1988), for example, suggest that the long-
term exclusive dealing contract adopted by Fisher Body and GM in 1919 limited the
ability of GM to hold-up Fisher Body by threatening to reduce demand for Fisher-
produced car bodies.
To examine the effect of exclusive contracts, we introduce an outside buyer into the
picture. Ex-post, the seller can supply the good to the outside buyer. The surplus
generated by this trade is#. To make the story interesting, assume(j)L <6 < <f>H . Assume
that the seller can either supply to the inside buyer or the outside buyer, but not both.
Ex-ante, the inside buyer and the seller can enter into an exclusive contract which
stipulate that ex-post, the seller can only supply to the inside buyer.65 Assume that this
contract is renegotiable.
Ex-post, the three parties bargain over the surplus. The bargaining process can be
modelled with cooperative game theory or non-cooperative game theory. Segal and
Whinston (2000a) and De Meza and Selvaggi (2003), each with a different type of
bargaining game, provide formal analyses of the incentive effect of exclusive contracts.
The main finding of Segal and Whinston (2000a) is an Irrelevance result that exclusivity
does not matter when all investments are fully specific to the relationship. Flowever, this
result does not hold when ex-post bargaining is non-cooperative (De Meza and Selvaggi
65 The inside buyer can make a lump-sum payment to the seller so as to induce him into this arrangement.
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(2003)). In what follows, we separately apply cooperative bargaining game and non-
cooperative bargaining game to reproduce their results with our simple model.
Cooperative Bargaining
As in Segal and Whinston (2000a), the Shapley value is employed to determine parties'
shares of surplus: each party's payoff is a linear function of his marginal contribution to
the various possible coalition in which he can be a member. Symmetric property is
imposed.
The three-party bargaining outcome is summarized in what follows:66
66 We demonstrate the calculation of the Shapley value for state (f)L. We label the seller as S, the inside
buyer as B, and the outside buyer as O.
When there is no exclusive contract, B marginally contributes (pL to coalition {S}, 0 to {Of, and 0 to {5,
Of. The last one is 0 because the seller and the outside buyer by themselves can generate surplus 0 which
is greater than (f)L. Since the seller can only supply to one buyer, B's joining {5, Of does not create any
surplus. S contributes (pL to coalition {B}, 0to {O}, and#to {O, B}. O contributes 0to coalition {5}, 0 to
{B}, and 9 — (pL to {S, B}. With these, the parties' bargaining payoffs can be put down as,
Vs = aBs<f>L + a°9 + aBs°6
VB = asB(j)L + aB x 0 + asB° x 0
VQ = &Q0 + cXq x 0 + a^s (9-<j>1)
The superscript ofCt denotes a coalition, and the subscript denote a member outside the coalition. For
BO
example, CCS is the weight we put on the marginal contribution of S to the coalition {B, Of. Ct is chosen
such that Vs +VB +Va = 0. That is, the sum of individual payoff equal the overall surplus generated by
the whole group. This requires,
asQ + a° + aB° + aBS -1 and +asB = aBS
Apply symmetric property, we have as0 = a° = - asB = Y» andor®° = aBS = • Put these back to
the above equations about V . We get Vv = — + ,V„ = —d>L, and y = —Q - — (j)L.
2 6 6 2 3
When the seller and the inside buyer sign an exclusive contract, B marginally contributes (j)L to coalition
{Sf, 0 to {Of, and #to {5, Of. Notice that under exclusivity, the coalition {S, O} can no longer generate
any surplus. The reason is that without the inside buyer's permission, the seller can not trade with the
outside buyer. Only after B is involved, the optimal surplus 0 can be realized.
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When the seller and the inside buyer did not sign an exclusive contract, the ex-post
bargaining payoffs for the seller, the inside buyer and the outside buyer respectively are:
In state^1: — # +—(pL, —(pL, ~0~—(/)1
2 6 6 2 3
In state(bH: -</>" +-0, -d>"--0, -0
2 6 2 3 6
Givenx, the inside buyer's expected ex-post payoff is,
rf = 0-*)V
6 2 3 2 3 6 6
When there is an exclusive contract between the inside buyer and the seller, the
bargaining payoffs to the seller, the inside buyer and the outside buyer respectively are:
In state (pL: -0 + -<pL, -0 + -</>L , -(0-f)
3 6 3 6 3
In state (j)H : -—, ——, 0
2 2
Givenx, the inside buyer's expected ex-post payoff is,
yi = H-x){~e+\^)+x\r = x(UH -G-I^)+V +\e36 2 236 63
Comparing these two cases, we can see that when the inside buyer is protected by an
exclusive contract, he does obtain a larger share of surplus. This is consistent with the
conventional wisdom on the effect of exclusivity. The increment of his surplus,— #, is
extracted from the seller and the outside buyer.
However, since the increment, ^0 , is not sensitive to his relationship specific
investment, exclusive contracts do not improve the inside buyer's investment incentive:
xNE - argmax— (J)L +x(—(pH — —0- —0L)-c(x)
x 6 2 3 6
S marginally contributes to coalition {B},0 to {0},and6bo {O, B}. O contributes 0 to coalition {S},0
to {B}, and 0 — (pL to {S, B}.
Following the same methodology, the payoffs for S, B, and O can be obtained:
vs =^e+^</>L,vB =2.0+V,and vQ = Ue-<t>L)-Jo 3 6 3
Similarly, the bargaining outcome for state (f)" can be obtained.
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xE = argmax— 6 + — (f)L + x(— (f)H — — 6 — — <pL) — c(x)
x 3 6 2 3 6
xE — xNE
This is not consistent with Klein (1988) and Frasco (1991 )'s argument on the incentive
effect of exclusive contracts.67
Segal and Whinston (2000a) in a more general setup prove an Irrelevance result, when
parties' investments are fully specific to the relationship, exclusive contracts do not affect
parties' investment incentive. The idea is that exclusive contracts only affect the surplus
generated between an inside party and an outside party. When this surplus is insensitive
to parties' investment, exclusivity does not affect the marginal returns of investments for
any parties. For example, in Klein (1988)'s discussion of Fisher Body v. GM, it is far
from clear that Fisher Body's relationship specific investments has external effects: GM
is better able to purchase from other car-body manufacturers, or other manufacturers can
produce car bodies more efficiently. Therefore, exclusivity may probably not affect
Fisher's investment incentives.
On the other hand, if parties' investments have external effects, exclusive contracts will
matter for investment incentive. Assume 0 is an increasing function of x ,
with^1 < 0(0) < 0(\) < (/>" . That is, the inside buyer's investment affects the value of
trades between the seller and the outside buyer. For example, suppose that the seller is a
manufacturer and the inside buyer is his distributor. The buyer's promotional efforts are
specific to the seller's product, but they have horizontal externality since other
distributors of the same good can free-ride on them. In this case, holding an exclusive-
right (exclusive territories) can encourage the inside buyer's promotional efforts:
xNE = argmax — (pL +x()-(pH — — 6(x) — — (f)L)-c(x)
x 6 2 3 6
xE = argmax— 0(x) + — <pL +x(— (pH - —0(x)-—(j)L)-c(x)
x 3 6 2 3 6
Since 6 (x) > 0, xE > xNE.
67 In Klein (1988)'s discussion of Fisher Body v. GM, it is the seller, Fisher Body, that makes investments.
But this does not affect the conclusion.
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Non-cooperative bargaining
The ex-post bargaining is modelled with Rubinstein (1982) alternative offer game.
Time is divided into periods of equal length, 0, t, 2t, 3t There is no time discount
for all parties but a risk of breakdown in negotiation at the end of each period.
In period 0, the seller is matched with the efficient buyer (in state (f)L, the outside buyer;
in state (pH, the inside buyer). A proposer is selected randomly with equal probability.
The other party can accept or reject the proposal. In the case of acceptance, the good is
immediately transferred. If the proposal is rejected, bargaining may either break down, or
move to the next period where the seller is matched the other buyer and the cycle is
repeated.
If the seller reaches agreement with the efficient buyer, the bargaining ends
immediately. If he reaches agreement with the inefficient buyer, in the following period,
the inefficient buyer can negotiation with the efficient buyer to resell the good. In the
resale sub-game, the bargaining is again modelled with alternative offer game with
random proposer and a change ofbreakdown at the end of each round.
Apply the Proposition 1, 2, 3 of De Meza and Selvaggi (2003): when the inside buyer
is not protected by an exclusive contract, in the limit as t —> 0, the unique sub-game
perfect equilibrium payoffs of the seller, the inside buyer and the outside buyer
respectively converge to,
,l <pL+6 n 0-tpLIn the stated : — , 0, —
2 2
, „ d)H+9 <fiH-9 nIn the state 11> : — , — , 0
2 2
While the inefficient buyer obtains a positive payoff with cooperative bargaining, he
gets nothing here. The two buyers behave symmetrically despite the fact that they have
different valuation: they will offer the seller the same price which is exactly the price in
the resale market. This makes the seller indifferent between dealing with either buyer.
When the inside buyer is protected by an exclusive contract, in the limit ast —> 0, the
unique sub-game perfect equilibrium payoffs of the seller, the inside buyer and the
outside buyer respectively converge to,
. i j.l 0L+0 d>L + 9 9-(t)LIn the stat: — , — ,
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, „ f (hH „In the stated —, ——,0
2 2
We can see that the inside buyer obtains higher payoffs in both states. The increment of
his surplus is solely extracted from the seller, but not from the outside buyer.
The inside buyer's investment incentive depends on the increment of surplus from
d)H — 0
state (pL to (pH . When he holds no exclusive rights, the increment is——— ; when he
6" ^1+0,H ±L
_j_ q Y
holds the rights, it is^ ^^— . Since by assumption 9> <pL, the
marginal investment return for the inside buyer is higher when he is protected by an
exclusive contract. Therefore, he will invest more.
As what happens under cooperative bargaining, exclusive contracts offer the protected
party a larger share of surplus. Given x, the expected payoff of the inside buyer is higher
under an exclusive contract: x h (1 — x) — > x .
2 2 2
However, the implications on incentive are different in these two analyses. Notice that
in our simple model, the inside buyer's investment has no external effect, e.g. the surplus
between the seller and the outside buyer, 9, is not sensitive to the investment. According
to the Irrelevance result, exclusivity should not have incentive effects. It does matter here
because exclusivity allows (f>L to affect the inside buyer's payoff when he is the inefficient
buyer. Absent of exclusivity, the inside buyer is effectively excluded from bargaining in
state (pL; the increment of his payoff from state (j)L to state tp" is only related - 0. On
the other hand, with exclusivity, the inside buyer's payoff is related to(pL when he is the
inefficient buyer; from state^to stated'7 , the increment of his payoff is now related to
both^f' -^and#-^. It is this asymmetric that allows exclusivity to affect incentive:
under exclusivity, he has extra incentive (0-(pL) to achieve state (j)H, and thus invests
more.
4.1.1.3 Summary of the review
The hold-up problem arises when a party has to make sunk relationship specific
investments of which the return is vulnerable to ex-post expropriation by the party's
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trading partner. Facing the potential of being held up, the party will be reluctant to make
socially desirable investments. Underinvestment problem arises.
When ex-post bargaining is cooperative, exclusive contracts have no effects on
investment incentives if parties' investments are fully specific to the relationship. The
reason is that exclusive contracts only affect the surplus generated between an inside
party and an outside party. When this surplus is insensitive to parties' investment,
exclusivity does not affect the marginal returns of investments for any parties. On the
other hand, if parties' investments have external effects, exclusivity matters for
investment incentives.
When ex-post bargaining is non-cooperative, even if parties' investments are fully
specific to the relationship, exclusivity affects investment incentives. Under non-
cooperative bargaining, exclusivity allows the protected party's payoff to be sensitive to
his investment even when it is not optimal for the party to trade from the social point of
view. Therefore, the party will have more incentive to invest if he holds an exclusive
right.
4.2 The Model
A buyer and a seller trade to realize profit. The transaction requires relationship specific
investments from both parties, which costs C to each party. When both parties invest, the
surplus from subsequent trade is (1 + r)(f); when only one party invests, it is 0; when none




Under these assumptions, it is efficient for both parties to invest, r is a measure of
complementarities of the investments. Whenr > 1, the investments by the buyer and the
seller are complementary since the conditional marginal return is higher when the other
party invests than that when the other does not. On the other case, they are substitutable.
We call the production relation between the buyer and the seller the inside relation.
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The seller also has an outside option, say, to produce for a competitive market. He can
choose to invest C in this outside option to enhance its value. We could allow the seller's
investment in the inside option to affect the value of his outside option. But this would
complicate the analysis without offering more insights. Another way to capture this
investment externality is by a cost externality, which is embodied in the variable k.
The seller will incur investment cost (1 + k) x 2C if he chooses to invest in both the
inside and the outside relation, k captures the investment cost externality. Assume
k>-~ (4.3)
2
A negative k captures the possibility of synergy between the seller's two types of
investment. A positive A: captures the convexity of the seller's cost function.
To ensure that outside option is not meaningless. Assume:
y/>C (4.4)
Invest nothing:
Outside option worth 0
C
(1 +A)x2C
Invest both inside and outside:
Outside option worth y/
Invest outside:
Outside option worth y/
Assume that due to institutional restriction or production capacity, the seller can either
trade inside or outside the relation.
Further assume that the inside relation is more productive than the outside relation:
<p>y/ (4.5)
With this assumption, it follows that(l + r)^-2C > y/-C. So it is efficient for both
parties to invest in the inside relation. The values of (f),y/,C,k , and r are common
knowledge.
The trading game is organized as follows. The game has two dates. At date 0, the buyer
decides whether to invest in the inside relation; the seller decides whether to invest, if
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invests, inside or outside the relation, or both. After they make investment decisions, their
investments become sunk and observable to each other, but not to a third party.68
At date 1, the buyer and the seller bargain over the surplus of the inside relation.
Assume that each party possesses equal bargaining power. Nash bargaining solution is
employed to determine the payoffs: each party, with probability^, makes a take-it-or-
leave-it offer to the other party. If the offer is accepted, they trade and divide the surplus
accordingly, and the game ends; otherwise, the seller will opt out to pursue his outside
option, if any, and the buyer will end up with zero profit.
Investment stage
I
Bargain and trade stage
• Buyer decides whether to
invest in the inside relation;
• Seller decides whether to
invest, if invests, inside or
outside the relation, or both.
Each party, with probability ,
makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer
to the other party.
If the offer is accepted, trade
takes place between them and
surplus is divided accordingly,
and the game ends.
If the offer is rejected, the seller
will pursue his outside option, if
any, and the buyer will get
nothing.
At investment stage, the seller has four strategies: do not invest, Ns ; invest in the
outside relation Os ; invest in the inside relation, Is ; invest in both relation, IOs. The
buyer has two strategies: invests in the inside relation, IB, or does not invest, NB.
To solve the equilibrium investment strategy of this game, we adopt backward
induction: work out the equilibrium in the ex-post bargaining game given each
investment choice pair, and then analyze the entire game at ex-ante stage. The solution
concept is sub-game perfect equilibrium.
68
Some might wonder why there is no initial contracts between the inside parties. We claim that this
analysis is more on the hold-up problem per se, but not on contract solution at this stage (we do allow a
particular type of contracts, exclusive contracts, later on). Alternatively, we can assume that the nature of
the ex-post trade is ex-ante un-describable so that the optimal ex-ante contract is left with null contract
(Hart and Moore (1999)).
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Proposition 1: The equilibrium bargaining outcomes given each pair of investment
choices are as follows:
• (Ns,Ng): Trade does not occur. The gross expected payoffs to the seller and the
buyer are (0, 0).
• ( Ns , IB ): The buyer and the seller trade. The gross expected payoffs are
• (Os ,Nb): The seller trades outside. The payoffs are (y/, 0).
• ( Os , IB): The buyer and the seller trade. The gross expected payoffs are
,0 + V 0-W }
2 ' 2
• (Is , Nb): The buyer and the seller trade. The gross expected payoffs are
(-<!>,-</>).
2 2
• (Is , IB ): The buyer and the seller trade. The gross expected payoffs are
,1 + r 1 + r
• (IOs,Nb): The buyer and the seller trade. The gross expected payoffs are
(<P + V 0-W }
2 ' 2
• (IOs , IB): The buyer and the seller trade. The gross expected payoffs are
A\ + r)(j) + y/ (\ + r)tp-y/
2 ' 2
Proof. Complete information bargaining ensures ex-posts efficient outcomes. Trade
always takes place where the overall surplus is higher.
Given investment choice (Ns , NB), there is no surplus either inside or outside the
relation. No trade takes place and both parties end up with zero profit.
Given (Ns ,/B), the surplus in the inside relation is<p, which is above that of the
outside the relation, 0. Trade will take place between the buyer and the seller. The buyer,
with probability , gets the whole surplus 0, so does the seller. Therefore, the expected
payoffs for the seller and the buyer are \
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Given (Os ,NB), the surplus in the seller's outside relation is^, which is above that of
the inside relation, 0. The seller will pursue his outside option. The payoffs for them are
(if/,0).
Given (Os,IB), the surplus in the inside relation is (p\ the surplus in the seller's outside
relation is y/ . Given that (p > y/ , trade will take place in the inside relation. With
probability^, the buyer makes a take-it-and-leave-it offer to the seller. To make the
seller accept his offer, he has to match the seller's outside option and offers at least y/ to
seller. With the other probability^, the seller makes a take-it-and-leave-it offer to the
buyer. Since the buyer has no outside option, the seller will get the entire surplus (p.
Therefore, the expected surplus for the buyer is (<p - y/) , and that for seller is ~ (p + y/.
Given (IS,NB), trade will take place in the inside relation, since there is no surplus in
the seller's outside relation. Each equal bargaining power, they will split the surplus half
and half, which leads to expected payoffs {^(p,^(p).
Given (IS,IB), trade will take place in the inside relation. The overall surplus in the
inside relation is(l + r)0. The buyer with probability^ gets the entire surplus. So does
1 H~ V 1 ~b V
the seller. Therefore, the expected payoffs for them are (- <p, (p).
Given (IOs,NB), the surplus in the inside relation is0. That in the seller's outside
option is^. Given^>^, trade will take place in the inside relation. When the buyer
makes offer to the seller, he has to offer the seller at least yj for it to be accepted. When
the seller makes offer, he gets the entire surplus. The expected payoffs to them are
{<P + V <t>~V )
2 ' 2
Given (IOs, IB ), the surplus in the inside relation is (1 + r)(p. That in the seller's outside
option is y/ . Given (p>y/, (1 + r)(p > y/ and trade will take place in the inside relation.
With probability , the buyer gets (1 + r) - yj and seller gets y/ ; with the other
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probability^, the buyer gets nothing and seller gets(l + r)0. The expected payoffs to
(1 + r)(j) + y/ (1 + r)(p-y/xthem are (-————, ——— ).
Q.E.D
Given the ex-post bargaining outcomes, we now turn to the ex-ante investment choice
problem. Note that the above payoffs have not accounted for the investment costs, since
they are already sunk ex-post. While in the ex-ante stage, the buyer and the seller have to
take the costs into account when they choose among their investment strategies.
Therefore, in the ex-ante stage, the payoff to each player given an investment choice pair
should be calculated by subtracting from his payoff at the bargaining stage the cost
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In what follows, we provide some propositions featuring several interesting
2
equilibriums. We are particularly interested in the case when (j)>—C , since
r
2
when^>—C, the social-optimal investment choices, (IS,IB), will be an equilibrium
r
outcome if the seller is refrained from investing in his outside option.69
The following propositions and corollaries are provided given that assumptions (4.1) to
(4.5) hold.
Proposition 2: ( Os , IB ) is equilibrium if and only if — pair satisfies
Max{——, 4C} < (f) < ^ + ; andMax{r</>, 2C} <l/s <0 — 2C.
1 -r r
Proof: see Appendix B.
Corollary 1: Equilibrium (Os, IB) exists only ifone of the following sets ofconditions is
satisfied:
• ——<k< 0 andr < — + k
4 2
• k > 0 and r < 1
2(1 + *)
Proof: see Appendix B.
Graph 4.1 depicts the (Os, IB) equilibrium in a <f> — y/ space.
Given that the buyer chooses to invest, in the model's set-up, trade will take place in
the inside relation. The seller has four choices: invests nothing and free rides on the
buyer's investment; invests in his outside relation to acquire bargaining power for ex-post
negotiation; invests in the inside relation to increase the overall surplus; invests in both
69 If the seller is refrained from investing in his outside option, he is left with investment choices Ns and
Is . For (7S , IB) to be an equilibrium, the seller should have no incentive to deviate to Ns , and the buyer
1 F r ^ j,





relations. What he will choose depends on the marginal investment return, the investment
cost and the resulting sharing rule.
If the seller chooses to invest in the inside relation, the marginal investment return is rtp .
Although by assumption, r<p> C , this may not be a profitable choice for the seller,
because he can only capture half of the marginal return, while bears all the investment
r(b
cost. Unless—- C > 0, investing in the inside relation will be a dominated choice for
the seller. Apparently, as the investments in the inside relation becomes more
substitutable, the distortion of the seller's incentive due to the hold-up problem becomes
more severe.
Instead of to increase the overall surplus, the seller can invest in his outside relation to
alter the ex-post sharing rule. The marginal return of investing outside is y/ . By
assumption,^// > C . But the seller will not invest outside all the time asy/ > C, since the
surplus in the seller's outside relation will not be realized ex-post. The outside relation is
useful for the seller only because it contributes to his ex-post bargaining power. For we
assume equal bargaining power, the marginal contribution of investing outside is .
Unless ip > 2C , investing outside will be a dominated choice for the seller.
The interesting case arises when the seller's share ofmarginal return of his investment
in the inside relation is above the costC and the value of his outside relation is above 2C.
If his inside relation and outside relation display some synergy, say, a negative k, the
seller will invest in both relations. But if his cost function is convex (a positive A:), it may
not be in his interest to invest both. If this is the case, he will have to choose one,
depending on which offers him more profit. This gives rise to the following corollary.
2C 1
Corollary 2: Assume (J) > , equilibrium (Os, IB) exists only ifk > Oandr <1 .
r 2(1 + k)
For such k and r , ( Os , IB ) is equilibrium if and only if 0 — ip pair
. _ 2C , , . 2(1 + 2k)C , ,
satisjies < 0 < , andr(p <y/ < 0- 2C.
1 — r r
Proof: see Appendix B.
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A non-negative k is essential to obtain this result. Otherwise, given (j) >— and y/ > 2C ,
r
the seller's shares of investment returns in both relations are positive after taking into
account the costs, and it is optimal for him to invest in both.
In the case when the seller has to choose one to invest because of the convexity of his
cost function, he will invest in the relation where his investment return is higher. Given
equal bargaining power, the seller's investment return in the inside relation is-^-r^, and
that in him outside relation is-^-^ . He will invest outside if and only if y/ > rcf)
(investment costs are the same for these two choices).
We now turn to the buyer's problem. The buyer has no outside option in this model and
his reservation payoff is 0. As long as ex-post trade takes place in the inside relation and
his share of surplus at least compensates his investment cost, he will invest ex-ante. This
puts an upper bound on the value of the seller's outside option.
Given investment pair (Os,IB), trade always takes place inside the relation. The
buyer's share of surplus is— (p if the seller does not invest in his bargaining power. But if
the seller invests outside, ex-post he can extract— y/ from the buyer. For the buyer to
invest ex-ante, his payoff from ex-ante point of view,—t/t-^yz-C, must be above 0.
This boils down to the last inequality in Proposition 1 and Corollary 2.
In terms ofwelfare, equilibrium (Os , IB) is inefficient, not only because the seller does
not invest in the inside relation, which he should, but also because he invests in
something useless from social point of view. In this equilibrium, the seller's investment is
not productive at all since trade never takes place outside. Although it affects the division
of surplus, the overall surplus is unchanged.
If the seller's outside option value is so high that the surplus retained by the buyer can
not compensate the buyer's investment cost, the seller's incentive to invest outside may
even drive the buyer out of the inside relation. Proposition 3 captures this intuition.
Proposition 3: (Os, NB) is equilibrium ifand only ifMax{~ <p , (p — (1 + [2k]~ )2C} < y/.
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Proof: see Appendix B.
Graph 4.2 depicts the (Os, NB) equilibrium in a (p-ip space.
Given k >—and r > 0 , equilibrium (Os , NB) can exist for any value ofk and r .
Relation-breaking may always be a potential outcome no matter what level the synergy is
between the seller's inside and outside relation, and no matter what degree of
complementarities or substitutability is between the buyer and the seller's investment.
For any value ofkandr, equilibrium (Os, NB) can exist at any value o^(p. No matter
how productive the inside relation is, if the value of the seller's outside option is
sufficiently large, relation-breaking will be an equilibrium outcome.
In this equilibrium, the buyer does not invest and seller invests in his outside relation.
Ex-post, trade takes place outside. The seller's investment is not useless from social point
of view.
Given the seller invests outside, the buyer can invest in the inside relation so as to
maintain the inside relation, since by assumption ^ > ^and ex-post trade will take place
inside if the buyer invests. The reason that the buyer does not do so is two-folds. First, the
buyer has to assume all investment cost, while share the surplus with the seller. If the
marginal return (p is not high enough, it is not worth for him to invest. And this is what the
hold-up problem is about.
2C
If(p> 2Cwhenr >1, or^ > whenr < 1, the hold-up problem per se will not be the
r
reason for the buyer's under-investment. But from Proposition 3, (Os,NB) can be
equilibrium outcome for any value of (p. What makes the buyer to under-invest is exactly
the seller's investment in the outside option. Given that the seller invests outsides, the
buyer realizes that his bargaining power has been weakened. And how much it is
weakened depends on the seller's outside-option value. If under the resulting sharing rule,
the buyer can not make up his cost, he will withdraw his investment. The condition for
the buyer's under-invest is ^(p-^y/-C < 0 . is the surplus the buyer can get
with — bargaining power; — y/ is the buyer's losses due to his weakened bargaining power.
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Given that the buyer does not invest, the seller may invest inside rather than outside,
since the productivity is higher in the inside relation. In equilibrium (Os, NB), the seller
does not do so because he has to share surplus with the buyer while incur all the cost, and
his share of surplus in the inside relation is less than what he can get outside. The
condition for this is^-^-C<^-C, simplifying which yields (p < y/.
The seller may also invest in both given that the buyer under-invests. The rationale is
that by investing in both, he can capture the supreme efficiency of the inside relation and
at the same time prevent the buyer from free riding on his investment. The drawback of
this approach is that it may be too costly. Given investment pair (Os, NB), the gain for
the seller to switch to IOs is— (p — y, and the loss is C + 2kC . Ifk is non-negative, seller
will stick to Os as long as the buyer sticks to NB. If k is negative, it may be easier for him
to switch rather than for the buyer to do so. The condition necessary to sustain (Os , NB)
as an equilibrium is — (j) —— y/— (1 + 2&)C < 0 , simplifying which
yields (p- 2(1 + 2k)C < y/.
Remark 1: The synergy between the seller's inside and outside relation can help sustain
their inside relation.
From Proposition 3, k only affects equilibrium (Os, NB) when it is negative. And
when k gets more negative, the necessary and sufficient condition for (Os,NB) to be
equilibrium becomes more stringent. The idea is that when the synergy between the
seller's inside and outside relation gets higher (a more negatived), it becomes less costly
for the seller to further invest in the inside relation. Since the inside relation is more
productive than the outside one (<p>y/), the seller will not give up this superior surplus
and trade will take place between the buyer and the seller. Therefore, synergy helps
sustain the inside relation.
Proposition 4: (10s, IB) is equilibrium ifand only one of the following sets ofconditions
is satisfied:




• ~-<k<0, </>>-~Candy/>(2 + 4k)C
1 , 1 2
• -~<k<--, </>>-C
Z 4 ^
Proof: see Appendix B.
Graph 4.1 depicts the f /Os, /J equilibrium in a <p-y/ space.
Equilibrium (IOs,IB) can exist for any value ofk and r, given k >——and r > 0. For
2
any/:andr, (IOs,IB) is an equilibrium outcome only if^exceeds—C, since otherwise,
the buyer will be better off if he does not invest ex-ante. When/: is positive, the necessary
condition on^is more stringent: (f> has to be above— f°r the equilibrium to exist.
r
When/: > 0, the seller's cost function is convex. And as A: goes up, it becomes more and
more costly for the seller to invest in both relations. Given that the buyer invests, the
seller can withdraw his inside investment and free ride on the buyer's one, unless the
productivity in the inside relation exceeds the above lower bound. It is apparent that this
lower bound is increasing in k .
y/ also has to be above certain lower bound for the equilibrium to exist, y/ can be
understood as the increment of the seller's bargaining power. Unless the value of
bargaining power exceeds the cost of acquiring it, the seller will not invest outside.
A represents the cost of acquiring bargaining power. Apparently, the lower bound for y/ is
generally increasing in A .
Note that the seller's investment in his outside relation does not affect the buyer's
investment incentive. Although it helps seller to extract a constant amount (-^ y/) of
surplus from buyer, it does not affect the division of surplus on the margin.
In this equilibrium, both the buyer and the seller invest in the inside relation, and the
seller also invests in his outside relation. Ex-post, trade takes place inside. The seller's
outside investment is useless in the sense that the outside surplus will not be realized
afterwards. As (Os, IB), equilibrium (IOs, IB) has a flavour of costly bargaining because
a trading party makes investment which is not productive at all from social point of view
and aims just at extracting surplus.
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Proposition 5: Equilibrium (IS,1B) exists only ifk >— Fork satisfies this condition,
2C 1
(Js - Ib) is equilibrium ifand only if C < y/ < (2 + 4k)C and(f) > Max{ .
r r
Proof: see Appendix B.
Graph 4.1 depicts the (Is, IB) equilibrium in a space.
In equilibrium (Is, IB), both the buyer and the seller invest and only invest in the inside
relation, which is the social first best of this game. It is first best because after taking into
account the ex-ante investment cost, the overall surplus realized ex-post is the highest
under this investment pair.
Previous works on Hold-up do not consider the possibility of investing in outside
option. If we translate this restriction into our setup, then the seller has exactly the same
investment strategies as buyer does, Ns and Is . In this case, the necessary and sufficient
2C
condition for the first best outcome (Is, IB) to be equilibrium is^ > .
r
2C
However, if we allow the seller to invest outside, (f> > is no longer the sufficient
r
condition. For (IS,IB) to be an equilibrium, the synergy between the seller's inside and
outside relation must be somewhat less than perfect (k > ~~J- If not> given choice pair
(Is, IB), the seller will definitely further invest outside, no matter how low the efficiency
of his outside relation is. The reason is that building bargaining power is not as costly as
before after he has invested in the inside relation.
2C 1
The equilibrium exists only if (p> and^ > — y/. The first one is the standard hold-up
r r
free condition. Given that the other party invests, a party will invest only if his share of
the marginal return from his investment exceeds his investment cost. The second
inequality is about the seller's incentive. Given that the buyer invests, the seller can
choose to augment the surplus in the inside relation, or build his bargaining power for ex-
post negotiation. And he will do what benefits himselfmost. Given that the buyer invests,
his marginal return from his inside investment is — r<p , and that from his outside
136
investment is— y/. For (IS,IB) to be equilibrium, it must be that case that— r<p> — y/.
2 2 2
This boils down to the second inequality.
(Is, IB) is equilibrium only if the seller's outside option value is below a lower bound.
Given choice pair (IS,1B), what prevents the seller from building bargaining power is
just the cost of doing so (note that the buyer's incentive is not affected here, since on the
margin, the buyer's share of return is unaffected). If building bargaining power is so
efficient (large y/) that the benefits overwhelm costs, the seller will deviate to choose IOs.
The upper bound for y/ is (2 + 4k)C . Apparently, it is increasing in k . A large k helps
sustain (IS,IB) as equilibrium. Put differently, given a larger k and all else the same, the
set of (<p,ys) where ( Is , IB ) is equilibrium is larger. But we can not claim
larger k improves welfare, since it also opens up more scope for ( Os , IB) to be
equilibrium.
Note that this game may have multiple equilibria. We can see this with Proposition 3
and Proposition 4. Given k > —— and r > 0 , equilibrium ( Os , NB) and equilibrium
(10s, IB) can exist for any value of A: and r . For any such k and r , (Os , NB) is an
equilibrium if and only ifis sufficiently large, and (IOs,lB) is an equilibrium if and
only if both (J) and y/ are sufficiently large. Therefore, given k > —— and r > 0 , for
any k and r , (Os,NB) and (JOs,IB) are both equilibria if and only if both tj) and y/ are
sufficiently large. To be precise, we provide the following corollary which is immediate
with Proposition 3 and Proposition 4.
Corollary 3: ( Os , NB ) and ( !Os , IB ) are both equilibria if and only
iftl>>Max{2(X + 2k">C, -}andy/>Max{-(/> ,</>- (1 + [2*]")2C,(2 + 4A:)C}.
r r 2
When (Os , NB) and (!Os, 1B) are both equilibria, knowing that the seller will
definitely invest outside, the buyer can improve his ex-ante payoff by investing in the
inside relationship. Doing so per se is not immediately beneficial since the seller will
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accumulate bargaining power large enough to leave him a negative ex-ante payoff.
However, knowing that the buyer will invest, the seller will further invest in the inside
relation so as to capture its supreme efficiency. And the buyer can share the increment of
the inside surplus from the seller's investment and make up his ex-ante investment cost.
In this way, both players achieve higher ex-ante payoffs.
Overall, when the seller is allowed to separately invest in his outside option, the hold¬
up problem gets more severe. Unproductive investments may be made just to accumulate
bargaining power (equilibrium (IOs, IB))\ these inefficient investments may crowd out
relationship specific investments (equilibrium (Os , IB)); even worse, the buyer-seller
relationship may break because of them (equilibrium (Os, NB)). All these inefficient
outcomes can happen where in the previous formalization of hold-up, socially efficient
outcome is an equilibrium outcome. In what follows, we examine whether exclusive
contracts can improve efficiency in our scenario.
4.2.1 Exclusive contracts
Assume that the court can verify whom the seller trades with. If so, ex-ante the buyer
and the seller can enter into an exclusive contract which stipulates that the seller can only
70
supply to the buyer. Assume that this contract is ex-post renegotiable. Assume that the
buyer and the seller sign this contract ex-ante. As before, we analyze the game with
backward induction.
Ex-post, given any investment choice pair, the seller's outside option can no longer be a
threat to the buyer. In the case they can not reach agreement, the buyer can insist on the
initial contract and prevent the seller from trading outside. Therefore, the seller's
disagreement payoff in any cases is 0. His outside option can no longer improve his
bargaining position.
However, the seller's outside option is not always useless. When the overall surplus of
the outside relation is above that of the inside one, the buyer and the seller will not give
up the outside surplus and the initial contract will be renegotiated. Given our
assumption 0 > y/, this happens only under choice pair (Os, NB). In this case, the inside
surplus is 0, and the outside one is^z. Obviously, the initial contract will be torn apart:
70 If the contract is not renegotiable, the analysis will be simple: the seller's payoff is never sensitive to his
investment in the outside option, and therefore he has no incentive to invest outside.
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the two parties will bargain over the surplusand the seller ends up trading outside.
Under any other choice pairs, renegotiation will not happen and the two party bargaining
over the inside surplus each with disagreement payoff 0.
Proposition 6: Under an initial exclusive contract, the equilibrium bargaining outcomes
given each pair of investment choices are as follows:
• (Ns,Nb): Trade does not occur. The gross expected payoffs to the seller and
the buyer are (0, 0).
• (NS,IB ): The buyer and the seller trade. The gross expected payoffs are (, ^).
• ( Os , Nb ): The seller trades outside. The payoffs are().
• (Os ,IB): The buyer and the seller trade. The gross expected payoffs are (, ~).
• (Is,Nb ): The buyer and the seller trade. The gross expected payoffs are ^).
• (Is , IB ): The buyer and the seller trade. The gross expected payoffs are
1 + r 1 + r
(- <t>>- <P)-
2 2
• (IOs , Nb ): The buyer and the seller trade. The gross expected payoffs are
(£ t)
2 2
• (IOs , IB ): The buyer and the seller trade. The gross expected payoffs are
1 + r 1 + r
(—*>■
Proof: Except under choice pair (Os ,NB), the inside surplus is no less than the outside
surplus. In these cases, no renegotiation happens, and the two parties will bargain over
the inside surplus. Since both parties' disagreement payoffs are 0, they will share the
inside surplus equally.
Under choice pair (Os, NB), since the outside surplus, y/, is greater than the inside
surplus, 0, the initial contract will be renegotiated. The seller will be allowed to trade
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outside and they bargain over the surplus y/. Again, since both parties' disagreement
payoffs are 0, they each obtain half of the surplus, .
QED.
Based on the ex-post payoffs, we can analyze the ex-ante investment choice problem by



































—(f> — 2(\ + k)C
~<t>
2
We can see that Os and IOs are the dominated choices for the seller, and are dominated
by Is . The idea is that holding the exclusive-rights, the buyer can undo the seller's effort
of accumulating bargaining power when trade takes place inside, and has the rights to
share the seller's surplus when trade takes place outside. Put in another way, the seller's
outside investment will be either useless or be expropriated by the buyer. So as long
as (f> > y/, the seller would rather work on the inside relation.
An exclusive contract effectively transforms the game back into the case where the
seller can not separately invest in his outside option: his choice set is left with Ns and Is .
The following result is immediate.
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2C
Proposition 7: When the inside relationship is sufficiently productive, (p > Max\2C, },
r
exclusive contracts help improve efficiency.
Proof: Exclusivity effectively eliminates Os and IOs from the seller's choice set. In the
game where the seller can only choose Ns and Is , the socially optimal outcome (Is , IB)
2C
is the unique equilibrium outcome if and only if0 > Max{2C, }.
r
On the other hand, absent an exclusive contract, equilibrium (Os,IB), (Os,NB) and
2C
(IOs,IB) can arise when (p > Max{2C, } (see Proposition 2, 3, and 4). Therefore,
r
2C




The intuition is that when accumulating bargaining strength is no longer a feasible
option, the seller will concentrate his investment in the inside relation. The buyer is
protected by the exclusive contract. He will not be threatened by the seller's outside
option, and will be more willing to invest. With exclusivity, the inefficiency induced by
the seller's outside option disappears. When hold-up itself is not a problem
2C
{(p> Max{2C, } ), social optimal is achieved.
r
Proposition 8: When the inside relationship is sufficiently unproductive,
2C
(p < Min{2C, }, exclusive contracts worsen efficiency.
r
2C
Proof. Under exclusivity, when <p < Min{2C, }, the unique equilibrium outcome is
r
(Ns,Nb ). Absent exclusivity, the unique equilibrium outcome is (Os , NB).
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71 Since we have assumed rtp > C , this proposition applies when r > 0.5
72
Appendix B characterizes the equilibrium conditions for choice pair (Is , NB),(IOs, NB), (Ns , IB),
2C
and (Ns, NB). When (p < Min{2C, } , none of these choice pairs can be equilibrium. From
r
Proposition 2, 4, 5, we can see that none of (Os , IB),(10s, IB), and (7s , /B) can be equilibrium
141
The overall social surplus of equilibrium (Ns , NB) is 0, while that of ( Os , NB ) is
y/ — C which is above 0. Therefore, exclusivity worsens efficiency.
Q.E.D
Investing in outside option is bad when the inside relation is sufficiently productive; it
is good when the inside relation is sufficiently unproductive. In the later case, hold-up is
severe and the parties will make no relation specific investments. Investing in outside
option at least creates some positive surplus. An exclusive contract unselectedly wipes
out the effect of outside option. It improves efficiency in the former case, but worsens
efficiency in the later one.
Overall, exclusive contracts matter for investment incentives in our setup. The presence
of exclusivity sufficiently reduces the sensitivity of the seller's payoff to his investment
in the outside option. As long as his investment in the outside option is less productive
than his relationship specific investment, his incentive to invest outside will be wiped out.
Our finding does not contradict the Irrelevance result in Segal and Whinston (2000a)
since the seller's investment in our setup can be purely external. Exclusivity improves
efficiency when the inside relationship is sufficiently productive, but worsens it when the
inside relationship is sufficiently unproductive.
Note that so far we have only studied the equilibrium outcomes of the "no contracts"
sub-game and the "exclusive contract" sub-game. We have not addressed the issue of
how the players might agree to an exclusive contract as part of the game. To address this
issue, suppose that a contracting stage exists before the investment stage. At the
contracting stage, the players bargain over whether to place their relationship under an
exclusive contract. Our prior expectation is that if the players are allowed to make side
payment and are not wealth-constrained, the bargaining outcome at the contracting stage
2C 2C
when (p < Min{2C, } . Therefore, the only possible equilibrium for (p < Min{2C, } is (Os , NB).
r r
Fromproposition 3, the condition for (Os , NB) to be equilibrium places no restriction on (p . The
1
_ .2C
condition for \f/ is Max{—(p ,(p — (1 + [2k] )2C} < If7. When (f) < Min{2C, }, the condition
2 r
for Iff is definitely satisfied. Therefore, the unique equilibrium outcome is ( Os , NB).
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will be efficient, in which case their transaction will be placed in the relatively more
efficient governing mode. However, this issue has to be subject to further investigation.
4.3 Conclusion
In the previous formalizations of the hold-up problem, e.g. Grossman and Hart (1986),
transaction parties are not allowed to separately invest in their outside options, and the
values of their outside options are merely a by-product of the parties' relationship
specific investments. Since a party's outside option provides bargaining strength during
ex-post negotiation, the party has extra incentives to make relationship specific
investments and the existence of outside option partially offsets the underinvestment
problem induced by hold-up.
This thesis shows that this type of formulations underestimates the hold-up problem.
After considering the possibility of separately investing in outside option, we show that
outside option can actually be a source of non-cooperative and inefficient behaviours and
the hold-up problem is potentially more severe than previously observed. Unproductive
investments may be made just to accumulate bargaining power. These inefficient
investments may crowd out relationship specific investments; even worse, the socially
efficient relationship may break because of them. All these inefficient outcomes can
happen where in the previous formalization of hold-up, socially efficient outcome is the
unique equilibrium outcome.
Based on our set-up, we find that exclusive contracts can affect investment incentive.
The presence of exclusivity sufficiently reduces the sensitivity of a party's payoff to his
investment in his outside option. As long as his investment in the outside option is less
productive than his relationship specific investment, his incentive to invest outside will
be wiped out. We also find that exclusivity improves efficiency when relationship
specific investments are sufficiently productive, but worsens it when they are sufficiently
unproductive.
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(-1.+1) PRE Median 0.1228% 0.1079% 0.774098
14 . 54 6 . 01 0.21944
Large 0.2251% 0.1962% 0.911207
15.61 6 . 839 0.181095
POST Median 0.1207% 0.0809% 2.319698
12.99 5.316 0.01018




Proposition 2: ( Os , 1B ) is equilibrium if and only if (f> — y/ pair satisfies
Max{—, 4C}<(/>< 2(1 + 2A:)C, andMax{r(f), 2C} < y/ < <p- 2C .
1-r r
Proof. Equilibrium (Os , IB) exists if and only if given some value ofr, k that satisfy the assumptions,
there exists feasible values of (p,y/ and C that make the following four inequalities satisfied
simultaneously:
2r 2 2
1, 1 _ ^ 1 + r , _
-0 + -V-C (2)
-0 +—1//-C >^-^-(j) + —y/-2{\ + k)C (3)
2




, ^ 2(1 + 2k)C<,i>< (7)
(5) and (8) imply (f) > 4C .
requires (j) — 2C > r(j) . To satisfy (j) — 2C > r(j) , we need (j) >
l//<0-2C (8)





2(1 + 2k)CSummarizing all these inequalities yields Max{ , 4C} < (/) <
1 — r r
andMax{r(p, 2C} <y/ <(/) — 2C .
Q.E.D.
Corollary 1: Equilibrium (Os , IB) exists only ifone of the following sets ofconditions is satisfied:
• < k < 0 and r < —I- k
4 2
k > 0 and r < 1 -
2(1Tk)
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Proof: To satisfy (5), (7) and (8), it requires that in the0 — y/ space, the (p where y/ = 2C and
2(1 + 2*)C
yj — (p — 2C intersect be smaller than , which requires:
r
r <—I- * (9)
2
Given (9), to satisfy (6), it requires, in the <p — yj space, the y/ where y/ = r(p
, 2(1 + 2k)C , ^ , 2(1 + 2*)Cand (p = intersect be smaller than that where y/ = (p — 2C and (p — intersect,
r r
which requires:
r < 1 (10)
2(1 + *)
When * > 0, (10) is binding; when < 0 , (9) is binding.
Since 1 and—I- k are below 1 given the range ofk , equilibrium (Os , IB) exists only if
2(1 + *) 2
. Cinvestment is substitutable. By assumption, <p> — in this case. Therefore, for the equilibrium to exist,
r
the following inequality must be satisfied:
2(1 + 2k)C C , 1—^ +->_;=>£> (H)
r r 4
As a result, for— k < 0, there exists (p, y/ and C that satisfy (1 - 4) if and only ifr <— + k ;




Corollary 2: Assume (p => , equilibrium (Os , IB) exists only ifk> 0 andr <1 . For
r 2(1 + *)
2C 2(1 + 2k)C
such k andr , (Os , IB) is equilibrium if and only if (p — y/ pair satisfies < (p < ,
1 — r r
and r(p < y/ < (p — 2C .
2C
Proof: Continue with the argument in the proof of Corollary 1. When0> , inequality (11) is
r






Apply Corollary 1, the condition for r is r < 1 — -
1
2(1 +it)
Inequality (5) and (8) imply 0 — 2C > 2C. With (6) and (8), we have0 — 2C >l//>r(f>. This
2C
requires 0 — 2C > r0 . When 0 > , r0 > 2C . Therefore, 0 — 2C > 2C is not binding. The
r




When 0 > , If/ > r0 is sufficient for If/ > 2C . The lower bound for If/ is If/ ~>r(f>.
r
2C 20 ~i~ 2A:)C
These yield the range of0 — lf/pair: < 0 < , anr/r(J) <lf/ < (j) — 2C.
\ — r r
Q.E.D
Proposition 3: Equilibrium ( Os ,NB) exists if and only if one of the following sets of conditions is
satisfied:
• k >0, 0 > Max{C, —}, Max{— 0 ,0 — 2C, C}<\f/<(f)
r 2
• — — < k <0, 0 > Max{C, —}, Max{— 0 ,0-2(1 + 2k)C, C}<\f/<(j)
2 r 2
Proof: Equilibrium (Os , ) exists if and only if given some value of r,k , there exists feasible value
of0, \f/ and C that make the following four inequalities satisfied simultaneously:
r lf/-C> 0 (14)
y/-C>^<t>-C (15)
if/ — C > —0 +—2(1 + k^C (16)
0 >^{(/)-y/)-C (17)
(14) is satisfied by assumption. To satisfy (15-17), it requires:
lf/>-(p (18)
\f/ > 0-2(1 + 2k)C (19)
y/ > 0 - 2C (20)
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First assumed > 0. With (20), (19) is non-binding if equilibrium exists. Equilibrium exists if and
C 1
only if <p — If/ pair satisfies 0 > Max{C, —} and Max{—(p ,(f) — 2C, C} <(//<(/>.
r 2
Next assume——<k<0 . With (19), (20) is non-binding. Equilibrium exists if and only
C 1
if (/) — If/ pair satisfies (p > Max{C, —} and Max{—(f) ,(j) — 2(1 + 2k)C, C}<lf/<(/>.
r 2
Q.E.D
Proposition 4: Equilibrium (IOs,IB) exists if and only one of the following sets of condition is
satisfied:
. k> 0, 2(1 + 2^Candy >(2 + 4k)C.
. ~-<k <0, <p>-C andy/>(2 + 4k)C
4 r
1 1 2
• < k < — —C and If/ > C
2 4 r
Proof. Equilibrium (IOs ,IB) exists if and only if given some vaiue ofr,k , there exists feasible value
of (f>,y/ and C that make the following four inequalities satisfied simultaneously:
f 1 + r 1 1
__^ + _^_2(l + k)C>-<l> (21)
!±^ + I^_2(l + *)C>i^ + i^-C (22)
+ + k)C>^</>-C (23)
V
Simplifying the above yields:
(1 + r)(b-W _ ^ 1 . ^r--C >-((/>~y/) (24)
y/ > 4(1 + k)C - r(j> (25)
,.2(1 + 2k)C<P>-4 >— (26)
r
y/>(2 + 4k)C (27)
<p>-C (28)
The right hand side of (25) takes maximum value (2 + 4k)C when (j) = —C . By (27), (25) is non-
r
binding if the equilibrium exists.
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For k > 0, (26-28) are satisfied if and only if (f>> — — and y/ > (2 + 4k)C .
r
1 2
For < k < 0, (26-28) are satisfied if and only if (j)>—C and y/ > (2 + 4k)C .
4 r
1 1 2
For—- < k < , (26-28) are satisfied if and only if (f)>—C and \j/ > C .
2 4 r
Q.E.D
Proposition 5: Equilibrium (Is ,IB) exists only ifk > ——. For A: satisfies this condition, (Is , IB)
2C 1
is equilibrium if and only if C < y/ < (2 + 4k)C and (f) > Max{ ,~yf\ ■
r r
Proof. Equilibrium (Is ,1B) exists if and only if given some value ofr,k , there exists feasible value
of(j),y/ and C that make the following four inequalities satisfied simultaneously:
1 + r 1
(29)
1 + r
, _ . 1 , 1(b-C >-(b + -yr -C (30)
2 2 2
3 1 + r 1 + r 1
> ^~-<p + -^y/~2(1+ k)C (31)
1 + r 1
— (32)
Simplifying the above yields:





y/<(2 + 4k)C (35)
(2 + 4k)C > C => k > (36)
Given (36), to satisfy (33-35), for some y/ G (C, (2 + 4A:)C] , there must exist (p >— C such
r
that r(j)>y/. This is always true, given assumption r > 0 .
Q.E.D
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Equilibrium ( Is , NB ) exists if and only if V < 1 , k > , and (p — lf/ pair
4
C 2C 1
satisfiesMax{2C,—} < (f) < andC <1// — Mifl{—(p, 2C + 4kC} .
r r 2
Proof. Equilibrium (Is ,NB) exists if and only if given some value of f,k , there exists feasible value





I^_C>i^ + I^-2(l + A:)C (39)
1
, . 1 + r , „
-0>—4>~C (4°)
Given assumption^/ > C and (38), (37) is non-binding. Simplifying the above yields:
y/<^<p (41)




Given assumption If/ > C , (42) can be satisfied only if
1
2C + 4kC > C => k >— (44)
4
To satisfy (41-43), in (p —if/ space, the (p where If/ = — ^ and If/ — C intersect must be smaller
2C
than , which requires:
r
2C
2C< => r < 1 (45)
r
Q.E.D
Equilibrium (IOs, NB) exists ifand only ifone ofthefollowing two sets ofconditions is satisfied:
1
k >— , r <-
4 2(1 + 2k)
1 C 2C
, and (p — \f/ pair satisfies Max{4{\ + 2k)C, —} < (p <
r r
d{ 1 + 2k)2C <y/<tp-{2 + 4k)C.






• For 1 < r <
3 + 4k
(3 + 4k)C unu ^ - Y
C 2C
• Forr < 1, Max{{3 + 4k)C,—} < 0 < andC < y/ < 0 - (2 + 4&)C.
r r
some value ofr,k, there exists feasibleProof: Equilibrium (10s , NB) exists if and only if given
value of0, y/ and C that make the following four inequalities satisfied simultaneously:
V.
^0 + ^Xf/-2{\ + k)C >0 (46)
^0 + ^y/-2(\ + k)C >y/-C (47)
-0 + —y/-2(\ + k)C>—0-C (48)
-ys ^(l + r)0-i// c> v' ' 1 /r—— - C (49)
2 2
Simplifying the above yields:With (47), (46) is non-binding if the equilibrium exists
y/ < 0-{2 + Ak)C (50)






For k > —— , to satisfy (50-52), in 0 — y/ space, the 0 where If/ = 0 — (2 + 4k)C
¥
2C
= 2C + 4kC intersect must be no larger than , which requires:
r






^, 1For > k > , to satisfy
4 2
(50-52), in 0 — 1// space, the 0 where If/ = 0 — (2 + 4k)C
2C
y/ — C intersect must be smaller than , which requires:
V
2C 2
3C + 4kC < => r <-^—
r 3 + 4k
(54)
To ensure at least some ofXhc0 — lf/ pair satisfying (50-52) also satisfies 0 > If/, we require:
(55)
2C 1
— >2C + 4kC=>r<—
r l +:
Given (53) or (54), (55) is not binding.
2k
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Equilibrium (Ns An) exists only iff < 1 and one ofthe following sets ofconditions is satisfied:
C 2C
• k>0,Max{2C,~}<</><— andC <y/<2C
r r
1 1 C 2C
• 0 > k > —
, r < —, — <0< andC <y/ < Min{2C, —r0 + 4(1 + k)C}4 2 r r
1 1 2C
• 0>k>—, 1 >r>~, 2C<0<—andC <y/<Min{2C, -r0 + 4(\ + k)C)
4 2 r
. r < —, —<(/)< (3 + 4^)C andC <y/ < —rtp + 4(1 + k)C
4 2 2 r r
1
^ 7 1 1 3 , (3 + 4k)C
• -—> k > ~—
, l>r> — , and r < — + 2k . (j), I// satisfy 2C < (J) <
andC <y/ < —r(f) + 4(1 + &)C
Proof. Equilibrium (Afs,7g) exists if and only if given some value ofr,y,k , there exists feasible
value of (f>, \// and C that make the following four inequalities satisfied simultaneously:




^ >^(Z>+1^-2(1+ A:)C (58)
Simplifying the above yields:
-d)-c>0 (59)
2




y/ <-r0 + 4(1+ k)C (62)
0 > 2C (63)
To satisfy (69), (61) and (63), it requires:
— C >2C => r < 1
r
(64)
For k > 0, (62) is non-binding if the equilibrium exists. (62) is the condition by which Ns is a better
choice for seller than IOs , given buyer chooses IB . Ifyd JS 2C and k> 0, IOs is dominated by Is .
So if the payoff ofNs for seller is above that ofIs , then it is also above that of10s. That is, if (61) is
183
satisfied, (62) is satisfied. So given k 2 0 and r< 1 , if and only if (f),y/ satisfy
C 2C
Max{2C,—} < (j) < and C < y/ < 2C , (56-59) can be satisfied.
r r
n , 1 ^ 1
For 0 > k > —— and r < — , (62) is binding. Given such k and r , (56-59) can be satisfied if and
C 2C
only if0, lj/ satisfy — < ([> < and C < Xf/ < Min{2C, —r(f> + 4(1 + k)C} .
r r
1
^ , 1 ^ 1
For—— 2. k > —— and r < — , (62) is binding. Given such A: andr , (56-59) can be satisfied if and
C (3 + 4k)C
only if0, \f/ satisfy — < (f) < and C <y/ < —r(j) + 4(1 + k)C .
r r
ForO > k > —— andl > r > —, (62) is binding. Given such A: andr , (56-59) can be satisfied if and
2C
only if y/ satisfy 2C < (j) < and C < If/ < Min{2C, —r(f> + 4(1 + k)C}.
r
For 2 k > and 1 > r > — , (62) is binding. Existence of ( Ns , IB ) requires that,4 2 2
in (j> — y/ space, the (f) where y/ = —r(f> + 4(1 + k)C and y/ = C intersect must be larger than 2C ,
which is:
(3 + 4k)C ^ 3>2C => r <—1-2k (65)
r 2
(3 + 4k)C
Given (65), (56-59) can be satisfied if and only if 2C < (f) < and
r
C <yt <-r0 + 4(l + k)C.
Q.E.D
Equilibrium (Ns , NB) can not exist.
Proof. Given buyer chooses NB, rather than choosing Ns which gives him 0, seller can always ensure
a positive payoff by choosing Os .
Q.E.D
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